Problems of Communism

EPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1978

Book Reviews

John W. Dyckman
Jack C. Fisher
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Vincent C. Chrypinski
Daniel Tretiak

India's CPI-M
Bhabani Sen Gupta

Conflict in Indochina
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Opposition in Poland
Adam Bromke

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Cover: Voters cluster around an information booth of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI-M, on June 14, 1977, state legislature election day in Calcutta. Photo by Santosh Basak-Gamma/Liaison.

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Indian Politics and the Communist Party (Marxist)

By Bhabani Sen Gupta

In the new political conditions that have prevailed in India since the electoral defeat of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in March 1977, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI-M, has moved into a position of some strategic importance, at both the national and state levels. To be sure, the party still represents only one strand of Indian communism. Its competitors include the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India, or CPI—from which the CPI-M split in 1964—and various Maoist groups that emerged in the 1970's from the splintering of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI-ML—originally formed by dissidents from the CPI-M in 1969.[1] Moreover, the CPI-M is, by its own description, a "weak and scattered" party.[2] Its influence is confined to certain regions (several states in the east and the state of Kerala in the west), and it draws much of its support from the rural and urban poor in these regions.

At the same time, the CPI-M is a cohesive party, with disciplined and dedicated cadres and a support base that has proved enduring over at least a decade. In addition, it has established a working relationship with the dominant Janata (People's) party on the national scene in defense of democracy, and it has embarked on a novel "govern and mobilize" strategy in West Bengal that may hold implications for Indian politics generally.

This article will look at the role of the CPI-M in India today. To place that role in context, it will assess the CPI-M against the backdrop of recent political events in India and of the party's own history.

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The Political Context

On June 26, 1975, Prime Minister Gandhi declared an internal emergency; subsequently, with the approval of a captive parliament, she installed an authoritarian regime. Her actions were not merely reactions to the populist movement mounted by right-wing opposition parties during 1974-75 under the leadership of the Gandhian leader, Jayaprakesh Narayan. According to her perception, she was responding to a crisis of the Indian constitutional system.[3] Consequently, she imposed an iron order on a seething and volatile republic by imprisoning thousands of political opponents and by suppress-

1. For earlier discussion, see the author's "India's Rival Communist Models," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1973, pp. 1-15.

2. Communist Party of India (Marxist), *Political Resolution,* New Delhi, 1978. This document stems from the party's 10th Congress, held in April 1978.

3. This is convincingly shown in David Selbourne, *An Eye to India,* London, Penguin, 1977. Another outstanding study of the latter part of Mrs. Gandhi's rule is Henry Hart, Ed., *Indira Gandhi's India: A Political System Reappraised,* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1976. Among Indian publications, see Kuldip Nayar, *The Judgment,* New Delhi, Vikas, 1977; and Prashant Bhushan, *The Case That Shook India,* New Delhi, Vikas, 1978. For further studies of Indian communism, see the present author's *Communism in Indian Politics,* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1972; Mohan Ram, *Maoism in India,* New Delhi, Vikas, 1971; and Sankar Ghosh, *The Naxalite Movement,* Calcutta, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhaya, 1974.

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

New Delhi citizens watch a tally board for the June 14, 1977, elections to a number of India's state legislative assemblies. Early reports show CPI-M success in West Bengal, Tamil Nadu (T. Nadu on the board), and Punjab.

—Pana-India/Keystone.

ing the democratic freedoms and civil liberties of the Indian people.

In January 1977, confident that voters would give her regime their overwhelming approval, Mrs. Gandhi called for elections to the Lok Sabha (parliament). At the same time, she temporarily relaxed the rigors of the Emergency. Released from prison, leaders of four opposition parties hurriedly formed an electoral coalition—the Janata party. Soon thereafter, in February, Janata was joined by a fifth group, a breakaway Congress party faction led by Mrs. Gandhi's Minister of Defense, Jagjiwan Ram, the most prominent leader of India's 100 million untouchables.

The elections, which took place in March, dealt Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress party a crushing blow. The Congress party was defeated in all of northern India: it failed to get a single seat in the states of Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and the Union Territory of Delhi; and it was able to capture just one seat each in the states of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. Only in the south and in Maharashtra (its traditional stronghold on the west coast) did it retain its majority. In all, the Congress party won just 151 of the 542 seats in the Lok Sabha. The Janata party (with its ally in Punjab, the Akali Dal), on the other hand, won 305 seats.[4] Thus, the Congress party, after nearly 30 years of uninterrupted rule in India, lost power. Mrs. Gandhi herself, defeated even in her home district, surrendered the prime minister's office to Morarji R. Desai, head of the Janata party.

In subsequent elections to the legislatures of India's 22 states, the Congress party suffered an even worse disaster. In June 1977 elections for all but five state legislatures, Janata dislodged the Congress party in the north, and the Left Front, led by the CPI-M, defeated it in West Bengal. A deep

4. The Congress party garnered 41 of 42 seats in Andhra Pradesh, 26 of 28 in Karnataka, 14 of 39 in Tamil Nadu, 11 of 20 in Kerala, and 20 of 48 in Maharashtra. Of the seats that neither the Congress or Janata and its Akali Dal ally captured, AIDMK, a caste-oriented local Tamil Nadu party, won 19; the CPI, 7; and other parties and independents, 34. See S. L. Shakdher, Ed., *The Sixth General Election to the Lok Sabha*, New Delhi, Oxford and IBH Publishing Co., 1977, p. 19 and the tables.

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crisis overtook the Congress party, from which Mrs. Gandhi broke away with her majority faction on January 1, 1978 (her new party was appropriately called "Indira Congress," or "Congress-I"). In later elections in the remaining five states, Mrs. Gandhi's faction won in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka (both in the south), the CPI-M triumphed in Tripura,[5] and no party captured a majority in Assam and Maharashtra. In Assam, Janata formed a minority government with the support of the CPI-M and some independent legislators. In Maharashtra, the two feuding Congress party factions hurriedly joined together to install a shaky coalition government. However, that coalition collapsed in July 1978, when a faction of the official Congress party broke away (together with some legislators belonging to Mrs. Gandhi's group) and joined hands with Janata, the CPI-M, and three small local factions to contrive a People's Progressive Front coalition government. This development created yet another crisis in the official Congress party.

Thus, in the course of three rounds of elections held from March 1977 to early 1978, profound changes were wrought in Indian politics. The old Congress government fell, giving way to Janata, a newly formed coalition of right-wing parties. Mrs. Gandhi lost her unchallenged position in the Congress party, and new leaders appeared. And in many of the states, the traditional pattern of politics was overturned.

Two broad themes now dominate Indian politics. First, the leading issue in Indian politics remains Mrs. Gandhi herself. In general, democratic elements oppose her return to power, and authoritarian elements tend to favor it. This broad polarization is unstable, to be sure, and often feeble. But it unmistakably cuts across many existing party and political boundaries. The official Congress party, for example, is formally opposed to Mrs. Gandhi's authoritarianism, but some of its leaders have been negotiating with her for the reunion of the two Congress party factions. While the CPI condemns Mrs. Gandhi, it maintains electoral links with her faction. Even among the constituent groups of the Janata party, there are some who take a more benign view of the former prime minister than others do.

Second, India's bourgeois politics have at the same time shown a marked tendency toward fragmentation. As already noted, two factions have broken away from the official Congress party since the beginning of 1977—Ram's group before the parliamentary elections of March 1977 and the Indira Congress after the first round of state elections. The Janata party has likewise not been immune to internal unrest, even though the five constituent groups claimed, when forming the new central government, that they had abandoned their individual identities and that Janata was now a single, unified political party. So far, however, despite intracoalitional conflict in June-July 1978 and the exit of two cabinet members,[6] the Janata has survived, although the stability of the government and even that of the party itself have at times been in serious doubt.

The CPI-M in Recent Indian Politics

The ups and downs of the CPI-M's fortunes in the last decade have been no less remarkable than those of India's bourgeois politics in the last few years. In the late 1960's, after the CPI-M had made modest gains in certain states, notably in Kerala and West Bengal, Mrs. Gandhi began a systematic campaign to suppress it. As a result, for more than half a decade from the early 1970's to 1977, the CPI-M lived virtually in a political wilderness, deprived of power and leading a semiclandestine existence. The party's reemergence in 1977-78, then, is all the more noteworthy—testimony to its enduring strength. This persisting appeal suggests that one cannot understand the party's current policies and programs without reference to its history during the last decade.

In 1967, the Congress party unexpectedly lost in elections to nine state legislatures, including those of Kerala and West Bengal. In both states, the two warring Communist factions—the CPI and the CPI-

5. According to an editorial in *Indian Express* (Delhi), Feb. 10, 1978, "the country was least prepared for the Marxist victory" in Tripura. Tripura is a tiny Indian state bordering on the hill tracts of Bangladesh. It has an area of 10,360 sq. km. and a population of 1,556,822 (1971 census). Thirty percent of the population is tribal; most of the rest, Bengali. It is 200 miles by air from Calcutta to Tripura and 1,500 by rail (around Bangladesh), but the little state is a cultural satellite of Bengal. The Communists had a strong base among the tribals in the 1950's; now the CPI-M support base covers the Bengali segment as well as a strong segment of the tribal population.

6. The cabinet ministers, who were for all practical purposes dismissed by the Prime Minister, were Charan Singh (Home) and Raj Narain (Health and Family Welfare), both leaders of the Bharatya Lok Dal (Indian People's Party), a coalition of several disparate groups of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, and Maharashtra. Put together in 1974 by Singh, the BLD is the second strongest constituent of Janata, after Jan Sangh (People's Association). Four junior ministers belonging to the group also resigned. The BLD and its leaders are nonetheless still in the Janata party, and efforts are being made to reconcile the differences between Desai and Charan Singh.

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E.M.S. Namboodiripad, General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), pictured in the late 1960's, when, for the second time, he was serving as Chief Minister of Kerala.

—Wide World.

M—suddenly joined together and, along with several non-Communist groups, installed united front regimes. Both regimes, especially the one in West Bengal, immediately came into conflict with the central government. Mrs. Gandhi's tactic was to exploit the differences between the two Communist parties and thus to wean the CPI away from its coalition with the CPI-M. In so doing, it should be noted, she had Soviet help readily available. During the 1969-72 period, then, the CPI-M came under attack not only by the central Congress government and the Congress party but also by the CPI (as well as the newly formed Maoist party).

In Kerala, Mrs. Gandhi ousted the CPI-M from power rather easily. After new elections in 1970, a united front government headed by the CPI and embracing the Congress party and other non-Communist parties but not the CPI-M, took office.[7] Such a coalition government lasted until 1976, when it gave way to a similar coalition government in which the Congress party was the leading element. In West Bengal, Mrs. Gandhi found it more difficult to displace the CPI-M. Twice, by presidential decree, she dismissed the united front government. But the CPI-M fought back doggedly in elections, demonstrating its increasing influence among the rural and urban poor. In the elections of February 1969, for example, it captured 80 of the 280 seats in the West Bengal legislature, while the Congress party won only 55. The CPI-M's share of the valid votes, however, was much smaller than that of the Congress party—19.97 percent as against 41.32 percent. In the elections of March 1971, the CPI-M received 31.98 percent of the valid votes and 111 seats; the Congress party got only 28.20 percent and 103 seats. But even though the CPI-M's allies obtained an additional 12 seats, the party did not command an absolute majority in the legislature; hence, it was not permitted to form the government. Finally, in the elections of 1972 (which the CPI-M claimed were rigged), the Congress party recaptured West Bengal, reducing the CPI-M to insignificance in legislative terms.[8] By 1972, then, Mrs. Gandhi had removed the CPI-M from the seats of power in both Kerala and West Bengal.

Subjected to systematic oppression, the CPI-M went into hibernation.[9] Furthermore, many of its cadres came seriously to doubt that the party could ever capture power through elections, even at the local level.[10] As early as 1972, at its Ninth Congress (at Madurai, in Tamil Nadu), the CPI-M warned that Mrs. Gandhi was moving toward a one-party dictatorship. "The existence of all democratic parties is being threatened," it declared. "Those who swear by the constitution, who stand by the parliamentary path as well as others realise that constitutional liberties, including the right to vote, are

7. In the midterm election of September 1970, the CPI-M and its allies won 43 seats in a house of 133; the CPI-Congress combination won 68. Although the CPI-M's votes rose from 1.5 million in 1967 to 1.7 million in 1970, its share of the vote dropped about 1 percent in 1970, to 22.55 percent of the valid votes. However, the Congress faction led by Mrs. Gandhi suffered a much greater erosion of position. Its votes fell from 2.2 million in 1967 to 1.6 million in 1970, and its share of the valid votes decreased from 25.43 percent in 1967 to 18.7 percent in 1970.

8. The Congress party won 216 seats, and its ally, the CPI, 35. In contrast, the CPI-M garnered a mere 14 seats, and its allies, 5. With respect to share of the vote, however, the Congress received 31.98 percent of the total ballots, while the CPI-M got 27.61 percent—merely 5 percent less than in 1971. The CPI-M declared that there had been "wholesale rigging of an entire election" and boycotted the legislature.

9. *See the interview with Promode Dasgupta, party leader of the* CPI-M in West Bengal, in *The Statesman* (Calcutta), Nov. 24, 1976. He said that in 1976 at least 3,000 party members in West Bengal had either left the party or had been expelled (membership in April had been 28,700). Twenty-four out of 26 local committees in the greater Calcutta area, he went on, had been dismantled, and much of the party organization had gone underground.

10. *The Statesman,* Dec. 11, 1975.

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no longer secure under Congress rule."[11]

The CPI-M's tactical response to government suppression varied. In 1974-75, because of its prejudices against most of the right-wing opposition parties, it gave only limited support to the populist anti-Indira Gandhi movement. (At its 10th Congress in April 1978 it admitted this had been a mistake.) During the Emergency of 1975-76, however, it took a greater part in the underground struggle against authoritarian rule, thus incurring the arrest of more than a thousand of its cadres.[12] In contrast, the CPI (like Moscow) stood firmly by Mrs. Gandhi; it dubbed the 1974-75 struggle an "offensive of right reaction" and (like the USSR) gave its wholehearted support to the government during the first year of the Emergency.[13]

The parliamentary and state elections of 1977-78 completely reversed the political fortunes of the two Communist parties. Allied with the Congress party, the CPI went down to defeat too, its political line in a shambles. At its 11th Congress in April 1978, the CPI admitted that its support for the Emergency had been a major political error, but it nonetheless designated Janata as its primary enemy and maintained its electoral connections with both Congress factions. At the same time, it sought unity with the CPI-M with a view to building up a national alternative of "left and democratic forces."[14] (On the extreme left, the Maoists were split. One group, which called itself the CPI-ML, returned to the parliamentary path; several factions moved closer to the CPI-M; and the rest strove without success to form a Maoist party which did not slavishly imitate the Maoist revolutionary model.[15])

CPI-M figure and West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu pictured in a police van upon his arrest after dismissal of his united front government in 1970.

—Asoke Bose.

11. CPI-M, *Political Resolution,* Calcutta, April 1972.

12. CPI-M, *Political Resolution,* 1978, paragraphs 70, 74, and 119. During the Emergency, one of the controversies that tore at the CPI-M had to do with the degree to which it should participate in the anti-Emergency struggle. The political resolution adopted at the 10th Congress mentions Kerala, but not West Bengal, in describing the CPI-M's efforts against the Emergency. My own information is that some of the district-level cadres in West Bengal pressed the leadership for a more active role in the democratic struggle than the latter was ready to approve. Part of the CPI-M leadership seemed to echo the CPI perception of the Congress party. See, for example, Harikishen Singh's article in *People's Democracy* (Calcutta), Nov. 12, 1976; and the party's appeal to "Left-oriented Elements in the Congress," ibid., Nov. 7, 1976. These articles suggested that the CPI-M, like the CPI, was trying to differentiate between "progressive" and "reactionary" Congress party members. Jyoti Basu confessed that there was "some confusion" in the party on this issue. *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), Nov. 25, 1976.

13. For the CPI role during the Emergency, see this author's chapter "Communism Further Divided," in Hart, op. cit. In the second year of the Emergency, the CPI protested the rise of Sanjay Gandhi, son of Indira Gandhi, and incurred the grave displeasure of both. Sanjay Gandhi hit back by resurrecting the united CPI's "anti-nationalist" role during World War II. This acrimony, however, did not stand in the way of the CPI's electoral alliance with the Congress party.

14. Both the CPI and CPI-M have committed themselves to this short-term strategic objective, yet neither party has offered a precise definition of the national alternative of "left and democratic" forces. The difficulty here involves more than semantic problems. For the CPI, such an alternative tends to cover Communists of all hues, some Socialists, local left groups, the Official Congress, and sections in the Indira Gandhi Congress—but neither Janata as a party nor any of its constituents. The CPI-M's concept of "left and democratic forces" seems to include the CPI, those "Naxals" (i.e., Maoist cadres) who have been cooperating with the CPI-M, "progressive" elements in Janata (probably sections of the Congress faction), and local leftist groups—but by no means Indira Congress. At the same time, because the left forces in India are relatively small and scattered, neither Communist group's concept of a national alternative of "left and democratic forces" has any precision whatsoever. In reality, each now uses the phrase to refer vaguely to some kind of relationship with the parties of the bourgeoisie. What a viable "left and democratic" alternative might be can emerge only in the crucible of struggle.

15. The vast majority of the "Naxals" have either resumed more normal avocations or are frustrated. The group that has returned to the parliamentary line is led by Satyanarayan Singh, of Bihar; it won one seat in the West Bengal legislature in the June elections and one in Assam in the February 1978 elections. Groups led by Jangal Santhal and Ashim Chatterji have gravitated toward the CPI-M. The Left Front

(continued on page 6)

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Young members of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI-M, staff a voter information booth in Uttarpara (near Calcutta) during the June 1977 campaign for elections to the West Bengal state assembly, then still under the control of a coalition headed by the Congress party. Election posters at the rear call for a general mobilization to bring about release of political prisoners.

—Santosh Basak-Gamma/Liaison.

The CPI-M in contrast, fought the elections of 1977-78 in alliance with the Janata (except in West Bengal, where the local unit of Janata refused to link up with the CPI-M for state elections despite the central leadership's pleadings[16]). At the national level, the CPI-M's gains were not impressive. In the election of March 1977, it returned only 22 of its candidates to the Lok Sabha. Of these, 17 came from West Bengal; none, from Kerala. It partly compensated for its setback in Kerala by winning three seats in the hitherto impregnable Congress citadel of Maharashtra. Subsequently, in the Lok Sabha itself, the CPI-M has continued the alliance with Janata.

At the state level, the CPI-M made spectacular gains in West Bengal, Tripura, and Assam. In West Bengal, it won an absolute majority, with 177 seats in a house of 293; its Left Front partners cornered 53 more seats. Janata obtained only 29 seats, while the Congress party got 20.[17] In Tripura, the CPI-M conceded only four of the 60 seats in the legislature to a local tribal group and none to the Janata, the Congress, or the CPI. In Assam, where it previously had no legislative presence whatsoever, the CPI-M fielded 26 candidates, 11 of whom won and 9 of whom very nearly won. With an independent legislator joining it after the election, the CPI-M is the

government in West Bengal has facilitated a reconciliation by releasing all "Naxalite" prisoners except those against whom charges have been made by other state governments and have not so far been withdrawn. Recently, one Maoist group has been showing some activity reminiscent of the violent tactics of 1969-71.

16. The Janata party in West Bengal was led, until June 1978, by P. C. Sen, the man whom the united front had dislodged as chief minister in 1967. He rejected the CPI-M's offer of an electoral alliance with Janata in the state elections even though the central leadership of Janata preferred such a pact. However, the Bengal Janata is split with respect to the CPI-M and the Left Front regime. A strong minority faction led by Biman Mitra is inclined to cooperate with the Marxist-led government.

17. It should be noted, however, that only 54 percent of the electorate cast valid votes. Of these, the Left Front got 35.9 percent; the Congress 22.5 percent; Janata, 20.6 percent; and the CPI, 2.5 percent. As a consequence of its showing, the CPI-M won more than 75 percent of the seats in 10 of the 16 districts in West Bengal. In 1971, it had won more than 50 percent of the seats in only five districts.

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second largest group, after Janata, in the Assam assembly.[18] The CPI-M supports the Janata minority government, which is headed by a socialist; however, the party has refused to join in a coalition in which it cannot play a catalytic role.

Apart from these three states, the CPI-M made few gains. It won 12 seats in Tamil Nadu, 9 in Maharashtra, and 8 each in Punjab and Andhra Pradesh. But those totals were not insignificant considering the general instability of state politics in India.

As soon as the three rounds of polls were completed in February 1978, the CPI-M began preparations for its 10th Congress. At the numerous party conferences held all over the country, from the local-committee level to the state level, official stocktaking revealed that the party's total membership in 1978 stood at 100,000 or a mere 25,000 more than it had been in 1967. Kerala, as before, led with some 40,000 members. In West Bengal, however, membership had nearly doubled since 1967—standing at about 30,000 in early 1978.[19] Though the bulk of the membership was still in Kerala and West Bengal, significant increases had been recorded in Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, and Assam. Moreover, the party had been able to set up district-level committees in all but two or three states.

At the party congress itself, held in April in Jullundhur, Punjab, 188 of the 572 delegates were from district committees; 21 more, from grass-roots party units. As for the class character of the delegates, most came from the urban middle class and middle and rich peasantry. Only 83 were poor peasants or landless agricultural laborers. In terms of the delegates' ages, the CPI-M is not young: only 33 delegates were 33 years old or less. As many delegates had university degrees as not, and only 25 percent of the delegates had joined the party after it split off from the CPI in 1964.

All in all, it was hardly the picture of a growing and expanding party. It is little wonder that the Politburo and Central Committee elected at the congress consisted almost entirely of older Communists. However, the congress resolved to double the national membership in two years, and the organizational report adopted by the West Bengal party conference declared that the "time had come to increase the [state party's] membership a hundred fold."[20]

The 10th CPI-M Congress approved a political resolution stressing the defense of parliamentary democracy and democratic rights and liberties.[21] According to the resolution, the CPI-M was the only group that had, as far back as 1972, anticipated the authoritarian regime of Mrs. Gandhi, but even

Nripen Chakraborty, Chief Minister of the state government of Tripura, run by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) since the February 1978 elections.

—Asoke Bose.

18. The only in-depth analysis of the CPI-M and Left Front electoral base in Assam to have appeared so far in India can be found in Seema Guha, "The Left Base in Assam," *Perspective* (Calcutta), July 1978. In 1967, when the CPI-M made its debut in Assam, it fielded 17 candidates, none of whom won, and its share of the valid votes cast was 3 percent. The party put up 20 candidates in 1972, and again all lost.

In March 1978, the CPI-M boasted 1,899 members in Assam, and it had eight district committees and three local committees attached to the state committee. One hundred thirty-three delegates and 25 observers attended the 10th conference of the state committee in March. Of the delegates, 23 were poor peasants; 16, middle peasants; 8, workers; 34, middle-class employees; and 68, from the lower middle class. Forty-seven delegates came from the peasant front; 29, from the trade unions. Forty-two of the delegates were younger than 30. As many as 106 of the delegates had joined the party after 1964. See *People's Democracy*, June 11, 1978.

19. The CPI-M probably has about 50,000 candidate members.

20. Communist Party of India (Marxist), *Political-Organisational Report of the West Bengal State Committee* (in Bengali, for delegates only), Calcutta, February 1978, p. 46.

21. CPI-M, *Political Resolution*, New Delhi, May 1978.

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the CPI-M had not foreseen that a large part of the "bourgeois-landlord ruling class" would itself spearhead the struggle for democracy, and therefore had not initially reacted correctly to this development. India was now witnessing, the resolution went on, not merely a crisis of the "bourgeois-landlord" political system but also the "sharpest conflict ever" within the ruling class. Such circumstances made it possible to establish "broad and wide resistance to the emergency and dictatorial rule." The democratic "bourgeois-landlord" parties—i.e., the Janata coalition—continued to play an important role in the struggle for democracy and against dictatorship, a struggle that would bring "many vacillations and changeovers from one camp to another." The Indira Congress, the resolution stated, represented the antidemocratic, dictatorial forces and tendencies. Though it had been mauled in the elections, it was still strong in most parts of the country and was becoming stronger as a result of Janata's failure to develop as a cohesive body and to deepen the social content of democracy:

The authoritarian dictatorship has been removed with the electoral defeat of the Congress and the restoration of civil liberties and democratic rights. But the anti-emergency struggle and the electoral victory have not led to a shift in the balance of forces in favour of the working class, that is, the masses have not moved away from the influence of bourgeois parties and started rallying round an alternative leadership.

According to the resolution, then, the prevailing correlation of forces in India required the CPI-M to nourish its alliance with Janata and at the same time to move slowly toward a left and democratic national alternative.

Toward the end of July 1978, the CPI-M Politburo, meeting in Calcutta, reinforced this position. It declared categorically that there was at present no alternative to Janata rule if the authoritarian forces were to be kept at bay.[22]

Party Influence and Outlook

In the confusing and fragmented world of Indian politics of the late 1970's, the CPI-M plays a small but significant role. At the national level, its politi-

22. *The Statesman*, July 24, 1978.

The July 1978 meeting in Calcutta of the Politburo of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). On the left, holding a teacup, is party General Secretary E.M.S. Namboodiripad, and to his left is West Bengal Chief Minister and CPI-M Politburo member Jyoti Basu.

—Asoke Bose.

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cal alliance with Janata for the restoration of democracy in India has brought it into the mainstream of Indian politics. The Janata government can certainly rule without the support of the CPI-M's tiny faction in the Lok Sabha. But it doubtlessly values the Marxist connection because of the CPI-M's solid, if regional, support base among the urban and rural poor—especially since Mrs. Gandhi's personal popularity with the masses in most parts of India appears to be steadily increasing.[23] For its part, the CPI-M has used the alliance to wield influence far in excess of its own organizational or parliamentary strength.

At the state level, the CPI-M's influence is confined, as already noted, to certain regions. In the east, it governs two states—West Bengal and Tripura. It has also demonstrated surprising strength in adjoining Assam, where the minority Janata regime needs its support. Indeed, there has been some journalistic speculation that the Indian east may go "red" in the next decade. On the west coast, in distant Kerala, the CPI-M is the largest political force, and only the combined efforts of its opponents, including the rival CPI, keep it out of power. In large, prosperous, and politically crucial Maharashtra, the newly formed Progressive Democratic Front coalition (Janata and a breakaway Congress faction are the principal parties) requires the CPI-M's support.[24] Apart from West Bengal, Tripura, Kerala, and Assam, however, the CPI-M has a noticeable presence only in three state legislatures, those of Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and Punjab. In the sprawling Hindu-speaking Indian heartland, its organization is still skeletal, and its legislative presence, negligible.[25] But in all, the CPI-M governs 52 million people, about 8 percent of the total population of India. At the local level, therefore, it plays the role of a ruling party—much as the Italian Communist Party has done in Italy.

Amid fragmented politics and a dispersal of

Cadres of the CPI-M explain the programs of their party's West Bengal government to local citizens.

—Asoke Bose.

power, the CPI-M has by no means abandoned its strategic goal of creating a "left and democratic" national alternative. But it has had to move cautiously. It has chosen discretion over adventure and has preferred to nurse its alliance with Janata rather than to leap forward boldly. Hence, for the short term, it has adopted what may be called a "govern

23. Janata has won most of the by-elections held to the Lok Sabha and the state legislatures in 1977-78 but lost a crucial contest in Uttar Pradesh to the candidate of the Indira Congress. A public opinion poll printed in the Delhi journal *India Today*, June 16, 1978, claimed that 56 percent of those sampled in the metropolitan areas of Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras wanted Mrs. Gandhi to return to power, and 37 percent preferred Janata rule.

24. The Congress party's loss of power in Maharashtra is of considerable political significance. Maharashtra was the birthplace of the Congress party, and it had remained politically loyal to the Congress since India's independence. Uttar Pradesh in the north and Maharashtra in the west were the foundation of Congress power until the late 1960's when Uttar Pradesh temporarily slipped out of the Congress's grasp. In Maharashtra, the breakaway group that toppled the government in July 1978 belonged to the Official Congress party.

25. We have already noted the numbers of seats that the CPI-M captured in West Bengal, Tripura, Assam, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Punjab, and Andhra Pradesh. In addition, the party had 1 successful candidate in Rajasthan, 1 in Uttar Pradesh, 1 in Orissa, 4 in Bihar, and 17 in Kerala. The CPI, in contrast, won 23 seats in Kerala; 21 in Bihar; 9 in Uttar Pradesh; 7 in Punjab; 5 each in Assam, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu; 2 in West Bengal; and 1 each in Pondicherry and Maharashtra. The CPI claimed "notable success" in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu. See *New Age* (Delhi), July 17, 1977.

Historically, political ideas and movements in India have been generated in the coastal states but have had to be "nationalized" in the Hindi-speaking area to become the mainstream. This is how the Congress movement and party became predominant. Janata was able to capture power because it swept the whole of the Hindi-speaking north. The weakness of the Communists, particularly the CPI-M, in the entire Hindi region is a great roadblock to the spatial expansion of the movement. This weakness keeps the CPI-M remote from the threshold of power at the national level.

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and mobilize" tactical line in order to achieve its twin goals of consolidating and expanding its organization and influence.

This "govern and mobilize" line, which the CPI-M is pursuing in West Bengal and Tripura, deserves special mention in several respects. First, there is simply the proposition that "we can govern better." The CPI-M wishes to project the image of an honest and capable ruler, one that will govern according to the accepted norms of parliamentary democracy. In the states in which it holds power, therefore, the CPI-M's program is modest: moderate reform and governmental efficiency and integrity.

Second, the notion that "we can govern better" rests ultimately on an optimistic assessment of current Indian politics. The CPI-M believes that the government now in power in Delhi, unlike the previous Congress party regimes, will allow the CPI-M to govern. With Janata, that is, the CPI-M can cooperate *and* compete at the same time.[26] The CPI-M thus considers its current political position safer and more durable than its position a decade ago. For example, after proclaiming that "the durability of the left front government is a particularly important requisite of the advance of the left and democratic forces all over India," the political-organizational report adopted at the West Bengal CPI-M conference in January-February 1978 added that the "climate is now favorable" for both "defending and stabilising" the Left Front regime in that state and elsewhere.[27]

Third, "govern and mobilize" is not to be solely bourgeois parliamentarism. Rather, it has an extra-parliamentary, "Leninist" content—namely, mobilization. In order to govern better, especially to push the government's program through a sometimes reluctant bureaucracy, the party must mobilize not only party support but also, through party organizations, mass support at the grass-roots level—both within and outside West Bengal and Tripura.[28]

Finally, it is obvious that in the CPI-M's "govern and mobilize" model, the party and government must work in close coordination. Specifically, it is essential that the government function strictly under the guidance of the party. In West Bengal, for example, policy and major program decisions are made first at the topmost party level, then processed in the Left Front Coordinating Committee (on which all allied parties are represented), and subsequently transmitted to the government as "recommendations." Thus, the gradualist, incremental style of government goes hand in hand with bold, at times breathtaking, ventures in political mobilization and base consolidation.

Since a "left and democratic" national alternative is also the immediate strategic objective of the rival CPI and since several "fraternal parties," including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) have been coaxing the two rival Communist parties to move closer together, the reunion of Communist minds and muscles has become a polemical issue between the two groups. On April 13, 1978, the top leaders of both parties met in New Delhi for the first time since the 1964 split and agreed on a program of limited unity in action on specific issues on the trade union, youth, and *kisan* (peasant) fronts. In May, the CPI National Council urged the CPI-M to advance this limited accord to cover united *political* action and even reunion, but the CPI-M leaders summarily rejected the overture as an "ultra-leftist" gimmick. They pointed out that basic strategic and tactical differences between the two parties remain unresolved, and charged that the CPI was trying to deceive the growing number of dissidents in the CPI and to cover up the CPI leadership's resistance to a radical modification of its discredited political line.

The most fundamental difference between the two groups related to their perceptions of the bourgeois parties. In the CPI's eyes, Janata was *the* party of right reaction in league with the imperialist powers, and the CPI wanted the CPI-M to break away from Janata. The CPI-M, on the other hand, saw its alliance with Janata as essential to the struggle for democracy and against dictatorship. Moreover, the CPI-M leaders argued that the emergence of a left and democratic alternative was inextricably linked with this struggle. They insisted, therefore, that the CPI terminate its ties with the two Congress factions before any concrete steps

26. In 1968-69, a confrontation arose between the united front regimes and the Gandhi government at the Center. The CPI-M accused the Center of treating the state governments as "colonies" and posited that its confrontation with the Center was part of the class struggle going on in India. See Sen Gupta, *Communism in Indian Politics*, Chaps. 6-7.

27. CPI-M, *Political-Organisational Report . . .*, pp. 53-54. The political resolution of the CPI-M 10th Congress said: "In this vital struggle [for a left and democratic alternative] the left front ministries headed by our party in West Bengal and Tripura have tried to play an important role. The spectacular victory of the left alliance headed by us in West Bengal defeating both the Congress and the Janata has made it the object of admiration of wide sections of masses, who are watching every step taken by the ministry and are in full support of its measures." CPI-M, *Political Resolution*, pp. 42-43.

28. "Once Volatile Indian State Peaceful under Red Rule," *The New York Times*, Jan. 26, 1978.

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could be taken toward political unity or reunion.[29]

Relations with the Soviet Union is another issue that divides the two Communist parties. The CPI charges that the CPI-M is "anti-Soviet," while the CPI-M, of course, denies the charge.[30] CPI-M leaders maintain that they still admire the Soviet Union, but that they have long since ceased to worship it. At its Ninth Congress in 1972, the CPI-M adopted a stance of equidistance from the CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At the 10th Congress and thereafter, the CPI-M seems to have defined equidistance as its right to cultivate the friendship of the two giant Communist party-states on its own terms and to criticize the foreign and domestic policies of both. The political resolution adopted at the 10th Congress to a large extent mirrored the CPSU's world view, but the delegates persuaded the party leadership to delete from the draft resolution a paragraph that appeared to many to tilt toward Moscow. (Older CPI-M members are more favorably inclined toward the Soviet Union than are younger members.) The final resolution treated the USSR and the People's Republic of China on a par and expressed the desire that India build friendly relations with *all* socialist countries.

With regard to Peking, the CPI-M rejects the Chinese world view and is very critical of the PRC's



Members of a goodwill delegation from the People's Republic of China at a Calcutta public reception given in its honor in May 1978 by the Left Front government of West Bengal. Seated to the immediate right of the standing Chinese visitor is West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu; to the left, one removed, is Promode Dasgupta, leader of the CPI-M in West Bengal.

—Asoke Bose.

activities in Vietnam and Africa; however, it not only desires the restoration of friendly relations between India and China but also wishes to make a contribution to that end. In May 1978, for example, the Left Front government in West Bengal gave an official public reception in Calcutta to a visiting goodwill delegation from the PRC; in July and August, it organized a festival of Chinese films. At the same time, the CPI-M Politburo, meeting in Calcutta in July, blamed China for the present crisis between Peking and Hanoi.

The CPI-M's independence of the two giant Communist powers has gone a long way to embellish its nationalist image—without, so far, drawing any invective from Moscow or Peking.[31] Both Moscow and Peking are outwardly cool to the CPI-M, but both have established channels of communication with its leaders and are keeping a close watch on its political style and fortunes.[32] What distinguishes the CPI-M from most, if not all, other Communist groups in the Third World is that although it strongly favors expanding friendship between the developing countries and the two Communist powers, it just as strongly opposes Moscow's or Peking's involvement in their domestic affairs, especially links

29. Coaxing by "friends and well-wishers" of the Indian Communist movement was admitted by M. Basavapunniah in a polemical article in *People's Democracy*, Oct. 23, 1977. It had already transpired that some Soviet "academics" had met with CPI-M leaders. Ibid., Aug. 7, 1977. For an analysis of the polemics and of the two parties' respective stands on unity, see the present author's "The Great Non-dialogue between the CPI-M and CPI," *Perspective*, December 1977, and his "Left Unity Is Still a Distant and (Somewhat Faded) Dream," ibid., August 1978.

30. On the PCI charge, see Mohit Sen's polemical article in *New Age*, Aug. 28, 1977. This charge has been repeated several times since then. On behalf of the CPI-M, Basavapunniah said that the party was "not unfriendly" toward the Soviet Union. See *People's Democracy*, Apr. 16, 1978.

31. After Leonid Brezhnev's New Delhi visit in 1973, the CPI-M wrote: "It would . . . be an illusion to think that the economic problems facing the nation can be solved only by strengthening relations with the Soviet Union . . . . While we welcome every step that is taken to strengthen the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries, we deplore that the Soviet leaders go on praising the bourgeois-landlord Government in our country as progressive *in every respect*, totally ignoring the basic class character of the regime. How could Brezhnev himself and all the other leaders of the Soviet Union have made such pronouncements . . . ?" *People's Democracy*, Dec. 2, 1973. Emphasis in original. The article was written by Basavapunniah, who was then editing the party weekly. E. M. S. Namboodiripad, the CPI-M General Secretary, is the present editor.

32. According to Basavapunniah, some Soviet "academicians" have had discussions with CPI-M leaders; no contact has been made at the party level. *People's Democracy*, Aug. 7, 1977. US diplomats and academics have also begun to take an interest in the CPI-M model in West Bengal. Officials of the US embassy in New Delhi have met with party leaders, and American scholars visiting Calcutta try to see Chief Minister Jyoti Basu.

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Jyoti Basu, Chief Minister of the government of West Bengal since the June 1977 elections and a leading member of the CPI-M.

—Wide World.

on the part of either with indigenous revolutionary movements in the Third World. As the political resolution of the 10th CPI-M Congress pointed out, both the USSR and PRC "subordinate the development of revolutionary forces in underdeveloped countries to the opportunistic needs of their governments' foreign policies."[33] CPI-M leaders complained even in 1973 that Moscow was, solely in its own foreign policy interests, showering undeserved encomiums on successive Congress governments, governments whose domestic policies were by no means progressive, much less socialistic. In May 1978, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, the CPI-M General Secretary, accused the Soviet Union of trying, with the help of the CPI, to restore Mrs. Gandhi to power. Even though the CPI had admitted that its support for the Emergency was a mistake, he pointed out, the CPSU had made no such admission.[34]

The CPI-M's present posture, tuned to the flux and flurry of India's politics rather than to doctrinaire precepts handed down from Moscow or Peking, is markedly different from its stance of a decade ago. The party has taken an increasingly nationalistic position, it has searched for an *Indian* path to revolutionary social change, and it has been pridefully independent of the USSR and PRC. Indeed, it is the only Communist party in the Third World with a viable hope of attaining power to proclaim and practice an independent line, a line which seems to have made it more amenable to the Indian national elite.[35] To some degree, also, the CPI-M's tactical line is not unlike that of the Italian Communist Party, though the CPI-M leaders are quick to point out their differences with the Eurocommunists.[36]

In Indian politics of the late 1970's, then, the CPI-M compels attention both for its domestic victories and for its distinctive individuality in the diverse and splintered universe of communism. Since both have manifested themselves particularly in West Bengal, the activities of the party in that state bear detailed scrutiny.

West Bengal's "Marxists"

The CPI-M regards its "govern and mobilize" model in West Bengal as a pacesetter for India's troubled and uncertain political journey in the next decade. As this writer noted in early 1972,[37] the CPI-M had already succeeded in building an extensive support base among West Bengal's rural poor by implementing a tactical line of controlled

33. CPI-M, *Political Resolution*, p. 11.

34. *The Statesman*, May 18, 1978.

35. The Jan Sangh, now the strongest constituent group in Janata and traditionally anti-Communist, has a benign view of the CPI-M because it is "an independent communist party."

36. Unlike the CPI, the CPI-M does not condemn Eurocommunism as "anti-Soviet." The CPI-M stance is that all Communist movements are contextual. For the breakdown of international discipline, the CPI-M blames the CPSU and the CCP almost equally.

At the same time, CPI-M leaders strongly refute comparisons between the CPI-M and Eurocommunism. "We believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat," one of them told this analyst, but a little later he added: "If we come to power in the democratic process, we shall preserve and strengthen democracy with all democratic freedoms and liberties constitutionally guaranteed."

37. "Indian Communism and the Peasantry," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1972, pp. 1-17. This thesis was subsequently contested by Donald S. Zagoria (see "Kerala and West Bengal," ibid., January-February 1973, pp. 16-27). However, recent events would seem to have confirmed it.

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peasant militancy to secure the rights of sharecroppers, middle and small peasants, and landless agricultural laborers.[37] This support base was evidently strong enough to survive the party's six lean years, for it was the urban and rural poor who gave the CPI-M-led Left Front its large majority in the West Bengal legislature in June 1977.

The CPI-M in West Bengal has the advantage of having as heads of the government and the party two of the ablest veterans of the Communist movement. The head of the government is 64-year-old Jyoti Basu.[38] Basu has the stature of a potential prime minister, although he will probably never hold that office. The head of the CPI-M in West Bengal is 69-year-old Promode Dasgupta; he is also in charge of CPI-M affairs in the other eastern states.[39] Both Basu and Dasgupta are members of the CPI-M Politburo, and they have worked together for nearly 40 years. The CPI-M ministers in Basu's government come mostly from the district-level leadership (as many as 125 of the 177 CPI-M legislators are from rural areas) and in nearly equal proportions from the trade union and *kisan* fronts.[40]

In line with the "govern and mobilize" model, the West Bengal government is not aiming high. "Under the Indian constitution we cannot make the kind of basic changes that are needed," Basu told William Borders of *The New York Times* in January 1978. "If we assumed national power in Delhi, things would be very, very different. But for now we must be content to make whatever small improvements we can in the lives of the poor people, to make life more liveable."[41]

Specifically, the government is following a 36-point action program, 20 points of which are designed to transfer a major share of development resources to the weak and poor in the villages and to alter the balance of power in the countryside. Basu has pressed half a dozen government departments to mount a coherent and comprehensive attack on rural and urban poverty—beginning with the food, food for relief, land, and land-revenue policies announced and implemented during the first six months of the regime.

With regard to food, the Left Front government on November 20, 1977, set forth a policy aimed at maintaining, and if possible expanding, the prevailing public distribution system. (A small quantity of edible oil was in fact added to the weekly ration of rice, wheat, and sugar; later, a little bit of lentil was included, too.)[42] It was also designed to help the marginal, small, and middle peasants to stock, as far as possible, their own needs of rice and get the best possible price for what they must sell, and to procure the bulk of the target amount of rice for the public distribution system from rich farmers and rice mill owners. The poor and middle peasants were therefore exempted from the procurement levy (a percent of produce they must sell to officially appointed agents), while a rising scale of levy was fixed for farmers who own more than seven acres of land. In addition, in order to give the poor and

38. For a short biographical study of Basu, see the present author's "Divergent Leaders of Indian Communism," in Roger Swearingen, Ed. *World Communist Leaders*, New York, NY, Macmillian, 1969.

Promode Dasgupta, leader of the CPI-M in West Bengal and the party's chief organizer for eastern India.

—Asoke Bose.

39. For a political profile of Dasgupta, based on a long interview, see *Perspective*, April 1978.

40. For details, see the author's "Profile of the CPI-M MLA," *Perspective*, November 1977.

41. "Once Volatile Indian State Peaceful under Red Rule," loc. cit.

42. West Bengal has recently had a 2-million-ton deficit in food grains.

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West Bengal's food for relief and work program in action: left, a state government office in the town of Uluberia where grain is distributed to participants; right, construction on a small scale village irrigation project.

—Rajib Bose.

middle farmers some relief from the often compelling need to sell their produce for whatever price the trade is willing to pay, a subsidy of two rupees (about US20 cents) per quintal was given to these weaker sections when they sold their paddy to official procurement agencies.

The food for relief and work program, in which the Left Front government's performance was judged by New Delhi as India's best, gave the rural jobless one kilogram of wheat (supplied by the central government) and two rupees a day for working on small projects such as road building, renovation of village water tanks, and digging on small irrigation schemes. This program, though humble in appearance, is so important that its limited application created resentment among those who could not be brought into it because of a paucity of wheat. Rural wage earners are jobless for six months in the year, and their only source of money is the moneylender. Consequently, the food for relief and work program saved many of these people from hunger and the moneylender.

The CPI-M-led government has concentrated its efforts on the land question, the tensest issue in the Indian countryside. Its first steps to bring about a solution to this question were measures to secure the interests of nearly 3.5 million sharecroppers in respect to the land they cultivate and their share of the crop, and to help the agricultural wage earner get the minimum wage of eight rupees (about US90 cents) a day or something close to it.[43] By the end of the first harvesting season the Left Front government had succeeded in recording the tilling and crop-sharing rights of 20 percent of the sharecroppers. Moreover, it had decreed that a sharecropper with this record could get agricultural credit up to 600 rupees (about US$75) from a nationalized bank.

It proved more difficult to secure the wage earner the minimum daily wage of eight rupees. (Although the Congress government had fixed this minimum wage by law, landlords had obtained a court injunction that made the law inoperative.) Only the rich landlord could pay such a daily wage. In many areas, the CPI-M peasant cadres persuaded wage

43. As a rule, landlords in India record neither the tilling right of the sharecropper nor his share of the harvest. The absence of any record not only enables the landlord to evict the sharecropper but also prevents the sharecropper from obtaining bank credit for cultivation purposes, because he is unable to produce any legally owned asset. Since the advent of the "green revolution," hundreds of thousands of sharecroppers have been thrown off land with assured irrigation. This is probably the most notable cause of agrarian tension in present-day India.

In West Bengal, during the united front regime of 1967-70, the government, with the active help of peasant militants, identified 600,000 acres of land that landlords were holding in excess of the ceilings fixed by law; about half this land was distributed to landless peasants. When the Congress party recaptured power in 1972, about half the land distributed was taken away and returned to its former "owners."

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earners to take much less, thereby pleasing the middle peasant but causing some resentment among landless agricultural laborers and enabling opposition groups to charge the CPI-M with "betraying" the interests of the poorest sections of the rural population.

When the first harvesting season came in November 1977, the government announced that the actual tiller of the land alone has the right to the harvest. If the tiller happens to be a *jotedar* (landlord), however, he must give 25 percent of the crop to the sharecropper whose services he dispensed with for that season.[44] At the same time, the *jotedar* must register the name of the sharecropper he employs so that the sharecropper can gain legal recognition of his status as sharecropper.

This land policy, together with the revenue and levy policies laid down earlier, [45] won the CPI-M and the Left Front government the support of the sharecroppers, vast sections of agricultural wage earners, and a significant segment of the middle peasants, and produced a relatively peaceful harvesting season.[46] Only the rich farmers remained entirely aloof.[47]

In both the formulation and implementation of these policies, peasant mobilization—through the party and its *kisan* front—played a very important part. Within three months of the Left Front's taking of power, CPI-M cadres organized thousands of peasant meetings, rallies, processions, sit-ins, and petitionings throughout West Bengal in order to generate demands, explain the government's programs and policies, and put pressure on a lethargic bureaucracy to implement the decisions announced. A tiered program of mobilization led in these first six months to the construction of a three-level peas-

44. The *jotedar* is sometimes distinguished from the capitalist farmer in that his ownership is limited to 50-100 acres (a good part of it held illegally), and he is reluctant to invest his earnings to increase his crop. In eastern India, the *jotedar* is also often the village moneylender.

45. Small and medium landowners were exempted from the payment of land revenue.

46. For a comprehensive survey of the Left Front regime's land policy, see this writer's "Peasant Mobilisation in West Bengal," *Perspective*, January 1978, and "Fruits of Peasant Mobilisation in West Bengal," ibid., February 1978. This mobilization style is quite different from the style of the late 1960's. Cf. the author's "Indian Communism and the Peasantry."

47. For a typical example of how the rich peasants were isolated, see *People's Democracy*, Dec. 25, 1977.

A rally of West Bengal agricultural workers organized and addressed by the CPI-M.

—Asoke Bose.

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ant base linking the village through the block to the district-level organization.[48] At the district and block levels, all-party committees were set up to oversee policy implementation, to correct excesses, and to settle disputes through mediation and conciliation.[49] In certain areas, rich peasants were subjected to "social boycott," and a systematic campaign was conducted against police and officials suspected of "conspiring against the left front government."[50]

Soon after the end of the harvesting season, the Left Front government announced its boldest political decision so far—to hold elections to the three-tier *panchayat* (village council) system on the basis of full participation by political parties. This decision was indeed a break from tradition. For many years, as part of the Congress party's (and now Janata's) social engineering, the villages of India have remained "united" and beyond the pale of politics. At this level, therefore, elections have traditionally been "partyless." In reality, however, "partyless" elections have helped the rich landowning class and its allies capture the levers of power and resources throughout the Indian countryside. Moreover, since no *panchayat* elections have been held in most of the states for 10-15 years, this rural power structure has been consolidated. The CPI-M's sponsorship of full participation by political parties thus represents a blow to the status quo in the India countryside.[51]

A village woman votes in the June 1978 panchayat *(village council) elections in West Bengal.*

—Asoke Bose.

On June 4, 1978, an estimated 25 million voters in West Bengal elected 56,000 members of *panchayats, panchayat-samities* (the middle-level council comprising a number of villages), and *zila-parishads* (district-level councils) from an incredible number of 175,912 candidates. The main contest was between the CPI-M and the Indira Congress, although Janata, the Official Congress party, and the CPI also took the elections most seriously. In fact, the Indira Congress, the Official Congress, and Janata often combined their resources to put up a united front against the CPI-M. For some 6,000 seats, partners of the Left Front contested against one another, and the CPI-M's relations with its allies were soured at the grass-roots level in five districts. Reporters noticed an "anti-CPI-M wave" and an anti-CPI-M front in several districts.

For its part, the CPI-M mobilized its entire cadre, leadership, organizational, and other party resources. It came up with unprecendented rural support, established its political supremacy in all

48. This is described in some detail in the articles mentioned in note 46. A block is a group of villages. Formed as part of the community development program, it has since become an integral part of the Indian rural administrative architecture.

49. The style of the Left Front government includes working through public committees. In Calcutta city, for example, citizens' committees have been set up in all municipal wards to resolve local issues pertaining to the demolition of structures, the clearing of unauthorized shops from the streets, etc. An engineer of the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority, which receives considerable financial support from the World Bank and whose chairman is the chief minister himself, told this writer that the committees were very helpful in removing obstacles to city improvement programs.

In the villages, local committees have reduced litigation to a degree that has alarmed lawyers and a whole set of social elements that has flourished for hundreds of years on endless court cases relating to all manner of rural disputes and tensions, especially over land. A great portion of rural indebtedness is due to peasant litigation.

50. This, once again, is part of the style of the CPI-M and the Left Front regime. In contrast to the rest of India, the Left Front regime does not defend the entire bureaucracy and police but differentiates between those elements who are willing to cooperate in implementing its programs and those who are believed to be resisting implementation. The campaign against the latter group is conducted by the party itself and by the Left Front Coordinating Committee rather than by the government. In contrast to the practice in the late 1960's, Chief Minister Basu is now urging government workers to put in an honest day's work.

51. For a graphic picture of the rural power structure, see Selbourne, op. cit. *Panchayat* elections have been held in 1978 in several states on a "partyless" basis. For a rather superficial analysis of the results, see *Indian Express* (Delhi), July 25, 1978.

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districts but one,[52] and extended its support base to the last frontier village.[53] (*Panchayat* elections held almost simultaneously in Tripura brought similar results agreeable to the CPI-M.[54]) Armed with this impressive display of political strength, the Left Front government is now preparing a program to transfer substantial resources and development functions to the three-tier village councils.

The Left Front government has not been able to bring about perceptible social change in West Bengal during the first 18 months of its rule. Nor was it expected to. However, there have been certain changes in the villages, and, more important, the village poor have begun to hope that their life will be a little better in the years ahead.[55]

Basu's claim that West Bengal is the best-governed state in India is hotly contested by his political opponents, who complain of a large-scale breakdown of law and order and depredations by CPI-M cadres in the villages. But the government has to its credit the prevailing industrial peace; a modest degree of capital investment in industry; full protection of the citizen's democratic rights and liberties; peaceful harvests; restoration of some order in the chaotic educational system; wide public acknowledgment of the honesty, integrity, and efficiency of the ministers; and some progress in eradicating corruption.[56] Calcutta's leading English-language daily, *The Statesman,* observed on the government's first anniversary that it had been "widely accepted as moderate, businesslike and well-intentioned. Political and administrative order under Marxist rule compares favourably with conditions under the Janata regime at the Centre and in several states."[57] A leading industrialist of Calcutta told *The New York Times:*

We have labor peace for a change. We have tranquility on the streets. . . . And we have a government that, Marxist or not, seems incorruptible and efficient.[58]

Prospects

Despite the CPI-M's achievements, its political future is far from clear. The shadow of Mrs. Gandhi hangs heavily over India's politics, existing political coalitions have shown strains and cracks, and India's politics at the state level are notoriously unstable. In addition, the CPI-M may fall prey to its own internal problems. Specifically, the "we can govern better" image that the CPI-M is trying to project may dampen the spirits of the radical elements in the party; it certainly fails to excite urban youth smitten by the bug of "revolutionism." One of the points of inner-party debates has thus been whether parliamentarism will not seduce the CPI-M as it has the CPI. In West Bengal, for example, roughly a third of the party members seem to harbor this doubt.[59]

Also pertinent to the CPI-M's fortunes is the issue of federalism. The "we can govern better" tactical line calls for continuing struggles, in league with all democratic elements, to strengthen Indian democracy. To this end, the CPI-M has demanded more federal content in the Indian constitution and substantial devolution of power and resources from the central government to the states. This demand was articulated in a memorandum adopted by the West Bengal cabinet on December 1, 1977, a memorandum that Basu presented to the central government and to all the state governments.[60] Anticipating that the CPI-M would be accused of encouraging divisive forces, the memorandum observed:

52. Except in the Darjeeling district in north Bengal, the CPI-M swept the election in the entire state, capturing each tier of the *panchayat* system. This success seemed to surprise the party leadership. In a statement on June 10, the party noted that its candidates had won by large margins even in those districts where it had not done well in the election of June 1977. *Ganasakti* (Calcutta), June 11, 1978.

53. For a comprehensive analysis of the West Bengal *panchayat* elections (the only analysis to have appeared in India so far), see this author's "Democracy Goes to Bengal Villages," *Perspective,* July 1978.

54. The Tripura *panchayat* elections are described in detail in *People's Democracy,* June 25, 1978.

55. A Bengali fortnightly *Paribartan* (Change) has been printing reports on social change in West Bengal since the Left Front regime came to power. These reports indicate small changes in the behavior of the police; small improvements in the economic condition of primary school teachers, small farmers, sharecroppers, and agricultural wage earners; but a great change in the minds of the rural poor, who are said to identify themselves with the government and expect their lives to be better in the years to come. Although some writers doubt whether the gradualist approach of the CPI-M will succeed in speeding up the process of change, a majority of them, most of them from the villages, seem willing to accept gradual, incremental change. *Paribartan* (Calcutta), July 1, 15, and 30, 1978.

56. The Left Front government has so far refused to assume powers of "preventive detention" to deal with "antisocial" elements. It has released from prisons thousands of persons detained without trial by the Congress regime; many of these are said to be criminals. The incidence of crime has shown an upward trend in the state but is still lower than in most of the other Indian states.

57. *The Statesman,* June 21, 1978.

58. *The New York Times,* Jan. 26, 1978.

59. This estimate is based upon the writer's conversations with CPI-M cadres.

60. It proposed that the power of the central government be limited to defense, transport and communication, finance, and foreign affairs, and to coordinating rather than commanding the other departments of government. See the text in *The Statesman,* Dec. 2, 1977.

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An information booth and voter propaganda vehicle of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), CPI-M, in Calcutta during the June 1977 campaign for elections to the West Bengal state assembly.

—Santosh Basak-Gamma/Liaison.

A strong and unified India can only be one in which the democratic aspirations and the distinctiveness of the people of the different states are respected and not treated with disdain. We are definitely for strong states, but on no account do we want a weak Centre. The concept of strong states is not necessarily in contradiction to that of a strong Centre, once their respective spheres of authority are clearly marked out.

The memorandum argued the case for devolution and decentralization not so much on political as on developmental grounds.[61]

Submission of this memorandum was a well-timed political move which immediately caught the winds of political change in India. The memorandum provoked the first national debate in India on Center-state relations since the Constitution was written more than 25 years ago. While Prime Minister Desai predictably rejected the demand as a blow to India's unity and integrity, decentralization seems to have found hospitable soil in the politics of fragmentation and the dispersal of power. Over the years, centralization has made the states helplessly dependent on the central government for development resources; Mrs. Gandhi had also reduced the chief ministers to puppets in a cynical game of power. But the trend is now toward decentralization, and the CPI-M is trying to push it.

Though most of the chief ministers are reluctant at this stage to echo the CPI-M's demand for a devolution of political power, they have begun to press the central government for a much larger share of India's financial resources. A major initiative in this regard was taken by the five chief ministers in the south. At a meeting in July 1978, they formulated demands for more financial power.[62]

61. Among those who have given limited backing to the West Bengal initiative are the chief ministers of Kashmir and Tamil Nadu. Proposals for large-scale decentralization of financial power and development functions, however, have received wider support.

62. *The Hindu* (Madras), July 17, 1978.

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Basu immediately welcomed this initiative and will almost certainly take part in a larger conference of chief ministers being planned for the fall. The CPI-M, then, is in a strategic position to intervene in one of the most acute conflicts raging in India: competition between the national and local elites for the larger share of development resources.[63]

The reason why the CPI-M is a champion of federalism is clear. Its support base is local and restricted and will remain so for years to come, even if it expands to other states. The CPI-M strategy is to move toward the apex of power from the base of the pyramid. Only if the state governments get more political power and development resources can the CPI-M hope to have the political impact it desires on the Indian people. Federalism must go hand in hand with representative government because an authoritarian central government will make it impossible for the CPI-M to govern in the states. The CPI-M is therefore in the forefront of India's struggle for democracy, a complex struggle of uncertain outcome.

Today, the possibility of the CPI-M's holding power in the central government either on its own or in equal partnership with like-minded forces is still remote. But the party will bear continued watching for the part it plays in the defense of Indian democracy, for the changes it undergoes in the interplay of Indian politics, and for the kind of personality it acquires as a result of its own—and India's—political experiences.

63. In July, at the invitation of the West Bengal government, education ministers of 10 states met in Calcutta for two days and agreed that education should be put back onto the "state list" of subjects in the Indian Constitution. Mrs. Gandhi had transferred education to the "concurrent list" during the Emergency. The Indian Constitution has three lists of subjects—state, concurrent, and central.

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New Conflict in Indochina

By Sheldon W. Simon

Indochina, involved in hostilities virtually without respite since 1941, remains an international tinderbox. With the termination of direct US military involvement in 1973 and the Vietnamese Communist and Khmer Rouge military victories in 1975, there was hope that peace would come at long last to this troubled region. But the Second Indochina War (1965-75) was not solely a part of the global conflict between Communist and US power superimposed on a supposedly peaceful region; rather, it occurred in a political, societal, and cultural context that can be traced back a thousand years. As the war came to an end, then, other long-standing tensions and suspicions surfaced—this time among Communist movements that had recently been allied in the struggle against the United States. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and Cambodia (Democratic Kampuchea), divided by centuries-long ethnic animosities as well as by differences in domestic and international policies and styles, were soon engaged in fierce border skirmishes. Vietnam, seeing Cambodia's forbidding internal situation, hopes that the Phnom Penh government might be replaced with a more amenable regime. Cambodia, for its part, fears Hanoi's intentions and alleges that Vietnam is bent on incorporating Cambodia into a new Indochina empire. Both countries have appealed to world opinion for support, Vietnam having so far been more successful in this respect than has Cambodia.

Like previous hostilities in Indochina, the current Vietnam-Cambodia war has broad security implications. Non-Communist neighbors, such as Thailand, wish to avoid taking sides politically and thus being sucked into the maelstrom. But the two giant Communist powers—the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC)—have not hesitated to compete for influence in the region. The PRC has moved to obstruct alleged Vietnamese efforts to create a hegemonic position lest such regional preeminence lead to an alliance with the Soviet Union as part of the latter's encirclement strategy against the PRC. Because Peking has viewed both Moscow and Hanoi as potentially linked rivals, it has chosen to support a recalcitrant Cambodia against what both it and Cambodia have interpreted as Vietnamese expansionism. Moreover, Vietnam has for domestic reasons begun to move against its resident Chinese; as a result, since May 1978 relations between the PRC and Vietnam have deterioriated rapidly, probably more rapidly than either side intended. For its part, the USSR has viewed these developments with considerable anticipation, hoping that Vietnam would be willing to compromise its neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute and perhaps even provide missile and naval bases in exchange for increased economic and military assistance.

In 1978, then, Southeast Asia is faced once more with military conflict in Indochina, teetering on the brink of hostilities on the Sino-Vietnamese border, and involved in the competition between great powers, namely, the Soviet Union and the PRC. Given the current diplomatic positions of both Vietnam and Cambodia, the prospects for a negotiated settlement appear bleak.

This article will be devoted to an analysis of the various dimensions of the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict. It will look not only at the conflict itself but

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Vietnamese artillery prepares to return Cambodian fire along the border between the two countries in April 1978.

—Jean-Claude Labbé-Gamma/Liaison.

also at the conflict's broader ramifications in the region.

Before we embark on this undertaking, however, it is important to sound a note of caution. Direct observations of the war or political conditions in either Vietnam or Cambodia are almost impossible. Both countries remain essentially closed societies. Cambodia, especially, seems hermetically sealed from the outside world except for a few invited delegations, whose movements are closely controlled. Although Vietnam has permitted greater access to outsiders, it too controls where they may go and, for the most part, whom they may interview. Therefore, this article is based primarily on diplomatic handouts, interviews with refugees, and an analysis of each side's media. The media are particularly important, for they project the image of the conflict that each side wishes outsiders to have. From each side's media, then, the analyst can create a picture of mutual fears and sometimes infer the policies designed to cope with these fears. Nevertheless, readers should be aware that the information base on the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict is both flawed and incomplete.

Historical Background

Turning first to the origins of the strife, it is well to keep in mind that as early as 1000 A.D., the Vietnamese state began a persistent pattern of southward expansion, which ultimately led to its first confrontation with Cambodian authority in the Mekong Delta. Indeed, the Cambodian name for the delta—*Kampuchea Khrom*—means "southern Cambodia."[1] Centuries of unequal conflict between a strong Vietnam and a weaker Cambodia—sometimes aligned with the Thai kingdom—left the Khmer

1. For good, brief historical descriptions of the centuries of animosity between Vietnam and Cambodia, which may best be compared with the ingrained hostility of Greeks and Turks or Hindus and Muslims, see Milton Osborne, "Kampuchea and Vietnam: A Historical Perspective," *Pacific Community* (Tokyo), April 1978, pp. 252-54; and Douglas Pike, "The Vietnam-Cambodia Border War, 1978," paper prepared for the East Asian Research Colloquium, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University, Washington, DC, April 1978, pp. 1-6.

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in their current reduced territorial boundaries after the French colonized the region in the 1860's. French intervention insured Cambodia's survival—which may explain why the Cambodians seemed less enthusiastic anticolonialists than the Vietnamese from the 1930's onward.

After the French left Indochina in the mid-1950's, the issue of Cambodia's boundaries was again raised. In 1967, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia managed to obtain agreements with both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Hanoi and the National Liberation Front (NLF) in the South to accept the existing, French-delineated border. However, these agreements did not deal with the ethnic minorities in each side's territory.[2] Nor did they serve to block territorial encroachments immediately after the Communist victories in 1975. In January 1978, Hanoi accused the Cambodians not only of having attempted to seize the Phu Quoc and Tho Chu islands in the Gulf of Thailand—and kidnapping 500 people in the process—but also of having made incursions in the Ha Tien and Tay Ninh areas. Phnom Penh countercharged that the Vietnamese had seized Poulo Wai Island and made forays into Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri provinces.[3] In effect, the events of 1975 set the stage for two years of increasingly intense warfare up and down the border between eastern Cambodia and western Vietnam, most particularly in Vietnam's vulnerable southern region.

Much of the outside world was stunned when it learned of these developments. Revolutionary movements that had pledged enduring solidarity repeatedly over several decades were now engaged in warfare and recriminations that recalled the worst days of their war with the United States. (Indeed, the Khmer media even compared the Vietnamese *unfavorably* to the Americans.[4]) Yet closer examination of the evolution of the Khmer Communist Party (KCP) demonstrates that its supposed solidarity wih Vietnam was more a product of Hanoi's public relations than any real commitment on the part of the Cambodians. Suspicion and animosity toward the Vietnamese existed from the founding of the Khmer party in the early 1950's.

In 1978, the first KCP genealogy ever published claimed that the party was founded in 1951. However, Douglas Pike, one of the most astute students of Indochinese communism, is skeptical, arguing that there is little evidence of a real Communist party in Cambodia at this early date.[5] Instead, there were several insurgent groups composed of both Marxists and nationalists in the First Indochina War (1946-54). Moreover, these groups preferred Sihanouk to the Vietminh. In 1966, however, when Lon Nol assumed the office of prime minister, the extreme Left went underground, and the Pracheachon Party (People's Revolutionary Party) emerged for the first time. Its leaders spent the ensuing decade in the countryside and became the leaders of Cambodia today.

The Vietnamese did not provide much aid to this group in its formative years, supporting Sihanouk's neutralism instead. Vietnamese Communist activity in Cambodia thus concentrated on organizing ethnic Vietnamese. This cavalier treatment generated mistrust among indigenous Cambodian Communists, the more so because other Cambodian leftists had gone to North Vietnam after 1954 and hence could be viewed as a potential fifth column upon their return.

Only with Sihanouk's overthrow in 1970 did the Vietnamese Communists begin serious organizational work among the Cambodian people. But once the armed forces commanded by the Cambodian Communists were strong enough to take the brunt of the fighting against the Lon Nol regime, the Cambodian party rejected Vietnamese policy guidance. Khmer suspicions of the Vietnamese seemed confirmed when, after the Paris accords of January 1973, Hanoi cut its aid to the Cambodians. The latter charged the Vietnamese with a sellout comparable to the Vietnamese abandonment of the Cambodian revolution at the 1954 Geneva Conference.[6] Indeed, it was the Chinese who in 1974 assumed the burden of supplying the arms that the Khmer Rouge needed to complete their struggle against Lon Nol.[7]

2. Although more than 1 million ethnic Cambodians may now be living in Vietnam—thousands since 1975 as a result of the repressive policies of the Cambodian authorities—it is unlikely that any Vietnamese are left in Cambodia. Pogroms against them began when Lon Nol assumed power in 1970. The remaining Vietnamese were forced out of Cambodia by its new Communist leadership in 1975.

3. See the Vietnam Foreign Ministry document distributed by the Vietnam News Agency (VNA) and in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report—Asia/Pacific* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-APA*), Jan. 6, 1978, pp. K/3-13. The Cambodian charges are outlined in Pike, op. cit., p. 16.

4. See Henry Kamm, "Cambodia and Vietnam—Ancient Enemies," *The New York Times*, Jan. 7, 1978.

5. The following discussion draws extensively upon Pike, op. cit., pp. 8-12.

6. For analyses of the relations between the Cambodian and Vietnamese Communists during the war against Lon Nol, see Sheldon W. Simon, *War and Politics in Cambodia: A Communications Analysis*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1974, Chaps. 3 and 5; and idem, "The Role of Ousiders in the Cambodian Conflict," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Spring 1975, pp. 209-30.

7. William Shawcross, "Cambodia: Nightmare without End," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Apr. 14, 1978, p. 34.

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

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The Khmer Communists feared that the Vietnamese planned to take over the Cambodian party through cadres sympathetic to the Vietnamese cause. In a statement of December 30, 1977, the Cambodian government charged:

When the Vietnamese set up their sanctuaries in Cambodia in 1965 . . . they secretly established a special Cambodian army headed by a group of evil men as their instrument on Cambodian soil. They incited this handful of Cambodian traitors to create a new party to destroy the Cambodian Communist Party, create a special state administration that would divide and destroy the Cambodian Revolutionary Army and oppose and attack the Cambodian revolutionary state power under the KCP leadership. However, these plans were defeated. . . .[8]

Apprehensions over traitors from within triggered a deadly, though obscure, power struggle within the Cambodian party during 1977, in which most of those purportedly killed were singled out simply because they had previously been trained in Hanoi.[9] In fact, contacts between the Vietnamese and Cambodian parties had broken off a year earlier (spring 1976), reportedly on Cambodian initiative. These talks were to have addressed the border dispute, problems of ethnic animosity among the border populations, and the creation of a permanent liaison group to handle conflicts as they arose.[10]

In October 1977, the Vietnam Foreign Ministry took the unusual step of briefing the diplomatic community in Hanoi on the border clashes, noting that Vietnam had called for negotiations. But a Cambodian diplomat, interviewed in the same city, refused any talks "until they stopped threatening us." "We don't want to become another Laos," he insisted, pointing to the Vietnamese military presence in that country as the same "special relationship" the SRV wished to impose upon Cambodia.[11]

As Hanoi sees it, Cambodia's hostile policy results not from any Vietnamese betrayal or hegemonic designs but rather from the xenophobia of the current Khmer leadership, nurtured on a decade of self-sufficiency in the Cambodian countryside. After agreeing temporarily to a united front in Sihanouk's name following Lon Nol's 1970 coup, the Vietnamese claim, the Khmer Rouge, under Pol Pot's direction, returned to an isolationist position in April 1975, and they embarked on a path of terrorism and the destruction of all potential opposition: "The evacuation of Phnom Penh, abolition of money, the post and telegraph, and forbidding contact between people—all this is aimed at preventing any opposition from developing."[12]

The Cambodian Domestic Scene

Whether or not one accepts Hanoi's interpretation of the causes of the rising tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia, there can be little doubt that domestic developments in the latter state contributed to the situation. Since 1970, Cambodia, a country historically known for its gentle culture, has seemingly run amok. The pogroms against ethnic Vietnamese at that time have reportedly given way to massacres against the Khmer population by the current political leadership. From 500,000 to 2 million out of a total population of 7 million may have fallen victim to this holocaust (600,000 others died during the Indochina war, many of them casualties of US bombing).[13]

How can such self-decimation be explained? A partial answer may be found in a kind of puritanical paranoia on the part of the leaders of Angkor ("the Organization"), as KCP elements initially referred to themselves. These leaders have conceived a super agrarian radicalism to be a solution to Cambodia's historical weakness and dependency, and according to their line of thought, anyone who has been associated with the cities, with foreigners, or with intellectual, business, or technical activities is tainted and must either be purged through hard labor in the countryside or be liquidated. According to Prime Minister Pol Pot, the sole reason for the regime's total evacuation of Cambodia's cities in April 1975 was internal security. "Enemies of all stripes" were lying in wait in "secret agent networks" to crush the revolutionary regime.[14]

Radical egalitarianism led to the abolition of private property, money, and the top of the social structure itself through the execution of many military

8. Pike, op. cit., p. 13.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 17.
11. Quoted in Nayan Chanda, "Anatomy of the Conflict," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jan. 13, 1978, p. 12.
12. Nayan Chanda interview with "a Vietnamese official," in ibid., Apr. 21, 1978, p. 18.
13. Smith Hempstone, "The Need to Bear Witness to Cambodia's Holocaust," *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1978.
14. See the discussion of this period in Karl D. Jackson, "Cambodia 1977: Gone to Pot," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), January 1978; Fox Butterfield, "Cambodia Offers Evacuation Motive," *The New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1977.

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Young women field workers from a cooperative in Cambodia's Takeo Province sit without a smile for an officially-sanctioned photo session with a Yugoslav photographer in March 1978.

—Wide World.

officers, government workers, and businessmen.[15] Collectivization became the Angkor's form of social organization. In a movement far more radical than the PRC's "people's communes" two decades earlier, Cambodian authorities abolished private households in 1977, replacing them with communal kitchens and sexually segregated living quarters. Schools and monasteries were closed. The new cooperatives were an extension of the Khmer Communists' war organization in the areas under their control since 1973. They apparently serve as a countrywide surveillance network through collective responsibility for members' behavior. By 1978, the Cambodian government declared that at least 2.5 million people, or one third of the population, were organized in this fashion and at work in the countryside building dams and other irrigation projects.[16]

Despite these draconian measures and the reported liquidation of those who had held any social status in the Lon Nol period or who had been associated with Vietnam, the Angkor demonstrates continued concern about the enemies in its midst: "Many joined the revolution at first and later switched to the enemy's side against the revolution." Khmer leaders seem to be using this ploy to explain agricultural shortcomings: "Enemy running dogs of all colors planted within our cooperatives sabotaged the 3-ton-per-hectare target." They have also stressed the importance of recruiting only "poor and lower-middle peasants" into cadre positions for the party, army, and rural cooperatives. Open recruitment, according to this line of reasoning, must be avoided, for it would lead to "revisionism, capitalism, the private ownership system, and [the return of] the bourgeoisie."[17]

The transformation of Cambodia into an agrarian command society has the cultivation of rice as its primary goal. Rice is to serve as not only a major item for the subsistence of the local population but also the country's chief export to earn the foreign

15. See John Barron and Anthony Paul, *Murder in a Gentle Land,* New York, NY, Reader's Digest Press, 1977; and Richard Nations, "Another 40,000 CIA Traitors," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* Aug. 25, 1978, pp. 37-38.

16. The cooperatives' functions are discussed in the broadcast of Phnom Penh Domestic Service, May 19, 1978, cited in *FBIS-APA,* May 23, 1978, pp. H/2-3. This broadcast also stated that in 1975 "nearly three million people came from the cities" and had to be integrated into cooperative organizations. See, too, a Yugoslav film report telecast by JOAK-TV, Tokyo, May 21, 1978, as cited in *FBIS-APA,* May 24, 1978, p. H/1.

17. Phnom Penh Domestic Service, Apr. 10, 1978, in *FBIS-APA,* Apr. 14, 1978, p. H/3; Phnom Penh Domestic Service, July 20, 1978, in *FBIS-APA,* July 28, 1978, pp. H/1-2.

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exchange needed to rebuild the economy. In 1978, visiting Yugoslav journalists reported seeing full silos in the countryside but noted the regime's inability to move the rice from its harvest location to other areas because of poor roads and a lack of transport. Although the government claimed that everyone received approximately one kilogram of rice daily, refugee accounts from both Thailand and Vietnam indicated that in reality the rations were half that amount. Refugee tales abound of virtual slave labor conditions under the direction of Angkor youths who hold the power of life and death over their charges. The absence of French-speaking people and the generally peasant character of refugees interviewed in Thailand lent credence to reports that the Khmer regime was killing the educated classes and that urban dwellers had been unable to survive the rigors of hard labor on the land. There are even some accounts of long-term malnutrition—which led to a drop in birthrates—particularly in the north, where drought and maldistribution had been severe.[18]

Most ominous in terms of the Vietnam-Cambodia war are refugee reports of pervasive hatred of Khmer Communist soldiers and officials because of the privileged positions they hold, the better diets they enjoy, and their harsh and arbitrary treatment of the population. The SRV has aired these reports, too, and could calculate that they reflect a regime ripe for overthrow.

Certainly, from the beginning of Vietnamese raids into eastern Cambodia in September 1977, the present KCP leadership has seemed to believe that Hanoi has embarked on an effort to oust it. The KCP has charged that "wherever they [the Vietnamese] have intruded, they have destroyed the administrative apparatus of the Cambodian people . . . and installed in their places remnants of the hooligans of the old Cambodian society, appointing them commune and village chairmen."[19] These allega-

18. See the reports by Henry Kamm in *The New York Times,* May 10 and 13, 1978; *Far Eastern Economic Review,* May 12, 1978, p. 14; Hanoi Domestic Service, March 10, 1978, in *FBIS-APA,* Mar. 15, 1978, p. K/1; and Radio Hanoi in Cambodian, Apr. 22, 1978, in *FBIS-APA,* May 1, 1978, p. K/17. In addition, the calculations by Jackson, op. cit., indicate that even if one accepts the regime's production claims and one assumes the fulfillment of its export plans, the population is going to be left with only 250-300 grams per capita a day for consumption in 1978.

19. Statement by the Cambodian Information and Propaganda Ministry, Phnom Penh Domestic Service, Jan. 6, 1978, in *FBIS-APA,* Jan. 6, 1978, pp. H/1-3.

Cambodian refugees in Tan Lap village of Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province.

—A March 1978 photo by the Vietnam News Agency, serviced via MTI by EUPRA.

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tions probably refer specifically to the political apparatus constructed by the Vietnamese Communists from the mid-1960's on in the eastern Cambodian segment of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In this area of some 3,500 square kilometers, the Vietnamese appointed sympathetic Khmer officials, collected taxes, controlled population movement, imposed a system of forced grain sales, and supervised peasant trade.

Accusing the SRV of having "always despised and looked down upon the Cambodian people and the Cambodian Revolutionary Army," Radio Phnom Penh has also broadcast alleged confessions of captured Vietnamese soldiers who recounted plans for the occupation of Cambodia: "After liberating Cambodia . . . Vietnamese people would settle down in all Cambodian provinces, districts, communes and villages; and a new Cambodian communist party would be created under Vietnam's control."[20]

By April 1978, the world press reported Radio Hanoi appeals to Cambodian front-line troops to cross over to Vietnam for training as liberation forces to be sent back to Cambodia. At the same time, there were indications Hanoi was providing such training to captured Khmer soldiers and the thousands of refugees who had fled to Vietnam after the border fighting intensified in 1977. (Until that year, the SRV had been returning refugees to the Cambodian authorities.) Some analysts believe Hanoi's strategy has been to weaken the Cambodian government through battlefield casualties and defections while working to create an army of sympathetic Cambodian refugees to supplant the present leadership.[21]

In the summer of 1978, Radio Hanoi—through alleged confessions of Cambodian prisoners of war—revealed the existence of a Vietnamese-backed anti-Khmer Rouge insurgency in the Svay Rieng (or Parrot's Beak) area. Calling themselves the "genuine patriotic and revolutionary forces of the 203rd Military Region," these forces claimed responsibility for a regional uprising in May 1978 covering Prey Veng, Kompong Cham, and Svay Rieng.[22] In addition, Hanoi reported the resettlement of several thousand Cambodian refugees on the Vietnam-Cambodia border in Tay Ninh Province—presumably a potential invasion or occupation force [23]

But the question remains: will enough Cambodians agree to collaborate with the Vietnamese? Or would a Vietnamese-sponsored insurgency backfire and create a wave of nationalistic sentiment in support of even the harsh Angkor? Past Vietnamese efforts along the lines sketched here have not been successful. Many of the 4,000-5,000 Cambodians trained in North Vietnam in the 1950's and 1960's and sent back to Cambodia are reported to have been executed by the present government. And some of those who managed to escape have expressed strong resentment against the Vietnamese, who treated them as inferiors.

Two Cambodian prisoners are taken to interrogation by Vietnamese soldiers during the border conflict of early 1978.

—Jean Claude Labbé-Gamma/Liaison.

Military Actions

Whatever the precise mix of fundamental causes, Vietnam and Cambodia have now become engaged in large-scale combat with one another. Cambodia seems to have set in motion the chain of events that led to major hostilities. In late 1976 and early 1977, the Khmer Rouge apparently created a free-fire zone several kilometers deep at all its borders to stem the flow of Cambodians fleeing to other

20. Phnom Pehn Domestic Service, Jan. 8 and Mar. 10, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 9, 1978, pp. H/4-5, and Mar. 14, 1978, p. H/1. The quotation is from the latter citation.

21. Frederic A. Moritz, "Viet Target: Phnom Penh Regime," *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Apr. 6, 1978; Henry Kamm, "Ongoing Conflict in Indochina," *The New York Times*, Apr. 30, 1978; and Fox Butterfield, "Vietnam's Leadership Despite Vexing Problems Shows Solidarity," ibid., June 19, 1978.

22. Hanoi International Service in Cambodian, Aug. 15, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 16, 1978, p. K/7; Hanoi International Service in Thai, Aug. 3, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 4, 1978, p. K/3-4; Hanoi International Service in Cambodian, Sept. 1, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 1, 1978, p. K/2; Hanoi International Service in Cambodian, Sept. 20, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 20, 1978, p. K/8.

23. VNA (Hanoi), Sept. 22, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 25, 1978, p. K/9.

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countries. (Since mid-1975, this population exodus has totaled perhaps 100,000 people, with most of them going to Thailand and Vietnam.) Vietnamese officials claim that SRV forces did not respond to Cambodian provocations until April 1977, when Khmer troops allegedly inflicted heavy civilian casualties near Chau Doc. After September 1977, a spokesman of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) has stated, Vietnam countered every Khmer assault. In early January 1978, Vietnamese army columns even pushed 30-40 kilometers into Cambodia and were followed back by some 10,000 refugees.[24]

This escalation in the fighting in the provinces of Svay Rieng and Tay Ninh may have grown out of Cambodian efforts to dislodge elements of the Vietnamese Third, Sixth, and Ninth divisions, which, according to Western intelligence sources, have been there since the mid-1960's.[25] There were other complicating factors as well. Reports in 1977 suggested that each of the two countries had provided rebel groups fighting the government of the other with sanctuaries in its own border regions, from which these groups had launched harassment raids. At least one analyst believes that Vietnam was forced to make a premature thrust into Cambodia to put a stop to this support for Vietnamese rebel bands.[26]

Physically, there is little doubt that Vietnam could have occupied much of Cambodia if it had chosen to do so. In 1977, it had an army of over 600,000 (compared to Cambodia's 90,000) plus an armed militia of 1.5 million in reserve. It also boasted some 900 Soviet tanks (in addition to 600 US tanks and 1,200 armored personnel carriers presumably taken upon the defeat of the South Vietnamese army) and 310 combat aircraft (not counting those captured from South Vietnam, which included a number of American A-37 fighter bombers, reportedly employed during the January 1978 invasion of Svay Rieng Province).[27]

Nevertheless, Hanoi's withdrawal after its successful military thrust does not seem to have been followed by the expected Cambodian political compromise. Instead of suing for peace, Khmer forces actually stepped up their own raids, particularly near the southern end of the 750-mile frontier. Reorganizing into guerrilla units, Cambodian forces successfully cut Vietnam's extended communications lines with ambushes and booby traps—ironically using the very tactics so successfully employed by the Vietnamese Communists against the Americans and Saigon.

Fighting has been so intense that Vietnam has had to pull some villages back from its borders and to divert its army from what has been its principal task—reconstruction. Agricultural production has suffered in the border zones, and the forcible resettlement of Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) residents in the "new economic zones" of the border areas has been extremely unpopular.[28] Interestingly, Cambodia has accused Vietnam of using its invasion to bring "several thousand Vietnamese nationals equipped with . . . mechanical rice harvesters in each area, plundering Cambodia's rice."[29]

By the late summer of 1978, Western news reports put Vietnamese units 10 miles inside Cambodia around the rubber plantation town of Krek. They may have linked up there with Cambodian irregulars from Military Region 203. These reports coincided with others indicating a transfer of Cambodian troops away from the western Thai border and to the precarious east. The Vietnamese also have massed 10 regular divisions on their side of the border, two more than at the time of the December 1977-January 1978 invasion. Moreover, other Vietnamese forces have been said to be moving through Laos to the Cambodian border.[30]

Through the first six months of 1978, Cambodian artillery barrages and sapper attacks on such border towns as Ha Tien and My Duc seemed designed to create a no man's land along the border and perhaps forcibly to revise the frontier by straightening out salients such as Ha Tien that jut into Cambodia. The continued movement of Vietnam army forces to these border areas, however, does not augur well for the success of such a policy.

Nonetheless, as Douglas Pike points out, Cambodia's aggressive behavior is not entirely irrational. Because there are international constraints on Viet-

24. Interview with VCP spokesman Hoang Tung by Nayan Chanda in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Apr. 21, 1978, pp. 18-22.

25. *Ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1978, p. 13; and David Binder, "Vietnam Holds Cambodian Region after Bitter Fight," *The New York Times*, Jan. 4, 1978.

26. Cited in Marian K. Leighton, "Perspectives on the Vietnam-Cambodia Border Conflict," *Asian Survey*, May 1978, pp. 449-50.

27. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jan. 13, 1978, pp. 14-15.

28. Henry Kamm, "Hanoi Has Its Own Quagmire in Fight with Cambodia," *The New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1978; Frederic A. Moritz, "Cambodia's Surprising 'Win' over Vietnam," *Christian Science Monitor*, Mar. 28, 1978.

29. Cambodian government statement broadcast by the Phnom Penh Domestic Service, Dec. 30, 1977, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 3, 1978, p. H/2.

30. Agence France Presse (Hong Kong—hereafter AFP), Aug. 28, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 29, 1978, p. H/1; *The Los Angeles Times*, Sept. 8, 1978; and Richard Nations, "The Power of Persuasion," *Far Eastern Economic* Review, Sept. 22, 1978, p. 10.

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A Vietnamese force engaged in a fight with Cambodian forces near the Cambodian-Vietnamese border in early 1978.

—Jean-Claude Labbe-Gamma/Liaison.

nam's use of force (just as there were constraints on the United States' use of force between 1965 and 1973), Cambodia has adopted the "small bristly dog" gambit: "The rule—as it is for a small dog surrounded by bigger, stronger dogs—is to bristle, assuming an aggressive posture and appearing so fearfully troublesome, so indifferent to consequences, as to convince others to leave well enough alone. It may not work, but it holds as much promise for the Cambodians as any other."[31]

Cambodia seems to have assumed the same posture toward Thailand. Although Thailand is obviously much less threatening than Vietnam and possibly even a potential ally against Vietnamese expansion, the Cambodian authorities have not made their peace with Bangkok. Instead, they appear to be holding the Thais at arm's length. This is especially puzzling, since the worst possible option for Cambodia would be a Thai-Vietnamese rapprochement leading to the possibility of encroachments by both large neighbors.

Cambodian attacks all along the 200-mile border with Thailand parallel military actions against Vietnam. In both regions, the forays are concentrated against border villages with the apparent motive of forcing their evacuation. Depopulation of the borders could serve two purposes—to keep Cambodian nationals from fleeing to nearby sanctuary and to insure that hostile neighbors and refugees do not have base camps close by from which to launch attacks. At least one element in Cambodia's border skirmishes with Thailand, however, seems to be absent from its conflict with Vietnam—namely the kidnapping of Thai villagers (and their livestock). Those villagers who have escaped back to their own country state that they were indoctrinated in the apparent hope that they would become Khmer sympathizers. Cambodian refugees also report that some Thai dissidents are being trained in Cambodia with an eye to coordinating their activities with Khmer military forays.[32]

Thai authorities have played down border difficulties by treating Cambodian attacks as initiatives of local commands in retaliation against the activities of anti-Khmer Rouge bands operating from Thailand.[33] It is true that the border situation is

31. Pike, op. cit., p. 7.

32. AFP (Hong Kong), Feb. 24, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 28, 1978, pp. H/1-2.

33. See Prime Minister Chamanan Kriangsak's remarks on Bangkok Domestic Service, Mar. 4, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Mar. 6, 1978, p. J/1.

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Thai citizens evacuated from a border village as a result of Cambodian raids. A truck loaded with members of Thailand's border patrol speeds along the evacuation road.

—Sven Simon via Katherine Young.

very complex, with Thai Communists, Khmer anti-Communists, and military units of both sides involved. Nevertheless, it is possible that the Cambodian government is attempting to demonstrate its displeasure at Thai attempts to normalize relations with Vietnam by keeping the border dispute alive. Even so, the Thais may not wish to press the Cambodians too severely for fear that this would further Vietnam's goal of bringing about the Khmer regime's downfall and the establishment of a pro-Vietnamese government in Phnom Penh. Certainly, Prime Minister Chamanan Kriangsak seems prepared to tolerate the existence of Cambodian sanctuary for Thai insurgent groups without any significant retaliation.

The Quest for World Opinion

Both Hanoi and Phnom Penh have presented their cases to international opinion through their own media, diplomatic representation abroad, international meetings, and carefully arranged tours for supposedly sympathetic foreign delegations.

Cambodia's most effective political gambit against Vietnam has been its allegation that the latter is bent on creating a federation of the three Indochinese states under Hanoi's control. A number of considerations lend credence to this charge—the SRV's relative political and military might, its historical domination of Indochinese Communist movements as far back as the 1930's, and (interestingly enough) even the US domino theory, which predicted a dominant Vietnamese Communist position in Indochina if the Saigon government fell.

The federation charge is really a variant of Cambodia's other claim, that Vietnam is bent on forcibly occupying Cambodia and installing a puppet government. According to this line of reasoning, Hanoi would prefer a peaceful transition—as in Laos—in which Khmer authorities would accept Vietnamese troops and bureaucrats as "advisers" to their government in a "federal" political structure. When the Khmer Rouge refused to accede to this policy, however, the Vietnamese chose a military option.

In a long list of charges against the Vietnamese, KCP Central Committee Chairman and Prime Minister Pol Pot declared:

At first Vietnam desired to have an Indochinese federation composed of one single state—to have one party, one people, one army and one country in Indochina. Later the Vietnamese pretended to raise the possibility of forming a special friendship and special solidarity through . . . agreements or treaties for cooperation—particularly in the fields of domestic and foreign policy, military affairs, economy and culture—without any borders. . . . The essence of Vietnam's Indochina Federation is to abolish the border in order to weld Cambodia to Vietnam.

However, when this political plan failed, according to Pol Pot, "Vietnam. . .launched a cruel and large-scale war of aggression. . .involving many divisions. . .to take over Democratic Cambodia territory east of the Mekong River. . . .More importantly, they would then send Vietnamese. . .cadres to control this territory."[34]

Vietnam has, of course, denied Cambodia's allegations. But, it does publicly insist that "the special relations" developed among the Indochinese states during the wars against France and the United States should be retained "in their nation-building and defense efforts, in the interests of their respective independence and prosperity."[35] SRV authorities contend, then, that Indochina is a "special region" because of the historical links forged during an anti-colonial struggle of almost half a century. Therefore,

34. Phnom Penh Domestic Service, Apr. 12, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Apr. 13, 1978, p. H/1.

35. Hanoi International Service in Cambodian, Jan. 13, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 13, 1978, p. K/2.

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"the three countries which had been associated. . . in the struggle for national liberation will be forever associated. . .in the building and defense of their respective countries."[36]

Cambodia wants no part of any "special relationship," condemning it as a transparent guise for regional hegemony. In the future, warn Phnom Penh spokesmen, should Vietnam succeed in swallowing Cambodia and Laos, "other Southeast Asian countries will be added to the union."[37]

Vietnam's propaganda campaign, however, has in general been more sophisticated than that of Cambodia, which has only recently begun to alter its posture of international recluse. Phnom Penh, for example, continues to be virtually a ghost town, so its seven embassies are isolated. With the exception of the PRC embassy, all are confined to one street, sealed off at both ends by barbed wire. An account by UN official Alexander Cassella notes:

Diplomats are not permitted to move beyond their street or to visit one another without a special permit. When they want to meet, they must do so in the street. Once a day a cooked meal is delivered to each embassy door. The menu is the same, day after day, month after month.

Even diplomatic pouches are examined by Khmer authorities before they are permitted to leave the country.[38] Such behavior can scarcely generate much international sympathy.

Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ieng Sary, left, talks with Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in Tokyo on June 13, 1978.

—UPI.

Vietnam, on the other hand, has entertained numerous diplomatic missions (including three from the United Nations), broadcasts daily in several languages, has a worldwide press agency, and has gone to considerable lengths to explain its stand to the outside world through all these channels. It has also exploited its UN connection through a request to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for financial aid to care for some 150,000 Cambodian refugees (132,000 described as Khmers and 18,000 as Sino-Khmers) who have fled to Vietnam since 1975. This request represents the first time that a Communist state has asked help from the UN in assisting refugees from another Communist country. From a political perspective, the apparent international legitimacy accruing to Vietnam's version of the Khmer government's atrocities against its own population is worth considerably more than the UN emergency aid of US$500,000.[39]

Soon after the border war became public knowledge, moreover, Vietnam began courting the five states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore—with which it had previously had strained relations.[40] It has moved particularly to improve relations with Thailand in order not to dissipate its military and economic resources any further in an unnecessary confrontation with Bangkok.

Cambodia, too, has at last begun to open its protective cocoon. In speeches to visiting delegations from Thailand, Singapore, and Romania and on visits to North Korea and Japan, high-level Khmer spokesmen such as Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary have stressed that Cambodia's independence is vital to a peaceful Southeast Asia.[41] Furthermore,

36. Hanoi International Service in English, Jan. 25, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 26, 1978, p. K/6.

37. Phnom Penh Domestic Service, Mar. 15, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Mar. 16, 1978, p. H/1.

38. Alexander Cassella, "Vietnam and Cambodia: Basic Incompatibility," *The New York Times*, Mar. 31, 1978.

39. Michael Richardson, "A Helping Hand for Vietnam," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 23, 1978, p. 20.

40. For an analysis of the tensions between Vietnam and the ASEAN states, see this author's "The ASEAN States: Obstacles to Security Cooperation," *Orbis*, Summer 1978, pp. 415-34, and "Indochina's Security Situation," in Sheldon W. Simon, Ed., *The Military and Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

41. Ieng Sary's address to a visiting Thai government delegation broadcast by Phnom Penh Domestic Service, Jan. 30, 1978, and translated in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 31, 1978, p. H/2; Radio Phnom Penh's report on Cambodia's presentation at the UN Disarmament Conference, June 21, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, June 22, 1978, p. H/5.

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Teng Ying-chao, center, widow of the late Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, arrives at Phnom Penh airport on January 18, 1978. She is greeted by Cambodian Prime Minister and party leader Pol Pot, left.

—Wide World.

Cambodia has endorsed the ASEAN concept of creating a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia, which, according to Pol Pot, would free the region "from all forms of interference and intervention of the imperialist and expansionist powers and their supporting cliques."[42]

Sino-Soviet Connections

Although essentially a serious regional conflict, the Vietnam-Cambodia war has broader security implications. It is linked to the Sino-Soviet confrontation by the fact that each large Communist state has come to back one of the antagonists. This linkage has been underscored by the surfacing of Sino-Vietnamese hostility in 1978, which may now rank with the Sino-Soviet dispute as one of the most ominous conflicts to arise between two Communist powers. (Since this article focuses on Indochina, however, Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Soviet relations will be discussed only insofar as they impinge upon Vietnam and Cambodia.)

It is noteworthy that while Moscow (having no position to protect in Cambodia) immediately took Vietnam's side in January 1978 after the border conflict was advertised in Phnom Penh and Hanoi media, China tried to avoid committing itself irreversibly to Cambodia. Initially, the PRC media reported the allegations of each side without comment. Chou En-lai's widow even journeyed to Phnom Penh in hopes of mediating the dispute, but to no avail. In fact, Peking's credentials as a mediator were probably suspect to Hanoi from the beginning. Not only had the PRC been Cambodia's only political backer after 1975, but as the January battles occurred, it also airlifted substantial amounts of ammunition into Cambodia. Subsequent arms shipments have reportedly included long-range artillery.[43]

By the Fifth National People's Congress in February, however, Peking had abandoned all semblance of neutrality. In his Political Report to the congress, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng condemned Vietnam (without actually naming it) in much the same manner that the PRC had been condemning the USSR:

42. Prime Minister Pol Pot's speech during the visit of Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, Phnom Penh Domestic Service, May 29, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, May 30, 1978, p. H/5; and Ieng Sary's talks in Tokyo as reported by Kyodo, June 13, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, June 13, 1978, p. C/3.

43. Intelligence reports cited in Leighton, loc. cit., p. 451.

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No country should seek hegemony in any region or impose its will on others. Whether a country treats others on an equal footing or seeks hegemony is a major criterion by which to tell whether it follows the five principles of peaceful coexistence and whether it is a genuine or sham socialist country. A socialist country should set an example in treating others as equals.[44]

One month later, the PRC's own simmering dispute with Vietnam boiled over.[45] Unconfirmed reports of fighting along the Yunnan border coincided with a major Vietnamese crackdown on the remaining Chinese merchant class in Saigon and the flight of thousands of ethnic Chinese to the PRC and Thailand. By September over 160,000 had reportedly fled to China on their own, without formal repatriation.

This exodus of many of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese added fuel to the flames of animosity which had been ignited as early as 1974-75. At that juncture, the PRC had occupied the Paracel Islands, and Vietnam had responded by taking over the Spratlys. Each country claims both potentially oil-rich island groups in the South China Sea. All of these developments, it should be noted, had occurred despite the widespread belief that the PRC did not wish to alienate Vietnam for fear of driving it further into the arms of the Soviet Union, perhaps even so far as to permit the USSR to use prize US-built naval bases such as Cam Ranh Bay.

Vietnam has chided the PRC for its protests over confiscation of the property of Cholon (Saigon's Chinatown) merchants:

The socialist transformation of private capitalist industry and trade, a universal law of socialist revolution, has been achieved in China. But when it is being carried out in Vietnam, should it stop before masses of property owned by bourgeoisie just because they are Vietnamese of Chinese descent?

44. Hua Kuo-feng's report to the Fifth NPC, carried by the New China News Agency (NCNA), Mar. 6, 1978, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Mar. 16, 1978, Supplement, p. 35.

45. For background information on the tension between the PRC and Vietnam in the aftermath of the Indochina war, see Sheldon W. Simon, "Peking and Indochina: The Perplexity of Victory," *Asian Survey*, May 1976.

Vietnamese citizens of Chinese origin gather their belongings in Vietnam's border town of Huu Nghi (Friendship) before crossing to the People's Republic of China in June 1978.

—MTI/SYGMA.

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Moreover, the Vietnamese point out maliciously that there was no such protest when thousands of Sino-Khmer fled Cambodia for Vietnam in 1975.[46]

The Chinese exodus issue is complicated by differing concepts of citizenship prevailing in the two states. While there is not space here to go into the opposing legal rationales in detail, the Vietnamese basically argue that most of Vietnam's *Hoa* (Chinese) are Vietnamese nationals as a consequence of a Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic agreement made during the 1950's for the North and of acceptance of citizenship in the South over the past 20 years. Therefore, China's protests constitute unwarranted interference in Vietnam's internal affairs. Peking counters by arguing that the Chinese in the North never had the opportunity to choose Vietnamese nationality *voluntarily* and that to claim citizenship for Chinese in the South because that was the situation under the Diem regime is "an absurdity."[47]

The Cambodian conflict enters into this Sino-Vietnamese imbroglio through a series of charges and countercharges concerning the motivation behind the Chinese flight. PRC sources claim that Chinese in both the North and the South had their possessions confiscated and employment opportunities revoked, thus leaving them destitute. They were then given the choice of moving to paramilitary "new economic zones" near the Cambodian frontier or leaving the country. According to this explanation, Vietnamese cadres also warned resident Chinese that a major war with Cambodia and the PRC was imminent and that to remain in Vietnam would be interpreted by Peking as treason against the Chinese motherland.[48]

The Vietnamese claim that the Chinese exodus was the result of rumors spread on orders from Peking delivered through the Chinese embassy in Hanoi,[49] but their version of the substance of the rumors coincides with the story of the Chinese. Hanoi nevertheless insists that the *Hoa* remain welcome in Vietnam and that they should stay and continue their efforts on behalf of the country's reconstruction.

Other observers find neither of these explanations adequate. Chinese businessmen in the South have left mostly for Thailand and Malaysia rather than for the PRC. At the same time, Chinese residents in the North have been receiving particularly close scrutiny from tax and security officials since the outbreak of open conflict with Cambodia and the crackdown on private trade. It is possible that they interpreted such actions as the opening stage of a new discriminatory policy. The exodus which began in late March following the clampdown on private trade, then, may have been simply a snowball effect of the combination of the tense political climate and personal concerns about the PRC's ties to Cambodia.[50]

In late May, Sino-Vietnamese relations hit their nadir. The PRC canceled its aid projects and made arrangements to repatriate its technicians. It also closed three Vietnamese consulates in South China—another unprecedented move in diplomatic relations between Communist states. During this period reports began to circulate of Soviet acquisition of missile and naval bases in Vietnam—which, the Chinese believe, is one of Moscow's major purposes in fanning Vietnam's anti-Chinese sentiments.

Scanning its strategic environment, the PRC claims to see a connection between Soviet support for Vietnam in its border war with Cambodia and the Soviet desire to pressure Hanoi into an alliance against Peking. Soviet naval bases in Vietnam, according to this scenario, would form part of a strategic arc from the Horn of Africa to Vladivostok. By egging Vietnam on to chauvinistic wars against Cambodia and the PRC, the Soviets can exact a political price for continued military and economic aid.

Moreover, Peking has little room for maneuver on the Overseas Chinese issue, for its reaction to their treatment would certainly be seen as a test case by Southeast Asian countries, which have varying degrees of anxiety about the 14 million ethnic Chinese living within their borders. The PRC, which has recently inaugurated a policy of backing the Overseas Chinese community for economic reasons, cannot allow Vietnam to succeed in suppressing its local Chinese without encouraging other anti-Chinese politicians in the region.

Nevertheless, China is caught in something of a dilemma in backing a Cambodian regime that is an

46. Commentator for *Nhan Dan* (Hanoi), May 29, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, May 30, 1978, pp. K/4-7.

47. These opposing positions may be found in an SRV Foreign Ministry statement carried by VNA on May 27, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, May 30, 1978, pp. K/1-4; a commentator article in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), June 9, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, June 19, 1978, pp. K/5-15; and a PRC Foreign Ministry note to the SRV dated May 12, 1978.

48. *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), May 21, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 24, 1978, pp. N/3-5; and the article by the *Jen-min Jih-pao* commentator, June 10, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 12, 1978, pp. A/11-13.

49. *Nhan Dan*, June 17, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, June 19, 1978, p. K/4.

50. This line of reasoning is reported in Nayan Chanda, "Vietnam Prepares for the Worst," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 9, 1978, pp. 10-14.

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international pariah. While Peking has in all likelihood urged a greater degree of moderation on Cambodian leaders, PRC planners probably do not believe that they can protect Pol Pot's regime against an internal uprising backed by the limited use of Vietnam's army. Therefore, recent tension on the Sino-Vietnamese border—insofar as it is orchestrated by China—may be designed to compel the SRV to shift its military attention away from Cambodia. While such a tactic may have merit in the short term, its long-run viability is uncertain. Moreover, a Sino-Vietnamese military confrontation would only provide further opportunities for Soviet leverage on Hanoi.

Possible Outcomes

A clear-cut, mutually agreeable negotiated settlement of the Vietnam-Cambodia war appears unlikely. As Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary has put things,

As for the so-called "Kampuchea-Vietnam dispute," it can be solved only after its roots are eliminated, for this is not a normal border dispute. It has remained unresolved so far not for want of negotiations. Since 1975 Kampuchea has held many meetings and talks with Vietnam at all levels. However, all these were in vain, for the roots of this problem lie in the fact that Vietnam has the intention of swallowing Kampuchea, subverting and aggressing against it, attempting to engineer a coup d'état, and force it to join an Indochina federation under its [sic] domination so that Vietnam can annex Kampuchea within a set period of time and take a step toward fulfilling its ambitions in Southeast Asia.[51]

Cambodia claims, furthermore, that even Hanoi's agreements cannot be trusted, that it has reneged on a frontier arrangement concluded in 1966-67 defining territorial waters in the Gulf of Thailand.[52] The maritime boundary question is also complicated by recent declarations from Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok of 200-mile economic zones, all of which overlap and must be reconciled. Hanoi has taken the diplomatic initiative in offering to negotiate. On February 5, 1978, it broached a three-point proposal that called for (1) an end to hostilities and the withdrawal of the forces of both sides five kilometers behind their borders; (2) a meeting to conclude a treaty that would pledge mutual respect and noninterference in each other's affairs as well as nonaggression, after which the border question would be settled "on the basis of respect for each other's territorial sovereignty within the existing border"; and (3) international guarantee and supervision of the agreement.[53] Hanoi spokesmen argued that the SRV proposal should put Cambodian fears of subversion and aggression to rest, for it would guarantee Cambodian's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[54]

Cambodian Prime Minister and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kampuchean Communist Party, Pol Pot, left, with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and CCP Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying (right rear) in Peking at the October 1977 national day celebration of the People's Republic of China.

—Camera Press.

Cambodia called the proposal "deceitful." It backed up this charge with an alleged confession of captured Vietnamese spies, who described the Hanoi document as a ploy to win over international opinion and cause Cambodia to lower its guard.[55]

But in May, perhaps to demonstrate some degree

51. Ieng Sary address to the Japan-Cambodia Friendship Society in Tokyo, Phnom Penh Domestic Service, June 18, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, June 20, 1978, p. H/4.

52. Interview with Prime Minister Pol Pot, Phnom Penh Domestic Service, Mar. 20, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Mar. 21, 1978, p. H/1.

53. SRV government statement carried by VNA, Feb. 5, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 6, 1978, p. K/2.

54. *Nhan Dan* editorial, Feb. 6, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 6, 1978, p. K/9; and an interview with the Vietnamese ambassador to France, *Le Monde* (Paris), Feb. 8, 1978.

55. Phnom Penh Domestic Service, Mar. 6, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Mar. 20, 1978, p. H/6.

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of "reasonableness," Phnom Penh presented a counteroffer. Cambodia declared that it would agree to talks in seven months if the SRV stopped all hostile acts during that period, including the infiltration of spies and attempts to stage a coup. Hanoi dismissed the counteroffer as, in effect, a rejection of negotiations.[56]

Despite its own difficulties with Vietnam, Peking may still be encouraging Cambodia to agree to meet with the SRV. A PRC Foreign Ministry statement dealing primarily with "the expulsion of Chinese residents by Vietnam" noted: "The Chinese government has always stood for the settlement of differences and disputes between states through consultation and negotiation."[57] Soon thereafter, Ieng Sary omitted any reference to a time limit prior to negotiations so long as Vietnam made "a public guarantee that it will respect Kampuchea's territorial integrity and sovereignty, stop interfering in its internal affairs and subverting the Kampuchean Government, and cease the activities to engineer a *coup d'état*. If this is done, then we will negotiate."[58] Still, there has been no indication that Vietnam plans to alter its behavior.

Vietnam is left in a dilemma. Protracted warfare would not serve Vietnam's interests, since it would divert precious resources from economic development, further diminish the morale of a war-weary population, and risk alienating international opinion and slowing external assistance. A major escalation of the war seems equally unpalatable, since it would exacerbate all the disadvantages just mentioned and probably even stiffen support of the Cambodian people for what most must now consider to be a thoroughly detestable government. Unilateral withdrawal could have severe political repercussions within the Vietnam Politburo and imply an abandonment of hegemonic aims in Indochina. Furthermore, as Pike points out, Vietnam's prospects for establishing a client regime in Cambodia are dim.[59] In addition to the difficulty of creating a client state short of military conquest, a client state could succeed only where a national infrastructure exists to be administered. There is no such infrastructure in Cambodia today. Instead, the incumbent government appears to operate through commune-like villages. To administer such an arrangement would require the Vietnamese to send units into every village. This would be military occupation, not a client government.

In sum, none of Vietnam's options are attractive, particularly since relations with the PRC have deteriorated so rapidly and now present Hanoi with the grim prospect of a two-front war. Moreover, Cambodia is unwilling even to consider negotiations until Vietnamese forces have completely left its territory. Yet the actual location of the border in many places remains a matter of disagreement. If there is to be withdrawal, from what territory should each side withdraw? Since the precise borders cannot be determined without negotiations, Cambodia and Vietnam are at a diplomatic impasse.

So long as the Cambodian government believes that Vietnam is bent on its overthrow and the annexation of Cambodian territory, a negotiated settlement to the war seems out of the question. Yet the political costs to Vietnam of altering its current protracted warfare policy are also high. Stalemate appears the most probable forecast unless the Soviets are willing to fully underwrite Vietnam's development needs—thus making escalation more attractive. However, Moscow has given no indications of such generosity.

56. The proposal was reported by AFP (Hong Kong), June 2, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, June 2, 1978, p. H/1. Hanoi's rejection was publicized in a *Nhan Dan* commentator column, June 5, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, June 5, 1978, p. K/1.

57. PRC Foreign Ministry statement, NCNA, June 9, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 12, 1978, pp. A/5-11.

58. Ieng Sary press conference in Tokyo, carried by NCNA, June 13, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 14, 1978, p. A/3.

59. Pike, op. cit., pp. 21, 25, 26.

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The Opposition in Poland

By Adam Bromke

Poland has always occupied a special place among the Communist countries because of the scope of its internal freedom. For the more than 30 years that it has existed, the Communist government there has failed not only to establish its legitimacy in the eyes of many Poles but also to extinguish all traces of opposition. Indeed, when faced with workers' revolts in Poznan in 1956 and in Gdansk and Szczecin in 1970, the authorities retreated before popular pressure.

Again, in June 1976, when the workers in Ursus and Radom took to the streets in protest against food price increases, the Communist government hastily withdrew the objectionable measures. This time, however, popular ferment did not stop there. The "June events," as the Poles call them, produced a chain reaction which led to the emergence of a fundamentally new political situation in the country.[1] Opposition, which in the past had been largely passive and scattered, has now become active—it has taken an organized, vocal, and increasingly influential political form.

A Shattered Modus Vivendi

Between 1956 and the mid-1970's, a subtle modus vivendi existed in relations between the Communist regime and various opposition groups. This was based on mutual acceptance of the country's difficult international position. Both sides, although for different reasons, wanted to avoid direct Soviet intervention in Poland. For the Communists, such intervention would have meant even further curtailment of their domestic authority; and for opposition elements, it would likely have entailed drastic restriction of what modest freedoms they in fact enjoyed. The compact was never overtly spelled out, but its essential rules were well understood and generally respected by both sides. In exchange for the Communist authorities' exercise of a modicum of moderation, opposition groups abstained from challenging the regime outright. Indeed, the major confrontations during this period were entirely spontaneous and narrowly focused attacks on specific policies. The workers' outbursts stemmed from sheer desperation over their economic plight, and the peasants' stubborn and largely successful resistance against the collectivization of agriculture was instinctive.

The Catholic church also avoided unnecessary confrontations with the Communist government. Continued mass adherence of the population to the Catholic religion—rooted in long national tradition—made the church a powerful organized force in the country. However, it conceived its role as largely confined to spiritual, moral, and at most cultural spheres, and only rarely, usually at a time of major crisis, did it take a stand on political issues. Although the church steadfastly defended the principles of freedom of conscience and respect for human dignity, its position, as articulated by its venerable leader, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, was

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1. Political developments in Poland since June 1976 are reviewed in the author's "Poland at the Crossroads," *The World Today* (London), April 1978.

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generally moderate. Indeed, in 1956 and again in 1970, when there was a danger that the escalation of domestic conflict might lead to Soviet intervention, Cardinal Wyszynski appealed to the Poles for calm and restraint.

During the period, the most articulate criticisms of Communist policies came from the intellectuals. The writers, scholars, and artists did not constitute an organized group, but through their frequent interactions, particularly in Warsaw, they formed a closely-knit milieu. As a matter both of principle and of fashion, in a sort of inverted snobbery, they strove to manifest their reservations about the Communist regime. These they punctuated by public protests against selected government measures. Generally, they denounced the restrictions on cultural freedom, but they also condemned some especially flagrant abuses of human rights. The intellectuals' proposals for reforms, however, stayed within the limits of the Communist system, for they were resigned to the fact that it could not be changed. Moreover, their criticisms were often constrained by their own pasts: most had been leftists, and many also had formerly been members of the ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). Of particular importance, the anticlericalism of many intellectuals prevented them from establishing solidarity with the Catholic church.[2]

In the mid-1970's, the overall political situation in Poland changed dramatically as a result of a number of factors. To begin with, the opposition became emboldened by the improvement in East-West relations and by the example of Soviet dissidents' use of détente as a protective umbrella for their activities. In the eyes of many Poles, the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe reduced the chances that the USSR would intervene in their country as it had in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Carter Administration's early pronouncements about human rights heartened them as well.

More important were the consequences of the coming-of-age of the postwar generation in Poland. Free of the defeatist memories of World War II, these younger people are impatient with their fathers' passive resistance to communism. They are no longer satisfied with the solution of "a little stabilization"—seeking refuge in private life and restricting one's interests to personal welfare—which was prevalent among the old generation in the 1950's and into the 1960's. The ferment among the youth first became evident in 1968 during the widespread student riots, in Warsaw and some other university cities, against restrictions on cultural freedom. In 1970, a clandestine group of young people who smuggled political literature from the West through the Tatra Mountains (and were hence dubbed the "Alpinists") was discovered and tried. In 1971, there were several trials of members of another underground group called Ruch (The Movement), with most of the defendants being under 30 years old.

Finally, the Gierek regime itself, through its mistakes, helped the opposition consolidate its forces and come out into the open. Intoxicated with its relative successes in the early 1970's,[3] the PUWP in 1974 abandoned its generally moderate stance and launched an open "ideological offensive," intensifying pressures on both the Catholic church and the intellectuals. The next year, despite signs of rapidly deteriorating economic conditions, the party proposed amendments to the Polish Constitution that would bring the document closer to the Soviet model. These proposed changes were regarded by the opposition as a violation of the implicit compact between it and the government. The result was a deluge of formal protests, signed by some 40,000 people in all, including many prominent intellectuals.[4] The Catholic Episcopate and Cardinal Wyszynski personally threw their great authority behind the opposition. Under popular pressure, the party modified the most controversial constitutional amendments, but the harm to the Communist regime had already been done.[5] Its

2. For a critique of the leftist intellectuals' negative attitude toward the Catholic church in the 1960's, written by a young leftist leader of the opposition, see Adam Michnik, *Kosciol, lewica, dialog* (The Church, the Left, the Dialogue), Paris, Institut Littéraire, 1977.

3. The situation in Poland in the early stages of the Gierek regime was reviewed in the author's "Poland Under Gierek: A New Political Style," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1972, and in Adam Bromke and John W. Strong, Eds., *Gierek's Poland,* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1973. For an assessment of the economic picture see Michael Gamarnikow, "Poland Under Gierek: A New Economic Approach," *Problems of Communism,* September-October 1972; Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy in the 1970s," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977. On the activities of the opposition, see Peter Raine, *Political Opposition in Poland, 1954-1977,* London, Poets and Painters Press, 1978.

4. Jacek Kuron, "Thoughts on the Program of Action," in *Ruch oporu* (The Resistance Movement), Paris, Institut Littéraire, 1977, p. 198.

5. The conflict over constitutional amendments is dealt with in the author's "A New Juncture in Poland," *Problems of Communism,* September-October 1976. See also, Alexandra Kwiatkowska and Georges H. Mond, "Strife to the East," *La Documentation française* (Paris), Sept. 9, 1977, pp. 8-11.

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Prominent figures in the Committee for Defense of the Workers (KOR): from left to right, Professor Edward Lipinski, novelist Jerzy Andrzejewski, literary historian Jan Jozef Lipski, and historian Antoni Macieriewicz.

—First two photos from Camera Press and EUPRA; last two provided through arrangement of the author.

prestige was seriously undermined, and from then on opposition activities snowballed. In May 1976, a new clandestine group appeared, calling itself the Polish Coalition for Independence (PPN). Its *manifesto*, circulated in *samizdat* form, called for restoration of democracy in the country and for Poland's independence from the USSR.[6]

An open break between the opposition and the Communist regime soon ensued. When, following the Ursus and Radom demonstrations in June, the Communist authorities resorted to widespread persecutions of the workers involved, the intellectuals promptly rallied to the workers' defense. In July 1976, a prominent writer, Jerzy Andrzejewski, praised the persecuted workers as "fighters for true socialist democracy" and pledged to persevere in efforts on their behalf.[7] To this end, on September 27, 1976, a Committee for Defense of the Workers (KOR) was established.

Committee for Defense of the Workers

The composition of KOR reflected the various layers of opposition in Poland. Among its members (14 originally and 31 as of this writing), there are several prominent prewar social democrats such as Professor Edward Lipinski, a respected economist, and Antoni Pajdak, one of the defendants in the trial of the Polish leaders in Moscow in 1945. They are all now in their 70's or even 80's. Another group is composed of well-known members of the wartime resistance movement. The youngest of these is a literary historian, Jan Jozef Lipski, who is now in his early 50's. But the largest, and also the most active, group in KOR consists of leaders of the 1968 student movement. Except for a former teacher, Jacek Kuron, who is in his 40's, these people are all in their early 30's or late 20's. The most widely known among them is a talented historian, Adam Michnik, who spent several months in Western Europe in 1976-77. Less known abroad, but no less influential, is another historian, Antoni Macierewicz, who, together with several of his friends and very much in the Polish tradition, joined the opposition ranks after having been active in the Boy Scouts movement in Warsaw.

A good many of KOR's supporters are student activists of 1968. Some of these have been members of Communist youth organizations or come from families with Communist ties. They still consider themselves leftists, or even Marxists, but of a more Western, Eurocommunist, or even social democratic brand. Others, such as the former "Alpinists," simply regard themselves as democrats. A relatively large group of the young activists are devoted Catholics, who continue to participate in official lay activities of the church. As a group, these young men and women, by now more mature and experienced than they were a decade ago and often hardened by years of imprisonment, are grimly determined to carry on their struggle for freedom.

6. See "The Declaration of the Polish Coalition for Independence," in *Ruch oporu*, pp. 187-93.

7. See *Aneks* (London), No. 12, 1976, pp. 43-44.

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KOR's initial aims were modest. Its first communiqués, issued in *samizdat* form, reported on the persecutions of the imprisoned workers—with detailed accounts of police brutality—and announced a public campaign to raise funds for medical and legal aid. Gradually, however, the Committee's goals grew more ambitious. They came to include amnesty for all the imprisoned workers and their reinstatement in the same positions they had held before June 1976, plus punishment of those police officers guilty of abusing their powers. On January 16, 1977, KOR appealed to the Polish parliament (the Sejm) to appoint a special committee to investigate charges of beating and torturing of prisoners.[8] Eventually, KOR's activities broadened further and involved assistance to a variety of individuals persecuted by the authorities.

Candles and flowers at an impromptu shrine at the Krakow apartment of student Stanislaw Pyjas, a supporter of the Committee for Defense of the Workers who was found dead on May 7, 1977.

—SYGMA.

The Committee has developed quite ingenious methods for its activities. It has declared itself to be not a *political*, but merely a *social*, body. To avoid submitting itself to public control by the Communist authorities, it has refrained from adopting a formal organizational structure. It has operated simply as a group of citizens spontaneously cooperating to promote common goals. All of the Committee's activities have been conducted openly, but, naturally, some of them, especially the publishing and distributing of the *samizdat* materials, have been carried on more discreetly than others.

KOR offers moral encouragement, legal advice, and financial aid to the politically persecuted. For this purpose, money has been collected all over the country. However, the major vehicles of KOR's influence have been the communiqués, declarations, and appeals circulated throughout the country in *samizdat* form. It has regularly published its own paper, the *Biuletin informacyjny* (Information Bulletin), named, significantly, after an influential organ of the Polish wartime resistance.[9]

Around these activities, KOR has built an impressive popular following. By the summer of 1978, there were official Committee representatives in nine cities, and active KOR supporters in many other centers. The Committee's demand for the establishment of a parliamentary committee to investigate police abuses was supported by close to 2,000 people, among them many distinguished intellectuals.[10] Cardinal Wyszynski, in several sermons, threw his enormous prestige behind KOR. Although refraining from directly endorsing the Committee's political goals, he made it clear that he fully supported its activities on behalf of the persecuted workers.[11]

The goverment's initial reaction to KOR's activities was mixed. On the one hand, a systematic campaign of vilification of the Committee was mounted in the press. The members of KOR were characterized as enemies of the socialist system in Poland and as collaborators of Western anticommunist centers. Several Committee members were dismissed from their jobs. Many others became objects of systematic police harassment and intimidation. At the same time, however, the arrested Ursus and Radom

8. *Dissent in Poland 1976-77*, London, Association of Polish Students and Graduates in Exile, 1977, pp. 123-37.
9. For a comprehensive collection of KOR documents in English translation, see *Dissent in Poland 1976-77*.
10. Ibid., pp. 123-37.
11. Ibid., pp. 149-64.

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Hunger strikers at St. Martin's Church in Warsaw in May 1977, protesting the arrest of six members of the Committee for Defense of the Workers (KOR) and of four KOR supporters earlier in the month. With the demonstrators is Tadeusz Mazowiecki (front row center, in the light-colored topcoat), Editor-in-Chief of the Catholic monthly Wiez, *who acted as liaison between Polish authorities and the strikers.*

—Photo provided by arrangement of the author.

workers were being quietly released one by one. By the spring of 1977, only five of them still remained in prison.

This uneasy standoff broke down after May 7, 1977, when Stanislaw Pyjas, a Krakow student and an active KOR supporter, was found dead. His fellow students reacted swiftly to what they took to be a political assassination (although it is doubtful that his death was in fact a premeditated action). Solemn requiem masses were celebrated in all the university cities in Poland. On May 15, some 2,000 Krakow students staged a candlelight procession through the city. Tension was high, and it was feared that clashes between students and police might ensue, sparking an open revolt. At that moment, six key members of KOR, as well as four KOR supporters, were arrested and accused of cooperation with anticommunist centers in the West. The arrests produced a new wave of protests. At the end of May, 11 persons held a hunger strike in St. Martin's Church in Warsaw. An appeal for the release of the KOR members, characterizing them "not as criminals, but as dedicated social activists," was issued by 17 prominent writers, scholars, and artists.[12] Under mounting popular pressure, the Communist government relented. On July 23, all of the prisoners—the KOR members and supporters, as well as the remaining five workers—were set free.[13]

KOR has, since September 29, 1977, gone under the expanded name of Committee for Social Self-Defense—KOR (KSS-KOR), although its composition and its structure have remained basically unchanged. Now constituted as a permanent body, KSS-KOR has expanded its goals from the defense of persecuted workers to more general combating of violations of the law, fighting for institutional guarantees of civil rights, and assisting in all similar social initiatives.[14]

12. *Kultura* (Paris), June 1977, p. 142.

13. An interesting account of the developments in Poland in 1977, with special attention to the activities of the opposition, is presented in Peter Osnos, "The Polish Road to Communism," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), October 1977, pp. 209-20.

14. These were reported in *Kultura,* November 1977, pp. 144-45.

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The achievements of KOR went beyond rallying a great number of people in defense of the persecuted workers and, through popular pressure, compelling the Communist government to abandon its reprisals. Perhaps even more important were the psychological consequences of this achievement. The Committee demonstrated that there is room in contemporary Poland for successful political action. By standing up to the Communist authorities, KOR overcame the political inertia among various segments of Polish society, and its example led to a proliferation of similar activities in many other spheres of life.

Proliferation of Opposition Groups

On March 25, 1977, the founding of a new group, called the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO) was announced. Its 18 founding members were predominantly from Warsaw and Lodz. The most visible among them was Leszek Moczulski, a former journalist and historian of World War II, who is now in his mid-40's. For the most part, however, ROPCiO, like KOR, is composed of distinctly separate prewar and postwar generations. Among its older members are a prewar general, Mieczyslaw Boruta-Spiechowicz, and a leader of the former Christian Democratic party, Stefan Kaczorowski. The younger members are mostly former participants in the clandestine group Ruch. The best known of the latter is Andrzej Czuma, who in the spring of 1978 pushed Moczulski aside and emerged as the leading personality in ROPCiO.

In contrast to KSS-KOR, the Movement has no Marxist leanings; if anything, it has reverted to the political traditions of interwar Poland. It is more critical of the Communist system and is more far-reaching in its proposals for political change. The objectives of ROPCiO, as defined in its initial manifesto,[15] are to fight for respect for human and civil rights, to assist persons whose rights have been infringed upon, to publicize violations of the laws, and to strive for institutional safeguards of basic freedoms.

To promote these ends, the Movement has established offices in 11 Polish cities, where free advice is offered to citizens aggrieved by the Communist authorities. By the fall of 1977, they had a current docket of 43 such complaints. ROPCiO's organ is a *samizdat* monthly, *Opinia* (Opinion). In addition to publicizing the Movement's program and activities,

15. See *Dissent in Poland 1976-77*, pp.182-85.

Diverse elements of Polish society gather for the September 1976 funeral of General Roman Abraham (the last commander of the Polish cavalry) in Wrzesnia: at the top, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, the Primate of the Catholic church in Poland, officiates at the funeral; at the center, in the prewar military uniform (with high collar and braided sleeve cuffs), General Mieczyslaw Boruta-Spiechowicz, who the following spring became a founding member of the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO); at bottom, in the center, Leszek Moczulski, a former journalist and historian of World War II, a prominent founding member of ROPCiO.

—Photos provided by arrangement of the author.

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the paper covers current domestic and international events quite extensively.[16] On June 5, 1977, ROPCiO sponsored the first reunion of former political prisoners, and on August 6 it organized a patriotic demonstration by the grave of prewar Polish Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly. On December 30, an *Opinia* correspondent tried unsuccessfully to attend the Warsaw press conference of US President Jimmy Carter.[17]

In addition to KSS-KOR and ROPCiO, various other groups and *samizdat* publications representing a wide diversity of opinion have appeared in Poland in the last year. About the same time that ROPCiO was set up, a Polish chapter of Amnesty International was founded, with some overlapping of key personalities. In the fall of 1977, the Polish Committee for the Defense of Life and Family was formed. It soon collected over 6,000 signatures on an appeal to parliament to abolish the existing, extremely liberal abortion laws.[18] In the spring of 1978, it came out with its own publication, *Samoobrona Polska* (The Polish Self-Defense), in which, in addition to continuing its antiabortion campaign, it openly reverted to the political tradition of prewar National Democracy. In the summer of 1978, Moczulski and some of his followers, after leaving ROPCiO, established a new monthly, *Droga* (The Road).

At the time of the demonstrations in Krakow in May 1977 the Students' Solidarity Committee (SKS) spontaneously came into existence. Its declared objective is to replace the Communist-dominated student organization with a body that truly represents the Polish students. SKS now has branches at virtually every university in the country and publishes two papers, *Bratniak* (Fraternity) and *Indeks* (Index). In the autumn of 1977, an independent journal of young Catholics, *Spotkania* (Encounters),[19] covering religious as well as social and political topics, was founded. In the autumn of 1977, the first issue of *Robotnik* (The Worker), a publication whose name was borrowed from the respected organ of the old Polish Peasant Party (PPS), appeared. It pledged to strive for replacement of the official trade unions with genuine workers' representation. This journal was soon followed by *Gospodarz* (The Farmer), addressed to the peasants and urging them to continue their opposition to collectivization of agriculture. Meanwhile, two literary *samizdat* periodicals, *Zapis* (The Record)[20] and *Puls* (Pulse), entered into circulation. Both were of exceptionally good quality, with the latter even including photographs and drawings. *Zapis* was issued by NOWA (Independent Publishing House), which at the same time announced that it intended to undertake publication of books banned by censorship. By the spring of 1978, 13 such volumes, six in belles-lettres and seven in the social sciences, had come out.

Side by side with these open opposition groups, various clandestine groups have continued to function or have started up in Poland in the last two years. For example, the Polish Coalition for Independence has continued to publish critical, often quite penetrating, analyses of various aspects of life in Poland, such as official discrimination against the Catholic church, lack of popular respect for the law, widespread corruption among the ruling elite, and apathy among the people. To oppose these negative phenomena, the PPN has prepared several practical guides to action which outline, for instance, how to cope with the security police and how to collect true information about the situation in the country.[21] In the fall of 1977, another clandestine group gave evidence of its existence with the first issue of a bimonthly, *Polska Walczaca* (Fighting Poland), whose name, significantly, was a cryptonym used for the Polish wartime underground. On October 20, 1977, a Declaration of the Democratic Movement, signed by 110 people, was published in still another *samizdat* paper, *Glos* (The Voice). The declaration observed with satisfaction that in the preceding two years Communist attempts to break the Movement had not only failed but had in fact made it even more popular, to the point that it now had "thousands" of adherents. The time had come, the declaration stated, for the Democratic Movement to undertake the struggle for Poland's democracy and sovereignty.[22]

Along with the flourishing of *samizdat* publications came a proliferation of discussion groups of all sorts, especially among the young people. Some of them have been sponsored by KSS-KOR, ROPCiO,

16. The first four issues of *Opinia* were republished in book form in the West: *Opinia, Pismo ruchu obrony praw czlowieka i obywatela, Numery 1-4* (*Opinion, Organ of the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights*, Nos. 1-4), London, Polonia Book Fund, 1977.

17. See *Opinia* (Warsaw), No. 9, January 1978, and *The New York Times*, Jan. 2, 1978.

18. *Samoobrona Polska* (Warsaw), mimeographed, April 1978, p. 11.

19. The first two issues of this journal were published in book form: *Spotkania: niezalezne pismo mlodych katolikow* (Encounters: Independent Organ of the Young Catholics) [Lubin, Nos. 1-2, October 1977-January 1978], Great Britain, n.p., n.d.

20. The first two volumes, *Zapis I* [May 1977] and *Zapis II* (October 1977], were republished by Index on Censorship, London.

21. For the initial program of PPN, see *Dissent in Poland 1976-77*, pp. 165-70.

22. Reprinted in *Kultura*, December 1977, pp. 138-41.

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or the SKS, while others have sprung up quite spontaneously. They have met in private homes and also, occasionally, on local church premises. In Warsaw and in some other major cities, veritable intellectual salons have emerged, where prominent writers read their works and well-known scholars give lectures.

The Flying University

In November 1977, at the initiative of the students' committees, an effort was made to transform some of these occasional lectures into systematic courses. The aim was to supplement the education offered at regular universities, especially in those fields where Communist ideology had placed political limitations on objective scholarship—*i.e.*, in modern history, literature, philosophy, and the social sciences. This new venture has been designated the "Flying University" (UL), after a similar institution in Warsaw at the turn of the century that had played an important role in rekindling national consciousness among Polish students attending Russianized schools by giving secret training in native history and literature. Unlike its distinguished predecessor, the present Flying University is an open institution. It is sponsored by the Society for Educational Courses (TKN), which was founded on January 22, 1978, and is composed of 61 persons, including many prominent writers and scholars. To supervise the quality of courses offered at the UL, the Society established from among its members an Education Council.[23]

In the first trimester (or set of lectures), the Flying University offered five courses on an experimental basis, but by the third trimester, that number had risen to 13. These lectures took place in Warsaw as well as in other major university cities. Although the UL offers no diplomas, its courses have proved to be quite popular. Attendance has averaged 30–40 students but has run as high as 100 for lectures such as Polish postwar history. As an aid to students, "flying libraries" of books banned from the regular university collections have been established. To cap things off, a Free Association of Research and Studies was founded in the spring of 1978. Composed of scholars who have been prevented from working at official institutions, it seeks to foster research free of political influence and to disseminate the results in the form of *samizdat* publications.

23. Ibid., March 1978, pp. 86-87.

The Communist authorities have charged that the objectives of the Flying University are not educational but political, that its main aim is to spread opposition ideas among the young people. Consequently, the authorities have tried hard to restrict the scope of UL activities. Students participating in the courses have been warned by regular university officials about possible adverse consequences for them, and some SKS activists have been interrogated by the police. Several lectures, especially outside of Warsaw, have actually been broken up. Moreover, a few younger lecturers have been arrested and detained long enough to prevent them from meeting their classes. Owners of apartments where lectures have been taking place have been fined for holding "illegal gatherings," and some have even been threatened with eviction from their dwellings.

Since late winter, as the activities of UL have expanded, the scope of official pressure has visibly intensified. Nevertheless, the lectures have continued, and in June 1978 the Flying University completed its first "academic year."

Debate Over the Opposition Program

Since the opposition has been divided into several groups, and since there have also been internal differences within each of them, no single political platform exists to which all adhere.[24] This does not appear to trouble many in the opposition. As Jacek Kuron has observed, they feel that the time is not as yet ripe for the adoption of a unified opposition program. Rather, what is needed at present is the open airing of various tentative proposals.[25] ROPCiO's monthly *Opinia* voiced a similar sentiment in a June 1977 editorial. While a single opposition movement would appear better suited to fight a one-party dictatorship, the article observed, a pluralistic society could only emerge from below, through the exercise of pluralism in the ranks of the opposition. The result of this situation has been a broad public discussion, with a veritable flood of articles and pam-

24. For a general, but cautious, review of the aims of the opposition by a close Polish observer see Andrzej Szczypiorski, "The Dissidents and Reality," *Europa Archiv* (Bonn), No. 6, 1978. Overlapping and differing objectives have not prevented opposition groups from cooperating with one another. Thus, in mid-1977, ROPCiO strongly protested against the arrests of KOR members; and in the autumn, KSS-KOR members denounced intensified regime harassment of ROPCiO supporters.

25. Jacek Kuron, "Thoughts on the Program of Action," loc. cit. p. 198.

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phlets on the country's external as well as domestic situation appearing in *samizdat* form in Poland or smuggled to the West for publication in the émigré press.[26] As one Polish writer commented, not since World War II "has there been a similar debate about the program of action and the vision of a future Republic."[27]

The debate as a whole has been characterized by a remarkable degree of sobriety. In a political treatise written at the end of 1976, an author using the nom de plume Marek Turbacz set the tone.[28] He observed that "thinking in clear political terms" had "been generally alien to the Polish intellectual tradition" and had not been encouraged by 30 years of totalitarian rule. Then he proceeded to put forward his own argument in a detached and precise, almost scientific fashion. His assessment of Poland's position vis-à-vis the USSR was characterized by cold realism:

We are not able to free ourselves from the domination of Russia. . . .Poland, which is its most important satellite located on its road to Western Europe, cannot regain sovereignty as long as the Russian Empire exists. Neither will the Russian leaders permit Poland . . . to discard the Communist system. This would restrict their influence over us, and also set a dangerous example for the other satellites as well as for their own people.

The restoration of Poland's sovereignty and a basic change of the present system would be possible only if preceded by a fundamental change in Russia itself, or a drastic shift in the constellation of forces in the world at large. For this we may have to wait as long as a quarter of a century.

Soviet domination of Poland, in Turbacz's opinion, determines the limits of viable change in the country. Moscow is likely to intervene should strong anti-Russian sentiments surface among the Polish people; should the PUWP be removed from power and a multiparty system be restored; or should a major reorientation in the country's foreign policy take place. Therefore, the opposition should not promote such developments.

At the same time, Turbacz maintained, the fact that Poland cannot free itself from the USSR's domination does not mean that the Poles should passively resign themselves to their fate and await changes in the international sphere. "There is an essential difference," he pointed out, "between compromise and blind submission, as there is a distinction between a realist policy and collaboration." Within the existing framework, he argued, there still exists room for the Poles to try to improve their position. There are various domestic changes which the Polish Communist government could undertake without invoking the wrath of Moscow. It could carry out substantial economic reform, expand the role of self-government, enhance the role of experts in the administration, improve the quality of information, and broaden the scope of cultural freedom. These measures would significantly reduce the gap between the Communist authorities and the Polish people, and in this way diminish the danger of repeated violent confrontations between them.

In Turbacz's judgment, however, the Gierek regime is not able to undertake such reforms; and the possibility that some other Communist leader will emerge in the near future who would be willing to do so is remote. Under such circumstances "changes must be extracted from the government through popular pressure." This pressure should not be exerted through sporadic outbursts, but should take the form of a long-term systematic campaign. The opposition, in the author's words, should not incite "revolutionary upheavals, but rather promote everyday demonstrations of civic courage."

Adam Michnik, during his stay in the West in late 1976, outlined an opposition strategy in terms similar to those of Turbacz. Among the changes in Poland which he proposed, and which, in his opinion, would not be incompatible with the Communist system, were: the establishment of independent trade unions; the easing, but not necessarily the complete abolition, of press censorship; the granting of freedom to youth organizations; and the ending of all religious discrimination. Michnik, too, felt quite strongly that popular pressure aimed at extracting reforms from the Communist government should be considerably intensified. He recognized that this might lead to Soviet intervention, but he dismissed the possibility as remote. Soviet military intervention, he argued, would be catastrophic for the present regime; consequently, the Polish Communists would try to avoid

26. This discussion had been heralded by several interesting programmatic statements written during the first part of the 1970's. Perhaps the most significant among them was that by Marian Kowalski, "The Need for a Program," *Kultura*, May 1975. Also in 1975 there appeared (largely unnoticed in the West) an excellent study of communism in Poland by Marek Tarniewski, *Ewolucja czy rewolucja* (Evolution or Revolution), Paris, Institut Littéraire, 1975.

27. Socjusz, "Political Activities and Programs," *Kultura*, September 1977, p. 31.

28. Marek Turbacz, "Possibilities for Opposition Activities in Poland," *Aneks*, No. 16-17, 1977, pp. 3-46.

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it at any cost. Moreover, since it would be highly detrimental to East-West détente, Moscow would be extremely reluctant to take such a step.[29]

After his return home, Michnik emphatically reiterated these moderate views in a statement he made early in 1978. "We don't want to overthrow the system," he declared. Then he added:

We realize that in Poland today the Communist party must rule, and that Poland must stay in the Soviet bloc—we just want them to rule more justly. We want a dialogue with the party, not a clash. . . .[30]

Jacek Kuron, in a programmatic essay written toward the end of 1976, also disavowed any intentions on the part of the opposition to seek a confrontation with the government. He claimed that the opposition, on the contrary, is striving to promote peace in Poland. Soviet intervention, he argued, is more likely to be brought about by popular upheaval over some drastic government measures than by moderate reforms, which are the most effective way to pacify the Polish people.[31]

Not all of the statements in the *samizdat* publications, however, have been quite so reasonable as those just cited. Some have clearly gone beyond the limits which Turbacz warned the opposition not to transgress. Writing in the student paper *Bratniak,* Tomasz Mroz declared himself in favor of primacy of moral over political concepts. He rejected as naive the belief in the possibility of a compromise with despotic rulers and called for a struggle by the opposition conceived "as a moral necessity to fight against evil in political life." He argued, furthermore, that the acceptance of limited reforms would imply "the abandonment of maximum demands, and one must always keep in mind the ultimate goal. . .a free and independent Poland."[32]

Similarly, *Opinia,* the organ of ROPCiO, has taken an increasingly militant stance. The editorial article in its March 1978 issue held that either one is in favor of the Communist system and Poland's subordination to the USSR, or one stands for democracy and independence. "A middle ground," the article concluded, "no longer exists."[33]

The Polish Coalition for Independence, in some of its statements, has also adopted fairly extreme positions. In the spring of 1977, it came out with an eloquent, but highly emotional, statement defending the anti-Russian insurrectionist tradition in Poland. "It is owing to the conspiracies, insurrections, and the resistance movements," it exclaimed, "that today we are a nation." Although the PPN declaration stopped short of actually calling on the Poles to rise to arms, it implored them to persist in the struggle for independence.[34]

The PPN's program was criticized by a writer using the pseudonym of Marek Brzost. He characterized it as noble but utopian, since it did not point to a practical way of regaining the country's independence. Resistance without the chance of winning would only result in unnecessary losses. Dictatorships "can be overcome, but it takes more than moral and intellectual forces to accomplish this." And in the present situation of Poland, Brzost concluded, "the time is not ripe to. . .resort to open resistance."[35]

The leaders of the main groups of the Polish opposition evidently agreed with Brzost, for at a meeting in the spring of 1978 they categorically repudiated conspiratorial and insurrectionist tactics and opted to continue open and peaceful activities. Their declaration on that occasion stated unequivocally that members of the democratic opposition "will not let themselves be driven into conspiracy, they will not be provoked and will never resort to acts of terror, which could be exploited to liquidate any authentic, spontaneously formed outlets of social initiatives."[36]

The New Opposition Tactics

As Adam Michnik has pointed out in a lecture delivered in Paris, the year 1976 represented a turning point in the tactics of the opposition in Poland. Until that time, and even during the confrontation over the constitutional amendments, opposition appeals had been primarily addressed to the Communist authorities. The opposition assumed that changes would come "from above." That is, the opposition "counted on the positive evolution of the [Communist] party due to the enlightened policies

29. Adam Michnik, "Poland Lives," *Le Monde* (Paris), Dec. 16, 1976.
30. Cited in Nicolas Carrol, "Communism in kid gloves for a state where most people are dissidents," *The Sunday Times* (London), Apr. 9, 1978.
31. "Thoughts on the Program of Action," loc. cit., pp. 208-09.
32. "Why Protest?" *Bratniak,* November 1977.
33. "The Problem of Democracy," *Opinia,* March 1978. p. 6.
34. "The Polish Homeland—The Independence Tradition and Its Enemies," *Tydzien Polski* (London), Apr. 23, 1977.
35. "Some Remarks about the PPN Program," *Kultura,* November 1976, pp. 105-06.
36. Reported by Alexander Smolar in his article "Poland: 10 years After," *The Times* (London), Apr. 17, 1978.

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The prison in Radom where workers who participated in the spontaneous June 1976 demonstrations in that Polish town were held. Efforts to demand humane treatment and release of these workers were important in the subsequent emergence of a variety of new opposition groups in Poland.

—Photo provided by arrangement of the author.

of its leaders, while it abstained from pushing them in this direction through organized and persistent social pressure." With the establishment of KOR, opposition tactics changed. Appeals were now directed at the people, with the aim of generating changes "from below."[37]

An example is the opposition's new role as "public ombudsman." KOR's campaign on behalf of the imprisoned workers from Radom and Ursus helped them regain their freedom. Since that time, both KSS-KOR and ROPCiO have been systematically collecting and publishing information about the police's abuse of power and about the courts' condoning of such practices. In the spring of 1978, KSS-KOR issued a White Paper describing in some detail 25 cases in which police officers had violated the law. The document emphasized that this evidence represented only the tip of the iceberg and that many more such instances were known to the Committee.[38]

Another role which the opposition groups have played is to exert pressure on various branches of the administration by publicly criticizing their practices. A special column in *Opinia* has regularly scrutinized the shortcomings of economic policies in a highly competent manner, and in the spring of 1978 KSS-KOR came out with a comprehensive pamphlet exposing the grave economic situation in the country.[39] *Gospodarz* has pointed out the inadequacies of the newly introduced pension plan for private farm owners; and *Robotnik* has reported on the waste and inefficiency prevailing in some factories.

All of the *samizdat* publications have mercilessly attacked the censorship of the official press. They were provided with a golden opportunity in the spring of 1977 by the defection to the West of Tomasz Strzyzewski, an employee of the censorship office in Krakow. Strzyzewski took with him substantial

37. Adam Michnik, "A Strategy for the Polish Opposition," in *La Pologne: une société en dissidence* (Poland: A Society in Dissidence), Paris, Maspero, 1978, p. 100. See also Jan Gross, "Political Opposition in Poland," *Aneks*, No. 15, 1977.

38. *Dokumenty bezprawia* (Documents of Lawlessness), Warsaw, NOWA, mimeographed, Apr. 7, 1978.

39. *Uwagi o sytuacji gospodarczej kraju* (Remarks about the Country's Economic Situation), Warsaw, NOWA, mimeographed, 1978.

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confidential evidence about the inner workings of censorship in Poland. These documents, which amount to a devastating criticism of the entire system, were also made available to KSS-KOR and have been systematically reprinted by the opposition press.[40]

Finally, the *samizdat* papers have increasingly taken direct issue with authors publishing in the official press, and have also come out with critiques, at times harsh, of specific plays, television shows, and films. In a fairly close-knit intellectual milieu such as exists in Poland, challenges of this kind tend to put strong pressure on the writers, scholars, and artists to improve their performances, if only to avoid public ridicule. Faced with such pressure, the intellectuals, in turn, are more likely to oppose interference with their works by the censorship authorities. The meeting of the Polish Writers' Union held in Katowice on April 7-8, 1978, affords a good illustration. Union members decisively repudiated crude Communist efforts to intervene in the union's affairs and, in fact, elected to the union's Executive several persons prominently linked with opposition activities.[41]

Although various *samizdat* papers reminded their readers on the occasion of the February 1978 local government elections that under Polish electoral law, they could abstain from voting or cross out names of candidates who do not merit their confidence, this was just a trial balloon. The opposition is clearly not prepared to test the Communist party in an electoral battle. For the present, as one of the editors of *Glos*, using the nom de plume Marek Tarniewski, argued, "for anybody outside of the [Communist] party to try to win power would be premature." For the time being, he wrote, the opposition should concentrate on rebuilding an "authentic" social life, "independent of the government."[42]

Turbacz, in the essay cited above, summarized the present, restricted, political goals of the Polish opposition as the creation of an unofficial national culture, and, above all, the development of Polish political thought free from the influence of Communist ideology. This, he wrote, should lead to the rise of new cultural and political elites.[43] The existence in Poland of manifold *samizdat* publications, the ongoing debate in their pages about the opposition program, and the activities of various discussion groups and the Flying University suggest that these goals are well on the way to being realized.

An Uneasy Stalemate

Relations between the Communist government and the democratic opposition, as Antoni Macierewicz has observed, are currently stalemated. The opposition is unable to extract democratic reforms from the government, and the government is unable to prevent the opposition from trying to do so.[44] However, the fact that the activities of the various opposition groups are tolerated for the time being does not mean that their continued existence has been accepted by the Gierek regime. Short of a frontal attack, the Communist authorities are doing whatever they can to restrict, or at least to make as difficult as possible, opposition activities. The police keep close watch over all the groups. Between September 1976 and October 1977, there were at least 318 house searches, and about 1,000 people were arrested and interrogated.[45] Since early 1978, the intensity of police persecution, especially outside Warsaw, has, if anything, increased.

For the moment, the government can afford to tolerate opposition activities because they do not pose an imminent threat. The opposition has exerted influence basically among the intelligentsia, gaining only scattered support from the workers.[46] Two attempts to organize a free trade union movement—the first in Katowice in February 1978 and the second in Gdansk the following April—were confined to a handful of individuals and were both met with immediate and severe reprisals.[47]

Official propaganda tries to minimize the significance of the opposition groups still further by depicting them as a small bunch of extremists virtually isolated from the Polish people. In a statement for

40. The first volume of the documents revealed by Strzyzewski has already been published in the West, and the second volume is soon to follow. See *Czarna ksiega cenzury PRL* (The Black Book on Censorship in the People's Republic of Poland), London, Aneks, 1977.

41. *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), Apr. 10, 1978, listed the members of the new Executive.

42. Marek Tarniewski, *Dzialanie i przyszlosc* (Action and the Future), London, Odnowa, 1977, pp. 26, 29.

43. "Possibilities for Opposition Activities in Poland," loc. cit., pp. 22-23.

44. Antoni Macierewicz, "Legality," *Glos*, March 1978, p. 5.

45. Bogdan Borusewicz, "The Methods of Fighting the Opposition in Poland," *Spotkania*, October 1977.

46. Janusz Topacz, "What Is It All About?" ibid.

47. A writer from Poland has compared the position of the working class in the stalemate between the opposition and the government to the role of nuclear weapons in East-West relations. Should either of the principals reach for it, the other would respond with everything that it has. See Jan Kowal, "The Nature of the Ferment in the Country," *Trybuna* (London), No. 28, 1978.

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200,000 Catholic pilgrims assemble at the Polish town of Czestochowa on August 15, 1977, for the annual observances at the shrine of the Black Virgin.

—R. Darolle/SYGMA.

the foreign press, a government spokesman, Miroslaw Wojciechowski, estimated the strength of the opposition in Poland at some 100 hard-core members and about 1,000 sympathizers. The rest, he maintained, are people who will listen to the opposition arguments but who would not themselves get involved in its activities.[48]

Wojciechowski also categorically rejected the possibility of the Communist authorities' entering into dialogue with the opposition. However, he did express the hope that at least some members of the opposition would perceive the unrealistic nature of their present course and avail themselves of the opportunities, which he claimed exist but are not fully utilized, to develop socialist democracy in the country. As to those people who would continue along their present road, Wojciechowski warned, there would be no need for wholesale repression, but selective reprisals against them would be used and might even be intensified in the future.

This official picture is all too sanguine. In reality, the strength of the opposition is considerably greater than Wojciechowski's estimate. There are at present in Poland at least 20 *samizdat* papers published regularly, with a total monthly circulation of no less than 20,000.[49] To write, edit, publish, and distribute them must take at least several hundred persons, with a protective network of sympathizers around them of several thousand people. Since each copy of a *samizdat* publication is usually passed around among several persons, it is probably no exaggeration to estimate that they reach some 100,000

48. From an interview on West German television, reported in *Die Welt* (Hamburg), Mar. 11, 1978.

49. It is estimated by opposition circles that by early 1978 close to 100,000 copies of *samizdat* papers and books had been issued. As of the spring of 1978, the circulation of *Robotnik* was 15,000; that of *Opinia*, 8,000; and that of *Glos*, 2,000. See Stefan Kawalec, "The Traditions of Political Action," *Glos*, March 1978.

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readers, even if one takes into account the confiscation of some copies.[50] The scope of opposition activities, then, is quite substantial, and to try to break the opposition would require a massive police action.

Resorting to mass terror would have disastrous political consequences for the Gierek regime. It would intensify the alienation of intellectuals from the Communist government and would lead to a new rupture in relations with the Catholic church. Furthermore, it would also adversely affect Poland's external relations, expecially its trade with the West. The disruption of this trade is something which the country, in its present precarious economic situation can ill afford, for any further deterioration of the standard of living could lead to what Gierek fears the most—namely, new unrest among the workers. Finally, use of mass terror would in all probability revive factional struggle within the PUWP itself.

It is very doubtful that Gierek could weather such a political storm. In this respect, the opposition's assumption that he will refrain from wholesale terror at all cost seems to be quite correct.

Thus, as long as the democratic opposition maintains its present course of abstaining from conspiratorial and revolutionary tactics, there is little danger that it will provoke wholesale Communist efforts to repress it. But persistent refusal on the part of the Communist regime to recognize the opposition's existence could aggravate the opposition's radical tendencies. In fact, the government has already contributed in one way to such a development. By firing more than a hundred young men and women from their jobs for political reasons, the Communist authorities have, in effect, created a full-time cadre of opposition activists.

Moreover, one important factor that has contributed to the moderate course of the Polish opposition—the close relationship of its younger leaders to the older intelligentsia in its ranks—may not continue to prevail forever. So far, more experienced hands have helped the younger oppositionists appreciate the harsh realities of Poland's international position. Yet the structure of both KSS-KOR and ROPCiO is such that the initiative rests increasingly not with the older but with the younger members, who are often quite young indeed. In Polish history, there have been instances where such an imbalance ended in catastrophe. For example, the ill-fated anti-Russian insurrections of 1830 and 1863 were both started by young hotheads against the better advice of their elders.

The semiclandestine environment in which the opposition is compelled to operate and the subtle but unmistakable police persecution to which it is constantly exposed are also not helpful to its perseverance on a moderate course. Petty police harassment, while totally ineffective in substance, adds to an atmosphere charged with emotion. Furthermore, being compelled to remain at the margin of open political life introduces an element of the unreal into the opposition's activities. Its leaders compensate by occasional outbursts of grandeur, as when Moczulski claimed that it is the Communist party that finds itself in a state of seige,[51] or when Kuron declared that it is the opposition that tolerates the government and not vice versa (a statement that he later retracted).[52]

Last but not least, there is the danger that, in competing for popular support, the different opposition groups may seek to outbid one another by demonstrating their radicalism. Indeed, the increasingly militant tone of some *samizdat* publications indicates that this already may be beginning to happen. Yet, from the government's standpoint, intensified repressions would only enhance this tendency by pushing various opposition groups even deeper into the underground.

To sum up, then, the opposition appears to be pursuing a "calculated risk" strategy that rests on two assumptions. First, it anticipates that at some critical moment the Communist government would offer far-reaching concessions to the Polish people rather than risk Soviet military intervention. This assumption may well be valid with regard to the Gierek regime, which appears to understand that in the event of any political crisis of major proportions it would be swept from power. Yet there clearly are groups within the PUWP that would not be averse to, and might even welcome, direct Soviet involvement. As one Polish writer put it,

. . .there are people in the party who are looking forward to the confrontation—either because they

50. In a lecture given on Apr. 20, 1978, Teodor Palimaka, head of the Administration Division in the PUWP Secretariat, claimed that out of 20,000 copies of *samizdat* publications about one half are intercepted by the security police. *Zagadnienie z zakresu dalszego umacniania ladu, porzadku i dyscypliny spolecznej* (Problems Relating to Further Strengthening of Peace, Order, and Social Discipline), Warsaw, Ksiazka i Wiedza, May 1978, p. 18.

51. Leszek Moczulski, "The Last Stand," *Opinia,* October 1977. Quoted from *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), RAD 255, Dec. 23, 1977.

52. Jacek Kuron, "An Accord Is Possible Between Polish Opinion and the USSR," *Le Monde,* Mar. 1, 1977.

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believe that for a long time now the people have deserved a severe lesson in obedience, or because Moscow, the wiser for its experiences [of 1968] in Prague, may designate them as the leaders of the next, and this time carefully prepared in advance, new "government" of Poland.[53]

Radicalization of opposition programs, then, would only play into the hands of these Communist hardliners.

The second assumption underlying the opposition strategy is that in a climate of East-West détente the Soviet Union would be reluctant to intervene with force in Poland. This assumption is also probably accurate. The Soviet leaders seem to be well aware of the grave consequences such a step would produce for them in the international sphere. In the existing, strained state of East-West relations, it might well spell the end of détente. In order to avoid this risk, Moscow would probably accept substantial reforms in the present system in Poland as long as they were carried out in an orderly fashion and under the aegis of the PUWP. Yet, as Turbacz rightly observed, there are limits to Soviet toleration. And not only has the gap between the political situation in Poland and that in the other countries of Eastern Europe—not to mention the USSR itself—become quite extensive, but it also seems to be widening.[54]

Poland's present situation, then, rests on a delicate equilibrium among many competing forces. Failure on the part of any of these forces to exercise great caution could upset that equilibrium. For Gierek, or his successor, that will probably entail curbing the hardliners in the Communist ranks and offering tangible improvements to the Polish people. To produce such improvements, he may well have to expand the outside limits of Poland's freedom vis-à-vis the USSR, possibly even by standing up to the Russians. For the opposition, sufficient prudence not to push demands beyond the point of no return will obviously be indispensable. Kuron once commented that in Poland's position it is better to stop one step short than to go one step too far.[55] Will Poles manage to meet the challenge?

53. Leopolita, "Marginal Comments on the Program," in *Ruch oporu*, p. 238

54. For a comparison of the Polish and Czechoslovakian situations, see the author's "Czechoslovakia 1968—Poland 1978: A Dilemma for Moscow," *International Journal* (Toronto), October 1978; and for an assessment of the situation of the dissidents in the USSR, see his "Human Rights and Détente," *International Perspectives* (Ottawa), June-July 1978.

55. Jacek Kuron, "Thoughts on the Program of Action," loc. cit., p. 208.

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Books

Urbanization and Urban Planning Under Socialism

By John W. Dyckman and Jack C. Fisher

N. A. MILYUTIN. *Sotsgorod: The Problem of Building Socialist Cities*. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1974.

MICHAEL F. HAMM, Ed. *The City in Russian History*. Lexington, KY, University Press of Kentucky, 1976.

ALAN A. BROWN et al., Eds. *Urban and Social Economics in Market and Planned Economies*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1974. 2 Vols.

KAREL JOSEPH KANSKY. *Urbanization Under Socialism: The Case of Czechoslovakia*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

"CIVILIZATION has left us the legacy of huge cities, and to get rid of them will cost us much in time and effort, but it will be necessary to get rid of them, and this will be done." Such was the conclusion of Friedrich Engels as he assessed the impact of the city on human development.[1] The evidence presented in the works under review here, however, demonstrates not only how great such an effort would have been, but also how inconstant socialist planners have been in the pursuit of Engels' goal. Far from eliminating huge cities, socialist urban planners have struggled simply to contain them, and even this not always successfully. For the dynamics of urban growth are complex and imperfectly understood, with spatial solutions to problems the result of a combination of a large number of economic, political, geographical, and social forces and motivations. Moreover, a city's history may generate its own inertial forces. Hans Blumenfeld, one of the German urban planners who went to work for a time in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution, subsequently argued that such inertial forces are particularly strong after a city has attained a population size of half a million—i.e., that once that size has been reached, cities generate from their size new dynamics that serve to maintain or increase growth.

Under such conditions, putting an end to urban development could hardly be considered a routine task. Yet Marx and Engels bequeathed very little in the way of a specific urban program to their successors. The most specific objective which emerges from their writings is the well-known "abolition of the distinction between town and country" postulated in the Communist Manifesto. Engels developed the theme in his essay on *The Housing Question,* arguing that

> *There is no sense in trying to solve the housing question by trying to preserve our big cities. The elimination of the difference between the city and the country is no more nor less utopian than the elimination of the difference between the capitalist and the hired worker.*[2]

He advocated as uniform a distribution of activities as possible over the whole country, with an integral connection of industrial and agricultural production and extension of the means of communication. Lenin's Rural Electrification Program was advanced

1. Cited in N. A. Milyutin, *Sotsgorod*, p. 61.

2. Quoted in ibid., p. 60.

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at least partly to support these aspirations—i.e., to eliminate "the idiocy of the countryside."

Interwar planner Nikolay Milyutin's solution to this programmatic goal, his *Sotsgorod*, was the "linear city" extending integrated industrial and agricultural communities through the countryside along major arteries of transportation and communication. With this formulation, Milyutin was advancing—and interpreting in socialist terms—an idea aired repeatedly in the works of physical planners such as Soria y Mata in Spain and Le Corbusier and Tony Garnier in France. He was attempting to give physical form to a city planning program that would encompass the fragmentary indications available of the views of Marx and Engels, as well as the aims of Lenin.

In his essay entitled "The Revival and Schism of Urban Planning in Twentieth Century Russia" in *The City in Russian History*, S. Frederick Starr stresses the Marxist element in Milyutin's work and that of his 20th-century contemporaries in the Soviet Union:

Nikolai Milyutin's "linear city," Moisei Ginsburg's ingenious portable towns, and the supercollectivized phalansteries proposed by Leonard Sabsovich—all these surpass in boldness practically anything occurring elsewhere during the interwar years and all must be traced directly to efforts by their authors to translate Marxist precepts into actual urban forms. (pp. 238-39)

But he also acknowledges the impact of foreign architectural trends:

Yet even these efforts were deeply indebted to the rival ideals of the garden village and the classical city; throughout the most utopian discussions of small "agrocities" or of Corbusier's rigidly geometric metropolis, this indebtedness proclaims itself. (p. 239).

George R. Collins and William Alex go much further. In their admirable introduction to *Sotsgorod*, they detail the early influences on Soviet planners of the International Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM), founded in 1928 by Hélène de Mandrot, Le Corbusier, and others, and of foreign architects working in Russia, particularly Albert Kahn, whose company constructed "over fifty major enterprises in some thirty Soviet cities" between 1928 and 1932 (p. 21). Kahn had earned his reputation as an industrial architect in Detroit, Michigan, and Collins and Alex see in Milyutin's work the influence, for instance, of the theories of industrial process advanced by Henry Ford and Frederick W. Taylor, as well as the influence of various Western architects.

DESPITE the bold conceptions of Milyutin and others, however, a more traditional approach soon found its way back into Soviet planning. Collins and Alex point out that

...suddenly about 1932 in a movement that was epitomized, if not run, by Lazar Kaganovich of the Politburo, architectural theory ceased to be concerned primarily with design, construction and planning problems and became a branch of political theory....Emphasis was on expressiveness, not efficiency of function, and the management of traditional city-like agglomerations was to be the thrust of planning—not disurbanization, which had previously been considered to be the more logically proletarian goal. (p. 27)

This development led to a conflict between the two architectural currents which has never been fully resolved. Starr, in his article already cited in the Hamm volume, makes this abundantly clear when he writes:

Reviewers in This Issue

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VINCENT C. CHRYPINSKI—Professor of Political Science, University of Windsor (Windsor, Ontario); contributor to Bohdan Bociurkiw, Ed., *Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe*, 1975, and Adam Bromke and John Strong, Eds., *Gierek's Poland*, 1973.

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Stately avenues of apartment blocs are still being built in open countryside, even as economic journals call for cottage construction; grandiose avenues so immense as to make strong men feel like Gogol's Akakii Akakevich are being laid out in new urban districts just as efforts are being made to submit the ever-growing cities to a more human measure. (p. 240)

Nevertheless, as Collins and Alex note in their introduction to *Sotsgorod,* in 1932 the switch to big-city planning procedures (echoing the new traditionalism in architectural design and the reestablishment of pre-Soviet academicians in power) gathered momentum. The 1934 Bolshevik Party Congress in Moscow sent seven brigades of foreign architects and planners into Greater Moscow to work. The invitation which had been extended to CIAM to meet in Moscow was withdrawn. And Milyutin recanted his "leftist" phase.

From the point of view of architectural critics, this was a decisive moment in the stifling of the utopian enthusiasm of Marxist imagination. The imposition of Soviet architectural uniformity followed. As Milka Bliznakov observes in her contribution to the Hamm volume:

At this time, Arplan, a controlling organ, was established under the direction of Lazar Kaganovich. Its function was to review and approve each master plan and each design before its acceptance for construction, not only from a functional but also from an aesthetic viewpoint. The planning and aesthetic canons of the state were thus easily enforced and the results are generally reflected in the Soviet architecture of the following three decades. (pp. 253-54)

The sheer size of Soviet construction efforts, however, created opportunities for subtle deviation from official uniformity and for the reintroduction of early ideas. Soviet sources maintain that 900 new towns were erected between 1926 and 1966, the majority on the base of preexisting smaller settlements.[3] The size of the Soviet land mass, the interest in developing the eastern lands, and the overflow of the capacity of older cities in successive shifts from agricultural to industrial employment all contributed to the need for new towns. Exploitation of the opportunities for deviation created by the resulting high levels of activity led Bliznakov to conclude that while Soviet planners have not implemented the precepts of the 1920's in any systematic way, "a revival of Milyutin's linear city idea in conjunction with the urbanists' proposal for an administrative and cultural center in the middle of the town can be discerned in the most recent plans" (p. 256).

From the point of view of the planning theorist, in contrast, the priority given industrial development over spatial planning was perhaps more important than the ideological rationalizations of Kaganovich. Soviet planning, and that of most East European countries in the Soviet sphere, has given highest priority to heavy investment in industry, pushing aside, if necessary, other considerations. In the Soviet case, the use of industrial targets as the basic work incentives in the Five-Year Plans and the latitude given to industrial managers have frequently resulted in neglect or distortion of urban plans and spatial targets. The long waiting period required for official approval of urban plans in major cities has meant in fact that industrial developments, more urgently promoted, have often created conditions that have made original urban plans obsolete before they could legally be introduced. The experiences of new towns have constituted the most notable exceptions to this rule, even though the towns themselves have usually been founded on the basis of some industrial rationale. Ironically, the decision to locate a giant steel complex behind the Urals in the new town of Magnitogorsk—a decision which was in the tradition of spreading development and which drew upon the planning ideas of Milyutin—was opposed as "uneconomical" by location theorists among Soviet economic planners. However, events during World War II not included in the economists' calculations proved this a most fortuitous location.

IN THE post-World War II era, objections to the primacy of industrialization strategies in urban planning have come more from sociologists than from architects. A notable example of this criticism is contained in the paper of the Hungarian sociologists Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi in *Urban and Social Economics in Market and Planned Economies.* In a piece entitled "Social Conflicts of Underurbanization," they argue that Hungary suffers from "underurbanization" in the sense that overinvestment in industry and underinvestment in social and physical infrastructure and housing have produced social conflict and created social privilege in

3. Bliznakov, p. 255.

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their country. From their perspective, this development is "one-sided" and leads to excessive commuting, to an underconsumption of cultural overhead by commuters, and to social favoritism in the allocation of intown housing:

The fast growth in industrial employment and the underdevelopment in the infrastructure, principally in housing, leads to pseudo-urbanization, to the paradox of men living in villages and working in towns. (Vol. 1, p. 210)

Regrettably, this article lacks much important information, such as that on travel times to work for those employed in cities but living in villages. To Americans, this commuter pattern is hardly onerous or unenviable, and many choose it. But what is its cost to Hungarian workers? Here was a splendid opportunity for more detailed comparative analysis, yet the authors, who confine themselves to measurements of housing investments, fail to pursue it.

Nonetheless, Konrad and Szelenyi, and fellow Hungarian Ivan T. Berend in another paper in the same anthology,[4] document the overemployment of manpower in industry and overinvestment in industrial plant which from their point of view have resulted in lagging productivity in industry as well as in the undercapitalization of agriculture, services, and social infrastructure generally. Marxist bias in the definition of "productive" investments and goods, one of the more unfortunate elements of the Marxian view of capital in the hands of East European planners, has no doubt contributed to this imbalance. Even more important has been the continuing desire of communist Eastern Europe to "catch up" industrially with the most advanced capitalist powers. Still, the location and degree of localization of industrial sites remain important issues.

Obviously, commuting and the social conflicts (real or imagined) it creates can be mitigated by locating a larger share of industrial plant in smaller places within metropolitan regions. In fact, something of this sort is endemic in the United States and is often lamented by central cities because it deprives them of their industrial tax base. But in Hungary, according to Konrad and Szelenyi, "the debate between town and village was adjudicated in favor of the town" (p. 218). By "town," however, they seem to mean the largest cities, and particularly Budapest. If smaller places were included in the definition of "town," there would be no problem in their receiving a share of industrial plant. Yet Berend points out that even the satellite towns around Budapest have become commuter towns. The failure to bring industry to these satellite towns is inexplicable to American planners, and to many in Eastern Europe.

The most plausible explanation of the current state of affairs in Eastern Europe is the relative freedom given to industries and industrial managers in the selection of sites—a freedom emanating from the priority placed on industrial development and from the privilege enjoyed in communist social systems by industrial promoters and managers. Even in Yugoslavia, a country whose relationship to the mainstream communist nations is rather tenuous, the conflict between planning objectives and economic development forces goes on. A 1972 publication of the American-Yugoslav Project of the Johns Hopkins University Center for Metropolitan Planning and Research observed: "Although industry is exerting an increasing impact on urbanization patterns, it is too often located without consideration of planned urban development concepts."[5] The similarity to Berend's conclusion regarding Hungarian development is striking. "The results of urbanization," says Berend, "stand in contrast not only to the pace of the economy but also—first of all—to industrial growth" (p. 284). Despite growing economic maturity and more subtle concepts of development, Berend concedes, his country still has not rectified its industrialization/urbanization imbalances. Sectoral planning continues to dominate spatial planning.

This tendency is perhaps strongest in Czechoslovakia. In his *Urbanization Under Socialism: The Case of Czechoslovakia,* Karel Joseph Kansky asserts:

The governmental agencies that were responsible for the general societal development of the country have controlled the process of urbanization according to the Marxist belief that the process of industrialization determines that

4. Ivan T. Berend, "Development Strategy and Urbanization in Hungary: 1950-1970," in Alan A. Brown et al., Vol. 1, pp. 271-86.

5. See *Summary Report of the Ljubljana Demonstration Study,* Detroit, MI, Center for Urban Studies, Wayne State University, 1972, p. 12, cited in Vladimir Music, "The Response of Yugoslav Urban Planning to Development of the Country," in Alan A. Brown et al., Vol. 1, p. 321. The American-Yugoslav Project originated in 1966 when Mr. Fisher was professor at Cornell University. It moved with him to Wayne State University and subsequently to Johns Hopkins University.

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of urbanization—that is, they assumed that the spatial distribution of urban centers should be determined solely by that of industrial firms, and as such urbanization is a process subordinated to the process of industrialization. (p. 213)

Kansky seems to be referring here to a tenet of Czechoslovak orthodoxy rather than to any position taken directly by Marx. Still, his overall evaluation of the Czech situation is accurate.

THAT POLITICAL FORCES are operative to some degree in the urban and industrial planning of all societies, including market-oriented societies, will not surprise Western planners, though they may be dismayed at the power of these forces in development-hungry socialist nations. In a judiciously balanced observation in his contribution to the compendium edited by Alan Brown et al., Britton Harris, concedes that in the realm of industrial location in managed economies instances emerge where the technical economies of scale are clearly visible and the managers of state enterprises, by virtue of their importance in the development of the economy, are able to take a strong position that may override general policies as to the optimality, size, and location of cities. But he also points to similar incidents in India and concludes:

I recount this phenomenon in general because it illustrates in a closely related field the existence of certain convergent trends in disparate systems, reflecting a certain commonality in the basic forces at work. (Vol. 1, p. 155)

Unfortunately, despite Harris's observations, actual measurements of the performance of urban systems and urban planning in a comparative context do not exist. That they do not is manifest in the papers of the 1972 Windsor (Ontario) Conference of urbanists from various nations—papers which constitute the contents of the two volumes edited by Alan Brown, Joseph Licari, and Egon Neuberger. The theme of the conference was "comparative urban and social economics," but the comparative context in the large number of papers is slight. Indeed, the editors of the volumes concede in their introduction that many of the papers (in our view, virtually all of them) are not comparative in nature, and they offer by way of explanation the view that "sophisticated comparative analysis requires the development of specialized methodologies that are at this early stage largely unavailable" (Vol. 1, p. 6).

Certainly, it is unpromising to attempt to apply Western economists' models of urban growth to cities which have no land markets or rent gradients and which suffer from an arbitrary allocation of housing space. But as the Windsor papers themselves show, and as our own experience confirms, there has been a substantial exchange of technologies of measurement and of concepts between Western and Eastern urbanists, so that comparative studies should be possible. In his essay in the compendium, Harris makes the insightful point that American city planners have commonly employed the planning perspectives of East European economic and social planners in their allocative methods. And East European planners have, since the mid-1960's, made increasing use of measurement devices, modeling techniques, and, to a more limited degree, conceptual formulations of urban growth drawn from Western sources.

THE WORK of the authors of the present essay, extending over the ten years of the American-Yugoslav Project in Ljubljana, Slovenia, was intended to promote such an exchange of methods and views. We have reported the lessons of that experience in a recent monograph.[6] We found that the exchange was richest and most productive at the direct, working professional level, where problems common to urban development in both Eastern and Western societies are addressed. Problems of transportation and land use planning, environmental pollution, and technical aspects of mathematical modeling appeared to have common features in US cities like Detroit and in Belgrade. Ironically, however, city planning and management techniques seemed less developed in socialist countries ideologically committed to planning than in Western nations—most notably the United States—committed to the preservation of market institutions. The interdisciplinary nature of planning studies and the use of methods and concepts drawn from a variety of social sciences are more advanced in the US than in Eastern Europe, where the architectural design tradition remains strong.

Emphasis on national economic development and the relative neglect of some aspects of

6. John W. Dyckman and Jack C. Fisher, *International Professional Exchange: The Implications of the American-Yugoslav Project*, Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Center for Metropolitan Planning and Research, January 1977.

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urban life in the socialist bloc are reflected in the comparative underdevelopment there of city planning and management. The Windsor papers confirm, for example, the relatively tardy attention to environmental externalities in East European cities. That such attention is beginning to develop now is demonstrated by the recent agreement between the Johns Hopkins Center for Metropolitan Planning and Research and the Civil Engineering Institute of Bucharest, Romania, for joint work on environmental planning problems.

Both comparative insights and the development of technical competence are served by a concentration on professional management problems. As Jack Meltzer, one of the participants in the American-Yugoslav Project, observed:

...the Project was born out of interest in Yugoslav regional planning and development, conditioned by the undertaking's locale, rather than as an exotic research opportunity open to and dominated by scholars with career interests in Yugoslavia or Eastern and Southern Europe.[7]

This orientation proved crucial to the success of the project, for it permitted a focus on working relationships between professionals rather than on differences of ideological orientation. This is not to suggest that ideology is unimportant or that it does not suffuse daily work with certain perspectives, but to underscore that the nature of modern urban development casts up many problems common to different national and social systems and that there is much to be learned by cooperative work on such problems by representatives of those different systems.

THE HISTORY of the building of Russian cities is a story of the repeated use of foreign professionals—from the recruitment of LeBlond, Rastrelli, Vallin de la Mothe, Rossi, Montferrand, and others for the planning and construction of St. Petersburg to the early Soviet experiences referred to above. But these were efforts at the *building* of cities, not their management. The professionals were architects and physical planners, not sociologists or economists who could work on the fabric of economic and social relations of the city. Up to now, successful exchanges with socialist countries have followed this established tradition of technical transfer. But urban problems today are raising fundamental issues of social and political organization, and these are reflected in the growing role of sociologists in urban planning in countries such as Poland and Hungary, as well as in the United States.

Problems related to transportation, environmental control, and land development controls are recognized as commonplace in expanding metropolitan areas around the world. It is less well recognized that these problems go to the very roots of the organization of modern states and raise fundamental questions about the nature of the state apparatus and questions of local technical competence. The spatial organization of economic life has outstripped the organization of political functions of the state. Modern urban systems often overspill political boundaries and betray the impact of "geopolitical externalities," to use Kansky's terms. And, like it or not, this reality has reduced the ability of the modern state to deal with critical resource issues such as energy use, water and air quality, congestion and efficiency, the size of cities, and the quality of life of their citizens.

The problems of local government, in the US or Italy, Poland or Yugoslavia, derive directly from fundamental problems confronting the modern state. These include organizing, reorganizing, and adapting the process of governance to: (a) new demands for representative roles by minorities, regional interests, and metropolitan citizens; (b) structural changes in the character of modern economies which pose persistent and severe problems of fiscal adequacy and value choice; (c) shifting patterns of spatial occupancy and economic activity which no longer match the spatial extent and domain of powers of traditional political units; (d) changing views of professional supply systems, bureaucracies, and civil service; (e) growing information demands on local governments; and (f) the emergence of new interest groups in traditional governing systems.

In the opinion of the present authors, an integral view of the processes and problems of modern states is a necessary point of departure for understanding the problems of modern metropolitan regions. But this is not sufficient in and of itself. It is also necessary to bring to the discussion considerations of economic and technical forces having an impact upon states, particularly spatial organization, and thus, above all, the influence of metropolitan areas. Furthermore, it is crucial to understand changing social values and political demands that emanate from diverse

7. Ibid., p. 91.

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regions and urban areas. Finally, it is essential to formulate social and economic as well as technical definitions of "good government," so that goals as well as means become clearer.

The studies of Soviet and East European urban development reported in the books under consideration here demonstrate how far the socialist states have deviated from Marx's vision of the "withering away of the state." They only indirectly advert, however, to the crises of organization of the modern state, of which urban life is an increasingly important aspect. Much more rigorous comparative work will have to be done before these crises can be adequately understood.

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Soviet Politics and Political Culture

By Melvin Croan

PAUL COCKS et al., Eds. *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics.* Cambridge, MA, and London, Harvard University Press, 1976.

JERRY F. HOUGH. *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory.* Cambridge, MA, and London, Harvard University Press, 1977.

A. H. BROWN. *Soviet Politics and Political Science.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1974.

ARCHIE BROWN and JACK GRAY, Eds. *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States.* New York, NY, Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1977.

CHRIS HARMAN. *Bureaucracy and Revolution in Eastern Europe.* London, Pluto Press, 1974.

MARY McAULEY. *Politics and the Soviet Union.* Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, Penguin Books Ltd., 1977.

ACCORDING TO the almost classic, characteristically American adage, politics involves "who gets what, when, how."[1] More broadly conceived, politics may be said to entail both process and outcome, conditioned by particular institutional structures in various socio-cultural settings. The broader view is indispensable to the formulation of any halfway plausible approach to the perennial question of what, if anything, is distinctive about Soviet politics.

One such approach, now increasingly in vogue among Western scholars, lays heavy emphasis upon the Soviet system's encrustation in Russian historical tradition. Historians have warmed to the theme of the continuity between tsarist autocracy and the Soviet regime,[2] and for all their recent fascination with models of development, political scientists may now be falling into line behind them. It remains to be seen whether this is merely another passing interpretive fad. If not, it may constitute a lasting contribution to the study of Soviet politics.

NO SINGLE methodological orthodoxy, new or old, characterizes *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics,* edited by Paul Cocks, Robert W. Daniels, and Nancy Whittier Heer. This is a collection of original papers published in memorial tribute to an unassuming master and skillful preceptor of Soviet political studies, the late Merle Fainsod of Harvard University. But the volume's concluding essay, Zbigniew Brzezinski's "Soviet Politics: From the Future to the Past?" gives wide berth to Russian history. As Brzezinski sees it, the weight of centuries-old traditions serves to inhibit the "adaptability" of the Soviet system, so that it is now undergoing a "process of degeneration"—a degeneration that Brzezinski first postulated in the pages of this journal over a decade ago,[3] but which he now suggests has not yet "reached critical proportions" (p. 349).

The interplay between modernization and tradition is touched upon elsewhere in the Fainsod memorial volume as well, notably, in the contributions of Gregory Massell ("Modernization and National Policy in Soviet Central Asia"), Donald Carlisle ("Modernization, Generations, and the Uzbek Soviet Intelligentsia"), and Gail Lapidus ("Education, In-

1. Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics—Who Gets What, When, How,* New York, NY, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936; reprinted New York, NY, Peter Smith, 1950, and New York, NY, Meridian Books, 1958.

2. See, for two recent examples, Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime,* New York, NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974, and Tibor Szamuely, *The Russian Tradition,* New York, NY, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975. Even Isaac Deutscher, who would scarcely have been sympathetic to the studies of Pipes and Szamuely, noted that the Soviet order could only have been built out of old bricks, including "traditional methods of government, vital national aspirations, a style of life, habits of thought, and various accumulated factors of strength and weakness." Isaac Deutscher, *The Unfinished Revolution: Russia 1917-1967,* New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 11.

3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1966, pp. 1-15. Brzezinski's article and the discussion that followed were reproduced in Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ed., *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics,* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1969.

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dustrialization, and Social Change in the USSR").

By contrast, the spirit of an empirical political science, detached from grander historical considerations, informs Jerry F. Hough's essay on "Party 'Saturation' in the Soviet Union." His data indicate that party membership among males over 30 with higher education is remarkably widespread, accounting for a plump 50-plus percent of this entire age-gender-education cohort. Juxtaposing this finding to data concerning political participation in the West, Hough concludes that a fresh new look at the essential character of the Soviet system may be in order.[4]

This is the note that Hough repeatedly sounds throughout *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory,* a collection of many of his previously published articles, augmented by several new pieces. While guarding himself carefully at every turn, he consistently champions the notion of "institutional pluralism" as the proper point of departure toward "the reconceptualization of the Soviet system." If Hough's plea fails to persuade, it is, in the present reviewer's opinion, because he makes much ado about very, very little. His painstaking empirical research into neglected interstices and obscure nooks and crannies of the Soviet political system has proved eminently worthwhile in its own right. But findings at the microbureaucratic level, while neither necessarily inconclusive nor trivial, simply do not lend themselves to the construction of demonstrable hypotheses with regard to the salient features of the Soviet system at the macropolitical level.[5]

Hough's earlier study of local industrial decision-making,[6] by the same token, represented a fine example of institutional analysis based upon the careful examination of all available Soviet sources. The methodical approach to institutional analysis exemplified by that study receives deserved endorsement in A. H. Brown's critical survey, *Soviet Politics and Political Science.* This concise catalogue of the political science literature constitutes a veritable *vade mecum* of the theories, techniques, fads, and foibles of Western political analyses of the USSR. Brown himself calls, quite sensibly, for "a discriminating eclecticism" in the study of Soviet politics (p. 10). After surveying various approaches to and individual studies of Soviet political institutions, groups, and interests as well as the policy-making process, Brown concludes with a cautionary discussion of the limits and perils involved in studying Soviet political culture.

One wishes that Brown and his colleague Jack Gray had thrown at least some of that caution to the wind as they presided over the collective scholarly enterprise that resulted in the publication of *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States.* In addition to an introduction by Brown and conclusions by Gray, this volume contains separate chapters on the USSR, Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, China, and Cuba, by British academic specialists on each country. All the contributors address themselves to a common analytical framework, featuring four large considerations: (1) previous political experience; (2) values and fundamental political beliefs; (3) foci of identification and loyalty; and (4) political knowledge and expectations. They also touch, in varying degrees, upon four sets of relationships: (1) between the process of political socialization and political culture; (2) between political culture and political subcultures; (3) between levels of socioeconomic development and political culture; and (4) between political culture and political change. As Brown readily acknowledges, all this is far too big an order for chapters that average a mere 30 or so pages.

THE REAL VALUE of the volume edited by Brown and Gray lies elsewhere. First, it demonstrates the value of *comparative* communist studies and should go a long way toward answering those comparativists in the political science profession who have held a distinctive field of comparative communism to be both politically artificial and scientifically unsound.[7] Second, and even more important, the volume raises fundamental questions about the concept of political culture both by itself and in its application to

4. The focus of this essay-review precludes discussion of many of the remaining papers, all of which, however, are of very high quality.

5. In addition, the "foreign policy implications" that Hough claims for his work strike me as quite wide of the mark. Even if Hough had succeeded in demonstrating the Brezhnev era to be "more liberal and egalitarian than the Khrushchev era" (p. ix)—which I feel he has not—it would not necessarily follow that clashes of interest between the Soviet Union and the United States would be correspondingly diminished. Conversely, even if Hough is wrong about the direction of Soviet internal development, that need not rule out mutual accommodation where Soviet and American interests are congruent.

6. Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making.* Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press, 1969.

7. For the most cogent expression of this point of view, see John H. Kautsky, "Comparative Communism Versus Comparative Politics," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Spring-Summer 1973, pp. 136-70.

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the study of communist systems.

How, for example, ought the study of culture relate to the study of behavior? Brown, Gray, and their contributors agreed to narrow the scope of political culture to "subjective orientation" so as to exclude "observed behaviour" (p. 9). A better case could be made for a more anthropological approach to culture, accommodating both beliefs and behavior.[8] To be sure, any simultaneous consideration of both areas entails a certain risk of circularity of explanatory argument. That risk may have to be run. It is difficult to see how one can really dispense with perceptive assessments of observed behavior in communist political systems, given the absence of substantial "hard" survey research data with respect to beliefs.

Clearly, any treatment of modernization and tradition in the Soviet political system, or in other communist political systems, that overlooks considerations of political culture does so at its own peril. Yet, while relationships such as that between "official culture" and "dominant (or mass) culture" seem destined to continue to receive their fair share of attention, other, previously neglected aspects may prove even more tantalizing. The latter include the apparent congruence between Leninist political culture and certain traditional cultural elements of prerevolutionary peasant society, as well as the experience of the unintended strengthening of the latter by the former. The investigation of such phenomena will require the best analytical talents of both social scientists and historians.[9]

AT THE SAME TIME, future scholarship will need to continue to focus on the hoary question of the effect of changes in social structure upon the Soviet and other communist political systems. Such changes accounted for much of the hope the late Isaac Deutscher invested in the future of Russia's "unfinished revolution." Like many other Marxists, Deutscher looked to the emergence of a new, well educated Soviet working class as a source of creative ferment and, ultimately, democratic development.[10]

With respect to Eastern Europe, no such optimism is expressed by Chris Harman in his spirited treatment of *Bureaucracy and Revolution in Eastern Europe*. Utilizing a Trotskyist framework of analysis, Harman surveys the revolts that erupted in Eastern Europe from 1953 to 1970. He concludes with the prediction of an eventual cataclysmic upheaval by East European workers against their communist bureaucratic bosses. Given Harman's orientation, it is scarcely surprising that he should have almost entirely neglected the role of nationalism and other social forces in his analysis. Nonetheless, the emergence which he sees of a self-conscious industrial working class in Eastern Europe and perhaps also to some extent in the Soviet Union *is* an important new phenomenon and one that has yet to receive the sustained systematic study that it requires.

Social change compounds the challenges that confront communist leaderships everywhere. In the case of the USSR, as Mary McAuley's highly stimulating primer *Politics and the Soviet Union* points out, "the power is there to control the distribution of wealth, to mete out social justice—and the rulers do not know what to do with it" (p. 326). The present situation may be somewhat analagous to that of the mid-1920's, when, in her view, hesitation and infighting paved the way for a supreme dictator prepared to take extreme measures to break out of the "standstill" (p. 115). If Professor McAuley now alludes to "some unprecedented action" (p. 328) looming on the Soviet horizon, could she possibly be conjuring up the shades of a new Stalin?

ALL THE FOREGOING should provide an unequivocal answer to the question broached by the title of Adam Ulam's introductory essay to the Fainsod memorial volume reviewed here: "Do We Know All There Is to Know about the USSR?" As we strike out along fresh lines of research with re-

8. See Robert C. Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society," *Political Science Quarterly* (New York, NY), June 1973, pp. 173-90. In my view, Tucker also effectively disposes of the charge that political culture may be nothing more than a "residual category," i.e., one that by explaining too much ends up explaining exactly nothing. As Tucker expresses it: "Might not the central importance of a concept like that of political culture be that it assists us to take our bearings in the study of the political life of a society, to focus on what is happening or not happening, to describe and analyze and order many significant data, and to raise fruitful questions for thought and research—*without explaining anything?*" (p. 179). In other words, the proper function of the study of political culture may be less to postulate any explanatory "theory" than to proffer a variety of "pre-theories."

9. The uses to which such talent can be applied are exemplified by Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," *The American Political Science Review* (Menasha, WI), September 1974, pp. 1171-90, and in Jowitt's seminal study on "Leninism and Neo-Colonialism," University of California, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, forthcoming. At Harvard, Professor Ned Keenan (History) has done some fascinating exploratory work on the medieval and early modern roots of contemporary Russian political culture.

10. Deutscher, op. cit., p. 59.

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spect to considerations of traditionalism, empirical investigations of institutions and processes, approaches to political culture, speculations about the role of contingencies, or whatever, it is well to bear in mind Merle Fainsod's own sage injunction: Always try to ask the really difficult questions. Some, it should be added, may even have answers.

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Political Traditions of the Poles

By Vincent C. Chrypinski

M.K. DZIEWANOWSKI. *Poland in the 20th Century*. New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1977.

M.K. DZIEWANOWSKI. *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History*, 2nd. Ed. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1976.

JAROSLAW PIEKALKIEWICZ. *Communist Local Government: Poland*. Athens, OH, Ohio University Press, 1975.

OLGA A. NARKIEWICZ. *The Green Flag: Polish Populist Politics, 1867-1970*. Totowa, NJ, Rowman & Littlefield, 1976.

THE SPREAD OF political consciousness and the development of a national political culture is a historical process whose substance changes over time and across space. In Poland, the course of this process seems to have been unique. Initially, and until roughly the end of the 16th century, the growth of political awareness in Poland was closely linked to a concept of political community that encompassed the entire population. Subsequently, however, this idea of *communitas*, embracing all the Polish people, was displaced by a class-based "nation of gentry" as the dominant premise of the Polish state. Efforts to reverse this narrowing of political focus, finally undertaken during the reign of the last Polish king, Stanislaw August Poniatowski (1764-95), proved too late in coming. As a result of the infamous three partitions (1772, 1793, and 1795), the Polish state was first reduced in size and then eliminated from the map entirely. Sovereign Poland was not to reappear until the end of World War I, while Polish lands and people remained divided for more than a century among Prussian, Russian, and Austrian occupiers. Before all Poles could be imbued with the same basic political values, beliefs, and attitudes, the political and educational institutions that might have shaped Polish political culture in more ordinary circumstances fell into hostile hands.

Thus, while in other European societies the molding of political culture took place in conditions of sovereign existence, the building of Polish political culture became inseparably enmeshed with the struggle to recapture the independence lost toward the end of the 18th century. For regaining this freedom and uniting all Poles within their own nation-state was to prove impossible without also bringing into the strife social groups whose national awareness was lagging. This meant, above all, the intensification of the national consciousness of, first, the peasantry and, then, the emerging urban proletariat.

Although it would be incorrect to say that the serfs were entirely without national consciousness—tens of thousands of peasants' sons fought under the Polish flag between 1793 and 1813—it is probably safe to assume that the level of identification with Poland *qua* nation among the village masses was generally low. The indifferent or even hostile attitudes of a great many peasants, both in the Congress Kingdom and in Galicia,[1] toward the 1831 uprising in the Russian partition demonstrated this in no uncertain terms.

The growth of national allegiance among the Polish peasantry was a long and complex process influenced by a variety of political and socioeconomic factors. Undoubtedly, the most important of these was the emancipation of the peasants, carried out in the Prussian partition by gradual steps ending in 1848, in Galicia after 1848, and in the Congress Kingdom after 1864. Without question, emancipation was due, in large degree, to political concerns of the occupying powers, which wanted the cooperation of the peasant masses—

[1]The Congress Kingdom, created after 1815, consisted of part of Russia's acquisitions of former Polish territory, while Galicia was annexed by Austria. Prussia obtained Polish Pomerania, including the cities of Gdansk and Torun, and Poland's western provinces, including the city of Poznan.

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or at least their immobilization—in the continuing struggle with the highly nationalistic and rebellious Polish noblemen. Increasingly sharp conflicts over land distribution provided the occupiers with many opportunities to aggravate relations between the manor and the village. The bloody Galician riots of 1846 disclosed the degree of peasant antagonism toward the gentry that could be generated by insidious foreign bureaucrats.

Paradoxically, however, enfranchisement had results unforeseen by the occupying powers, which were trying their best to govern by the principle of *divide et impera*. It is true that the peasants' formal acquisition of freedom and land encouraged bonds between the peasants and their alien rulers, while strengthening the barrier between the former and the movement for national independence. Yet, the same circumstance served to expose the villagers more directly to those policies of the foreign governments which conflicted with the peasants' socieconomic interests and beliefs. The Poles under Prussian rule suffered German colonization and *Kulturkampf*. Those in the Congress Kingdom were subject to impressment into the Tsarist army and to the progressive Russification of schools, local government, and courts. In Galicia, Polish peasants were the victims of an Austrian alliance with big landowners. The increasingly oppressive schemes of St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna tended to cancel out more positive measures and actually accelerated the creation of a homogeneous Polish political culture. Improvements in economic well-being and the spread of education worked in the same direction by facilitating the dissemination of national ideals and by enlarging the numbers who accepted them.

However, before the peasantry could be fully integrated into the Polish nation, the presence of a growing industrial proletariat and its national consciousness came into full play. The class of urban workers developed initially from a small nucleus which consisted of a few factory laborers, masters and journeymen of bankrupt craftshops, noblemen who had lost their possessions or legal status, and peasants who had abandoned their villages in search of a better life. This stratum increased rapidly in size. In the Congress Kingdom alone, it grew from 78,000 in 1864 to about 300,000 in 1900 (Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland*, p. 11).

The wide diversity of socioeconomic backgrounds of these workers at first made the achievement of a uniform posture very unlikely, and attitudes toward the national question differed significantly among various subgroups. Thus, the transformation of this loose mass into a more homogeneous group developed in stages. At first, the bond was stimulated by the awareness of common interests at the place of employment. However, the expansion of these interests was facilitated by the mobility of workers in search of jobs within and between all three partitions. The fact that employers were most often of non-Polish stock tinged the newly acquired proletarian solidarity with strong nationalistic coloration. Finally, but not least important, the leadership activities of a numerically small, but highly patriotic group of noblemen who had joined the proletariat also greatly contributed to the growth of a national consciousness among the workers. Gradually the feelings of identity expanded to the borders of each partition and then beyond them to encompass the entire historical nation. The extent of these developments was indicated by the voluntary participation of many workers from all social strata in the uprising of 1863.

IT WOULD, of course, be both pleasant and convenient to have reliable measures by which we could trace the process of national integration of peasants and workers and date the stages of this evolution. Unfortunately, such measures have not as yet been established, and scholarly deductions, especially in regard to the earlier stages, are mostly hypothetical. However, it is generally accepted that a common sense of national identity was achieved between 1864 and 1918. During these years peasant and worker groups played an increasingly important role in national political life, and ever greater numbers from among their ranks assumed leadership positions. The outlooks of both peasants and workers and the characteristic features of their respective subcultures became gradually accepted as part and parcel of the Polish national culture. The feudal idea of a "nation of gentry" became a historical relic.

At the same time, and linked to the growth of national consciousness, internal differences and tensions multiplied and manifested themselves within Polish society. These conflicts resulted from the stimulation of new social forces and the growing recognition of socioeconomic interests and aspirations on the part of various social groups. Perhaps the most significant conflict lay between the peasantry and the landed gentry. Emancipation, while granting to the peasants freedom and the rights of ownership, did not in any way elevate them to an equal economic and political position with the landlords; nor did it appease

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the peasants' hunger for land. The accretion of new controversies, especially those arising from a persisting residue of the corvée system in the form of easements,[2] deepened a sense of wrong among peasants and activated further their class awareness.

While politicization of the peasantry was mainly the result of direct economic conflicts, the growth of class consciousness among Polish workers was advanced by two factors. First, large-scale industry, which employed a considerable number of workers, was expanding, producing at the same time social conditions and consequent grievances similar to those in Western Europe. Second, Marxist theories spawned in Russia began to penetrate Poland. Forces responding to both social ills and Marxist political ideas emerged in the Russian sector first, where industry was growing faster than in other parts of the country and where the lot of workers was worse than conditions in the Prussian and Austrian partitions. No less important was the influence of young Polish students who, while enrolled at Russian universities, became familiar with socialist doctrines and who propagated them among their compatriots upon their return to the Congress Kingdom.

In the concrete Polish situation, the phenomenon of a concurrent and interdependent development of two forms of politicization, one of a national and the other of a class nature, created a specific and difficult dilemma. On the one hand, the fight for independence required mobilization of all social groups by whatever means. Yet the activation of social forces also posed a threat to the equally necessary unity and solidarity of the nation. As might be expected, this dilemma caused significant discord and contributed further to the political differentiation of Polish society. Fortunately, it also provided an additional impetus for public involvement in politics and for a growth in political activity.

The dynamics of political mobilization and its organizational manifestations differed among the three regions of the partitioned country. The most diversified situation arose in Galicia, where the political system was relatively more liberal and thus presented the Poles with a comparatively weaker need for national solidarity. In the Prussian partition, political differentiation was also well advanced, although the policy of Germanization imposed on all groups the requirement of apparent uniformity in a common defense. In the Congress Kingdom, the Russian government severely limited political activities. Only after 1905 were restraints somewhat relaxed, and then trends followed patterns established in the other partitions.

AMONG SEVERAL political movements that emerged at the close of the 19th century, three were of primary importance: socialism, nationalism, and populism. Although at this time these movements did not enjoy mass followings and their political profiles were not clearly cast, they nonetheless were destined to play a dominant role in the history of Poland in the 20th century.

As might be expected, all three movements had to face issues arising from the twin stimuli of national and class consciousness. It was, however, in the socialist camp that the competing desires for social justice and national liberation caused the greatest turmoil. Attempts to incorporate both ideas into a single program of action proved futile, and the movement was permanently split into two rival groups. The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) continued efforts to unite socialism and patriotism. The Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKP&L), organized in 1900, rejected such fusion in favor of social revolution and proletarian internationalism. The SDKP&L later gave birth to the Communist Party of Poland.

Although the populist movement was less affected by the controversy, it too was divided, in 1913, into leftist and rightist groups (PSL-Lewica and PSL-Piast). The nationalist movement, stressing the primacy of national over class interests, promoted concepts of national solidarity and concentrated on the strengthening of national consciousness among peasants and workers.

Polish independence, regained in 1918, accelerated the spread and strengthening of both types of awareness and, ipso facto, contributed to the intensification of mass political involvement. National consciousness and patriotism became traits shared by all Poles, regardless of their social origin, age, or domicile. The sense of joint experience and common destiny produced enthusiasm and devotion which in spite of tremendous odds made possible the complete unification of the state, the creation of uniform administrative and educational systems, the building of an economic infrastructure, and many other achievements that would have been unthinkable without the ardent involvement of thousands of individuals.

The reestablishment of the Polish state, however, also served to

[2]In particular, much conflict arose from peasants' claims to rights of utilizing pastures and forests that belonged to landowners.

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stimulate class-oriented aspirations and demands for social justice. The devastations of World War I, many of whose battles were fought on Polish soil, had resulted in widespread poverty and had accentuated class differences and feelings of injustice. Revolutionary transformations in Russia merely added fuel to the latent militancy of the masses and sharpened class conflicts. Demands for radical agrarian reform and a comprehensive social security system, voiced by the parties of the Left, enjoyed wide popular support. The growing arbitrariness of the post-1926 governments, combined with the effects of the world depression that hit Poland in the 1930's, led to increasing unrest among workers and peasants and to strikes and mass demonstrations.

Still, the highly developed level of class awareness did not have an adverse effect on the intensity of the national consciousness of Polish peasants and workers. Certainly, the defiant posture which the entire nation adopted in the face of Nazi aggression in September 1939 proved this beyond any doubt. During the long and brutish years of double occupation, first by German and then by Soviet troops, the great majority of peasants and workers acted in the same spirit of patriotism and selfless sacrifice as did the rest of the Polish people.

The total transformation of Poland's socioeconomic structure in the years following World War II did not alter the determined patriotism of the nationally conscious Polish people. Indeed, it seems that the patriotic instincts of Poles have been ever more solidified by the Soviet domination of their country and by the manifested devotion to Moscow on the part of their own Communist rulers. Not surprisingly, the Polish Communists' propaganda—whatever its political justification—often uses (and abuses) patriotic slogans and nationalistic sentiments as a means of handling domestic problems. Such a strategy obviously exposes Polish nationalism to new and unforeseen challenges.

EVEN AGAINST THE background we have sketched, uniform review and evaluation of the four books treated here is made difficult by their topical differences, varied designs and approaches, and noticeable disparities in depth of perception and breadth of scope. Yet, the books do have one thing in common, for each illustrates, although with varying acuity, the political behavior of the Poles and, in particular, the way in which our two major strata of Polish society, the peasants and workers, gradually became involved in Polish national politics.

At the same time, it is to be regretted that the present reviewer was not able to include a work on the Polish nationalist movement, without whose coverage a story of the growth of Polish political culture remains dismally incomplete. In spite of its obvious importance, this topic has not yet received proper attention from English-speaking writers, with the result that a serious and balanced study of Polish nationalism still needs to be written.

Fortunately, Dziewanowski in his *Poland in the 20th Century* has provided a useful survey, however short, of each of the socialist, nationalist, and populist movements. Although the brevity of the text did not permit an in-depth analysis and forced the author to use many shortcuts and simplifications, the end product is an informative and highly readable book. Dziewanowski's task was not easy, for he had to trace a historical evolution over a considerable period of time and through changing geopolitical circumstances. Without resorting to imaginary concepts and artificial constructions, the author succeeded in achieving a lucidity which might be envied and imitated by other historians.

Having stressed the admirable merits of the tract, however, one must also note the presence of occasional errors, the omission of several important events and personalities, and the author's predilection for summarizing distinct historical periods in inconsistent, and even noncomparable, fashion. Undoubtedly, many of these shortcomings clearly resulted from the fact that the book was intended for a general public composed of self-taught and amateur historians as well as ordinary devourers of books. Nevertheless, this type of presentation does make a positive contribution to the advance of knowledge to the extent it arouses the readers' curiosity and teaches them to look at the past not exclusively through their own personal experiences.

The other volume by Dziewanowski relates better to the main theme of this review. The book is devoted entirely to the history of the Communist Party of Poland, i.e., to that wing of the socialist movement which tried to politicize Polish workers on the basis of internationalism, and which attempted to rouse the masses not in the name of national independence but by the call for proletarian revolution. Since this edition, except for the final chapters dealing with the first four years of Edward Gierek's leadership, is basically the same text as that published in 1959, it is probably not worthwhile to repeat here the extensive praise and some criticism which the study has received over the years.

It is, however, appropriate to

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stress once again that the author emphasizes especially the "original sin" of the SDKP&L leaders, who placed class interests over national ones. This attitude influenced greatly the subsequent posture of the Communist Party of Poland, which, with some tactical adjustments, insisted that the "historical *mission" of the Polish proletariat* was to be but a bridge between the victorious revolution in Russia and the anticipated revolution in Germany. The Communists proved unable to attract the masses to a program which disregarded the strength of national consciousness and overlooked the inducement of nationalistic aspirations.

Although socioeconomic conditions in the 1930's were more propitious for the acceptance of radical ideas, it can be confidently argued that, without the interruption of World War II and the Soviet domination of Poland which followed, the Communist Party could not have assumed control over the country and the political socialization process. Yet even having become the political master of Poland, the Communist Party still appears to have achieved only a limited success in establishing itself as the dominant focus of political identification. Political apathy, even if manifested only by a sizable minority of the people, must be a disturbing phenomenon in the eyes of the Communist leaders, especially given their need to mobilize the masses in order to overcome difficulties in the economic sphere.

But mere verbiage centered on national legacy and appeals to the nationalistic sentiments of the populace seem not to be enough. The true cause of evidently widespread popular indifference to politics probably lies in the perpetuation of old authoritarian tendencies which continue to survive leadership changes and administrative reforms. Piekalkiewicz, although his coverage does not extend to the recent innovations in local administration, gives ample evidence of the fact that it is not enough to simply allow more people to share in exercising the symbols of authority. Rather, active political participation and support seem to require not only the involvement of the masses in the political process, but also the genuine influence of ordinary citizens on decision-makers.

Although highly unlikely for fairly obvious reasons, the best way to politically mobilize the masses doubtless would be to permit the revival of an authentic populist movement. Farmers still comprise the most numerous segment of the Polish population, and the tradition of independent peasant parties is still strong among them, even if the size of the existing United Peasant Party (ZSL) is not impressive and its members care little for politics. Rather, it would seem to be the case that, as Olga Narkiewicz asserts:

> *Given the chance to express their real opinions, the ZSL members would, it is quite obvious, become as interested in politics as their fathers and grandfathers had been before them.* (p. 268)

While agreeing with this statement, however, one regrets that Narkiewicz has not done justice to the "forefathers' deeds." Neglected are many important figures of the populist movement as well as several important areas of activity such as programs and actions aimed at the social and cultural emancipation of the peasants. Moreover, the orientation of the peasant parties toward national values, a very essential element in the development of these organizations, also seems to have escaped the author's attention.

IN SUM, then, these four books warrant special attention, for the English-speaking reader usually has rather few opportunities to examine new and serious publications about Poland. The Polish past generally attracts the curiosity of but few historians, while most contemporary information coming from the shores of the Vistula River has been occasioned only by those political crises suggesting a lack of domestic order and stability. Needless to say, it is hoped that the problems of Poland, both past and present, will be treated more often and in more sustained fashion in the future.

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Peking and Asia

By Daniel Tretiak

A. DOAK BARNETT. *China and the Major Powers in East Asia.* Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1977.

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO. *Asia and the Road Ahead: Issues for the Major Powers,* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1975.

M.I. SLADKOVSKY. *China and Japan.* Ed. and tr. by Robert F. Price. Gulf Breeze, FL, Academic International Press, 1975.

JAE KYU PARK and SUNGJOO HAN, Eds. *East Asia and the Major Powers: From Confrontation to Accommodation.* Seoul, Kyung Nam University, 1975.

CHÜN-TU HSÜEH, Ed. *Dimensions of China's Foreign Relations.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1977.

CHINA in the post-Mao era has pursued a course that suggests its continued movement toward assumption of full membership in the international political system. The books under review here provide insight into this trend, particularly in the context of East Asia.

As for the books themselves, they are of three quite different types. First, there are two major analyses of the role of China—and of other powers—in East Asian international affairs, written by leading American experts on Asia, A. Doak Barnett and Robert A.Scalapino. Second, we have an interesting, if rather polemical, study of China and Japan by a Soviet Asianist, M.I. Sladkovsky. Finally, there are two collections of essays: one edited by two Korean scholars and dealing with issues of confrontation and accommodation in East Asia and especially Korea; the other a volume of essays collected by Chün-tu Hsüeh expressly to plug holes in the existing scholarly literature on Chinese foreign policy.

Of these, the Barnett book is particularly valuable. Well-written and carefully researched, this volume fills a major need in the field of Chinese foreign policy studies: whereas Barnett's earlier work *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy*[1] summarized major developments in China's policies toward Asia from 1949 to 1960, the current study brings us virtually up to date. The author's analysis rests on a coherent, explicit, and highly useful theoretical underpinning: he argues that China is deeply concerned with conducting balance-of-power politics, although its leaders do not say as much. At the same time, Barnett appreciates the subtle relationships that obtain and will probably continue to obtain between the major powers and the smaller—although not unimportant—Asian states. Moreover, some of Barnett's concrete predictions about Chinese foreign policy have already been at least partially fulfilled in the months since the book went to press.

Barnett's discussion of changes in China's behavior and attitudes toward the other three major actors in East Asia—the USSR, the US, and Japan—clearly reflects changes over time in his own perceptions of China as an actor in the Asian state system. Whereas in 1960 Barnett referred to "Communist China" and subtitled his book "Challenge to American Policy," now his subject is simply "China." In 1960, Barnett described China as "one of the most dynamic, disrupting and disturbing influences on the world scene . . . . a strong, unified and totalitarian nation, allied with the Soviet Union, intensely hostile to the United States, and posing a serious threat to the future of Asia" (*Communist China and Asia*" p. 1). Today, no cold war descriptions of this sort obtain. Barnett sees Peking as motivated by more ordinary "military and strategic considerations," and maintains that "under Mao Tse-tung, China pursued very distinctive balance of power strat-

1. New York, NY, Harper and Brothers, 1960.

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egies" in its foreign policy (*China and the Major Powers,* p. 1).

In contrast to the Barnett book, with its focus on China and Peking's interactions with the USSR, Japan, and the United States, Robert Scalapino's study is more broadly focused. It looks at the total Asian picture—including both South and East Asia. As a consequence of its multilateral approach, the work seems somewhat diffuse—at least from the viewpoint of a China specialist. More important for our purposes here, however, is the fact that Scalapino seems to detect a desire on the part of major actors in East Asia to maintain "equidistance"—a term that seems to be virtually synonymous with "balance of power."

The Sladkovsky volume is much narrower in scope than either of the first two books. This 1971 study looks at developments in China and Japan, mainly since the mid-19th century but particularly since World War II. Sladkovsky's treatment of Chinese foreign policy is hackneyed and unoriginal and suffers from a clear anti-Mao, anti-China bias. The book itself is a clear reflection of the chasm that divides the Chinese and Russians. Sladkovsky is quite critical of the PRC's—particularly Mao's—leadership from 1958 on and would probably only wistfully accept Barnett's view that in 1960 China was "allied" with the Soviet Union.

For the generalist interested in Chinese foreign policy, the Hsüeh volume is rather disconnected (indeed, the editor made no claims that it was supposed to "hang together"). For the specialist, however, there are a number of illuminating essays on specific aspects of Chinese policy, including the chapters "Soviet-American Rivalry in Manchuria and the Cold War" by Steven I. Levine, "Defense of Diplomatic Functions and Ideals During the Cultural Revolution: The Nepal Case" by Roger L. Dial, and "The Palestinians in China's Foreign Policy" by Yitzhak Shichor.

The Park and Han volume, too, contains a number of essays that are not closely linked, and there is a definite Korean focus. Yet the contributors touch many important bases not only with regard to Korea but also concerning the major powers' behavior in East Asia. As for Korea, the volume seems basically correct in predicting a protracted period of "no war, no peace"—a state of affairs the major powers apparently wish to maintain because they have enough problems on their plate and do not need a Korean crisis. (Public rhetoric aside, the "two Koreas" likewise seem to have pretty well decided on rational grounds that conflict should continue to be avoided.[2])

THE BALANCE-OF-POWER theme stressed by Barnett and Scalapino is important. Indeed, the reviewer has found such an approach useful in attempting to establish a theoretical framework for explaining a good deal of post-1949 Chinese foreign policy.[3] However, the concept should be used with care, for it does not apply easily or simply in the Chinese case.

The classic balance-of-power framework was built on systemic and personal ties embedded within a particular historical context that evolved during and after the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. Operationalization of the balance of power was carried out by sovereigns and their foreign affairs specialists (Klemens von Metternich, Charles de Talleyrand, et al.) *all of whom, knew each other* and understood the need for political bargaining in order to establish a post-Napoleonic Europe. Meeting in an antiwar climate not long after Napoleon's defeat, the actors *wanted* to set up a European state system that would prevent any single actor from emerging as a dominant power in the way Napoleon's France had. To preserve the system, its members subsequently entered into *shifting* alliances of one form or another to curb an actor moving toward domination. While diplomacy constituted the preferred mode of dealing with such situations, resort to conflict was not eschewed if required to maintain the balance.

To what extent does this "operational code" of the classical balance-of-power system help explain *China's* foreign policy in *East Asia*? As the situation in East Asia currently stands, crucial ingredients are missing: the leaders of the four powers involved have not enunciated a commitment to a balance of power among them. For the most part, also, personal ties such as those linking Europeans after the Napoleonic Wars have still not developed in Asia of the 1970's. (They *were* extant when Chou En-lai and Henry Kissinger negotiated, for example, and they may obtain when the US and Japan negotiate.)

Despite these important differences, which Barnett does not

2. North Korea's economy is sagging, and the succession issue is very serious. South Korea's economy is booming, but the "Koreagate" issue (involving alleged attempts by Seoul to purchase influence in the US Congress) has tarnished the image of the Park Chung-hee regime both domestically and internationally. Thus, for both Koreas the yearned-for goal of unification remains only a far-off possibility.

3. See Daniel Tretiak, "Toward a Theoretical Explanation of Chinese Foreign Policy, 1949-77," *Proceedings of the Fifth Leverhulme Conference, 1977,* Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, forthcoming.

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explore, an informal balance-of-power framework does seem to have existed in the 1970's, as he suggests. This reviewer would go a step further than Barnett does and suggest that China has played balance-of-power politics with its major adversaries ever since 1949. To be sure, Chinese leaders have not talked about their activities in these terms; moreover, their efforts to operate in such a fashion have met with varying degrees of success. Nevertheless, they have in practice functioned in the style of a classical European "balancer."

One wonders, of course, how the passing of the Mao era may affect China's behavior in the international arena. Thus far, little has changed in this respect. True, Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua has been removed from office for allegedly selling out to the Gang of Four. However, the foreign affairs apparatus itself has remained basically intact,[4] and, more important, the main policy lines worked out in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution have been retained and fleshed out. These include increased cooperation with Western Europe and Japan, intensified interaction with noncommunist Asian states, and a probing to see if the American relationship can be improved. As of autumn 1978, no change in the strictly bilateral political aspect of US-China relations seemed in the offing, although the May 1978 trip of US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to Peking showed that there was always the possibility of movement in this regard. In any case, trade and scientific exchange between the two countries appear to be developing almost autonomously and rapidly. Sino-Soviet relations by and large remain frozen, but the situation should not be considered completely static, as border negotiations begun in April 1978 show. Mao and Chou never closed off the Soviet option; they simply wanted it opened up on their own terms. The current leadership—for the moment—is preserving this position, but nothing is really immutable in international affairs. A diminution of Sino-Soviet tensions should not be entirely ruled out, notwithstanding daily rhetorical exchanges between Peking and Moscow.

THE PERSISTENCE of tradition in Chinese foreign policy is an important theme running implicitly—and at certain points, explicitly—through these books. But precisely what tradition from China's long history is it that persists? Were Asian states in the premodern era really vassals of China, subject to its suzerainty—or were matters far more complicated?

A number of studies in recent years have indicated that the traditional relationships between China and other Asian states were very complex and that the traditional view of these as simple lord-vassal relationships was largely a fiction.[5] For example, while the very strong and effective K'ang-hsi emperor (1661–1722) in the early Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty managed to achieve harmonious ties with certain Asian states on a lord-vassal basis, China's relations with a number of entities even then were not uniformly smooth.

By the same token, attempts to distill a "traditional" concept and then to apply that concept to China's relations with the major powers in the late 20th century does violence to the contemporary environment as well as to the historical tradition. Today, China's situation has changed dramatically since the early Ch'ing times when the Chinese empire faced no serious challenge from *any* major power—Asian or European. Although some foreign observers and visitors to China feel the "Middle Kingdom" complex still thrives in Peking—and many Chinese may indeed still harbor this ethnocentric notion—most of China's leaders seem to recognize that they face a genuinely different world. While China itself is a stronger power (which may give Chinese leaders some consolation), the USSR and the US can directly check its initiatives even in Asia, and political tremors in Vietnam, the Korean peninsula, or Cambodia can also trouble Peking.

Militarily, China still cannot measure up to its major adversaries, nor is there much likelihood that it will be able to do so even by, say, 1985. Although it can improve its state of military preparedness and the quality of its weaponry, the PRC is not in a position to challenge the USSR or the US in military terms or to exert influence on other powers in Asia through armed might alone. It faces considerable military power in Korea and Vietnam, and even Japan could cause China some military damage, although the costs to Tokyo would probably be high. The specter of China's *potential* military power

4. If Ch'iao did, indeed, sell out, his actions may have helped save the ministry itself. As the essay by Roger Dial in the Hsüeh book underscores, during the Cultural Revolution then Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi stubbornly resisted attacks by the Red Guards, but his stance, however courageous, nearly caused the ruin of the ministry.

5. See, for example, John K. Fairbank, Ed., *The Chinese World Order,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1968.

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is not to be dismissed lightly, but for the present it is through diplomatic, economic, and cultural means that the PRC can most effectively enhance its power in Asia.

IF CHINA is unable to dominate events in Asia, it must seek to work out its relations with the other powers on a basis of mutuality and equality. With regard to Peking's relations with Washington, the Vietnam war may have had the unanticipated effect of setting the boundaries of Sino-American hostility and thereby of providing a framework for eventual reconciliation. Thus, as the Cultural Revolution quieted down in China (around 1969) and the Americans slowly began to realize they could not win the war in Indochina, Peking and Washington began to realize that each was not the other's major enemy.[6] Moscow now filled that role.

As China and the US have approached each other in the 1970's, it has been on a more equal footing than in the past. The US may be a modern, powerful military-economic-political entity, but China has produced its own major achievements since 1949 and is no longer a despised weakling, or an exaggerated enemy. Moreover, the PRC now participates actively in the international community.

Although there are aspects of equality in the US-China relationship, the two countries have not yet begun to deal with each other as true equals. US reluctance to grant full diplomatic recognition to China frustrates the Chinese and thereby confirms Chinese convictions that the US behaves like a superpower. China and no few Chinese still act as though China was the center of the universe. Most Chinese officials presumably know that this is not the case, but the news has not filtered down to all the masses. A condescension toward Westerners and a messianic belief that the Chinese system is superior still manifests itself from time to time in Chinese dealings with foreigners—even though most foreigners are no longer willing to accept such attitudes easily.

Can these two great Pacific powers conduct their relations in a spirit of equality for the first time since they began dealing with each other? On the record of the 1970's, there is a slim possibility that this question can be answered in the affirmative.

But gnawing doubts persist about how easy the historical pattern of the relationship will be to change. The cultures, the political beliefs and behavior, and the traditions and patterns of interaction of the two states are so different that achievement of genuine equality will require great efforts on both sides. National leaderships will have to become better informed about and more empathetic toward each other. In this process, each will need to educate its own public but at the same time be open to influence by people in its system who have dealt with foreigners. Such mutually reinforcing conditions will not be realized easily.

QUESTIONS of Sino-American relations, of course, are tied to the larger global context. As noted above, the PRC has become an increasingly active member of the international system. It participates in international organizations, attends international conferences, conducts cultural and scientific exchanges, and has been expanding its tourist facilities almost daily since early 1978. At no other time since 1949 have China's relations with most of the noncommunist world been as wide-ranging and generally smooth as they are now. The PRC is often perceived to be behaving as a force for stability—particularly but not exclusively in Asia, where it has dealt with existing governments, avoided overly close association with forces seeking revolutionary change, and promoted a climate suitable for politics and business as usual (whether in Hong Kong-Macao or in noncommunist Southeast Asia). Domestically, China has gotten rid of its political "crazies" (the Gang of Four); boasts a new national leader, Hua Kuo-feng, who looks like the symbol of quiet confidence and rectitude, even though domestic political infighting may be continuing; and is settling down to hard and creative work. In sum, China of the post-Mao era would seem to fit in rather nicely with the Western liberal bourgeois notion of what any civilized state ought to do and be.

But are China watchers deceiving themselves? Is China deceiving them or even itself? As Harold Isaacs argued in his classic examination of Americans' changing perceptions of China, *Scratches on Our Minds*,[7] outside impressions of China have throughout history tended to oversimplify matters, to ignore China's complexity, its enormous population and land mass, and the dramatic problems of change and develop-

6. King C. Chen's essay, "China's Response to the United States: From Vietnam to Rapprochement," in the Hsüeh volume looks at how the US and China may have been forced to deal with the Vietnam issue to move their rapprochement along. What this reviewer would suggest is that if we look back to an earlier period, 1966-68, it may emerge that functional tension between China and the US actually laid the foundation for functional interaction over time.

7. New York, NY, The John Day Co., 1958.

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ment that have confronted it. Indeed, the neat labels that foreigners have applied to China have often reflected the viewer's preconceptions, reinforced by *selected* aspects of Chinese behavior. Outsiders' perceptions of China may even today not be free of such problems. For example, the negative Soviet evaluation of China under Mao—typified by the Sladkovsky book—does not seem to have changed markedly since the Chairman's death. The Scalapino volume is also tough on China, apparently because the author would have the US commit itself to the American-Japanese relationship, as more valuable than US-China ties. The Barnett book epitomizes the thinking of still another school—American Sinophiles of various political persuasions, who welcome what they see as evidence that China has calmed down and is playing by the rules of the current international state system.

While this reviewer tends to accept this last assessment and could not be happier if it remained valid for a long time to come, China has a way of springing surprises on us. To be sure, its current international behavior has conformed pretty well to the pattern suggested by Barnett in 1977. But, are China's days of domestic agonizing over? Is the international system really prepared to accept China as a full member of the system, and is China prepared to be such a member? Sinophiles pleased with the current state of affairs should flavor their optimism with a dash of caution or skepticism—looking backward just once in a while at the record of the past 200 years even as they look with hope to the future.

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